
































\X 






















































































































































. 
















































































































* <tf 



.sjV ^ 


















# o ' <& 



I? 



o- 






-S ^ 



V v 



-o- 



:%** 









O 






* 



^ $ 

o 
Q 






^ : 



^d< 






%o^ 






■ ^ 



-. 


















C 



^ 









k V ^ 



> •, ■» ,, '■V^ 









- -A. 












* 









\> 



c > 






W 









^ 


















V 












BRITISH INTERESTS 

AND 

ACTIVITIES IN TEXAS 

1838-1846 



A n 




THE ALBERT SHAW LECTURES ON 
DIPLOMATIC HISTORY 

By the liberality of Albert Shaw, Ph.D., of New 
York City, the Johns Hopkins University has been 
enabled to provide an annual course of lectures on Dip- 
lomatic History. The courses are included in the reg- 
ular work of the Department of History and are pub- 
lished under the direction of Professor John Martin 
Vincent. 



THE ALBERT SHAW LECTURES ON 
DIPLOMATIC HISTORY, 1909 



BRITISH INTERESTS 



AND 



ACTIVITIES IN TEXAS 

1838-1846 



By EPHRAIM DOUGLASS ADAMS, Ph.D. 

Professor of History in Leland Stanford Jr. University 



BALTIMORE 

The Johns Hopkins Press 

1910 






Copyright, 1910 
By The Johns Hopkins Press 



Press of 

The new Era printins Company 

Lancaster. Pa 






€ r << A 161774 



^rre^ 



CONTENTS. /£ 

Pagb 

Preface vi 

CHAPTER I. 
First Indications of British Interest 13 

CHAPTER II. 
The Negotiations of Treat and Hamilton. ... 36 

CHAPTER III. 

1 841. British Recognition Postponed. Ken- 
nedy's Mission to Texas 61 

CHAPTER IV. 

1842, January to June. The Montezuma 
and the Guadeloupe 79 

CHAPTER V. 

1842, July to December. First British Of- 
fer of Mediation. Elliot in Texas .... 97 

CHAPTER VI. 

1843, The Robinson Armistice and the Lon- 
don Abolition Meeting 123 

CHAPTER VII. 

1844, January to June. The Calhoun-Pak- 
enham Correspondence. Aberdeen's Plan 

to Prevent Annexation 155 

v 



VI CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER VIII. 

Page 

Aberdeen's Withdrawal from Joint Action 

with France 176 

CHAPTER IX. 

1845. Elliot's Mission to Mexico 197 

CHAPTER X. 

1846. Texas Annexed. Conclusion 219 

CHAPTER XI. 

Addendum. English Interest in the Annex- 
ation of California 234 



PREFACE. 



The material for the lectures included in this volume 
was gathered by research in the Public Record Office 
in London during the winter of 1 907-1 908. That 
time was spent in an examination of documents and 
correspondence connected with English-American re- 
lations from 1815 to 1855, after which date they are 
inaccessible. Such papers are chiefly in the foreign 
office correspondence and, while they throw much 
light on many controverted points in history, they are 
nowhere more illuminating than in the matter of the 
British attitude toward the American annexation of 
Texas. Hence the invitation of the Department of 
History of the Johns Hopkins University to deliver the 
Albert Shaw Lectures in Diplomatic History in May, 
1909, seemed to be most opportune and I gladly pre- 
sented there the result of my work relating to Texas. 
This presentation is purely technical, and, while seek- 
ing to meet doubtful points, it depends upon docu- 
mentary substantiation only. It might be indefinitely 
elaborated by citations from secondary authorities, 
or greatly bettered by a more complete portrayal of 
contemporary conditions. The purpose of the lectures 
forbade this. The California chapter, previously 
printed in the American Historical Review, is added 
because of its intimate connection with the Texan 
question. 

Many friends have greatly aided me by suggestion 
and advice in the general field of English-American 



Vlll PREFACE. 

relations, but to these my thanks have been previously 
expressed and need not be intruded in this preface. 
Three there are, however, to whom so much of the 
profit of the work in England is due that they must 
again submit to the expression of my gratitude. The 
kindly services and interest of the Honorable White- 
law Reid will always be remembered; Dr. J. Holland 
Rose saved me weeks of wearisome delay in getting 
access to needed documents by the care with which 
he guided my preliminary requests through the in- 
tricacies of official formality; and Mr. Hubert Hall 
of the Public Record Office extended, as always, that 
generous and scholarly aid which American students 
of history know so well. To these my thanks are 
again especially expressed. 

Ephraim Douglass Adams. 

Stanford University, California, 
February I, 1910. 



CHAPTER I. 
First Indications of British Interest. 

Between the years 1840 and 1846 the question of 
the extent of British interests in Texas and of British 
activities in relation to the independence of that State 
attracted much attention throughout the United States. 
The belief was prevalent that Great Britain was di- 
rectly interfering in the affairs of Mexico and Texas 
for the purpose of preventing the annexation of Texas 
to the United States, of securing abolition within the 
State of Texas itself, and of thereby exercising an in- 
fluence tending to the abolition of slavery within the 
United States. That this belief in British intent and 
proposed interference existed there can be no doubt, 
and, admitting its existence, neither is there doubt of 
its influence and importance in shaping American na- 
tional policy. By contemporary politicians, and partic- 
ularly by those from the South, the idea that Great 
Britain was planning to intervene was urged with not- 
able effect in the closing year of Tyler's administration, 
and it played an important part in the campaign that 
resulted in the election of Polk. The use made by 
Calhoun of what is known as the Pakenham-Calhoun 
correspondence, which relates the policy of Aberdeen, 
is of course well known, and at the time there was little 
question, save in extreme abolition circles, that the alle- 
gations of Calhoun had some foundation in fact. 

Later historical judgment, however, has generally 
tended to deny the truth of contemporary opinion in 
2 13 



14 FIRST INDICATIONS OF BRITISH INTEREST. 

this matter. Thus, Schouler regards Tyler and Cal- 
houn as lacking in candor in attributing to Great 
Britain abolition designs upon Texas. Von Hoist, 
who until recently had made the most extended exam- 
ination of the whole question, similarly asserts the in- 
sincerity of Calhoun, though acknowledging the natural 
and logical grounds of any suspicion of Great Britain. 
H. H. Bancroft goes beyond these two writers in deny- 
ing that there was in the mind of the advisers of 
Great Britain any purpose whatever to secure aboli- 
tion in Texas. The most recent work treating of 
American diplomacy under the administrations of Ty- 
ler and Polk, written by Professor Reeves, and form- 
ing one of the series of Albert Shaw Lectures, asserts 
that Aberdeen was throughout this period the true 
friend of the United States. This last statement does 
not necessarily deny a policy of interference in Texas 
upon the part of Aberdeen, but it clearly leaves the 
inference that Aberdeen was accused upon insufficient 
grounds. 

It is the purpose of the present work to offer the 
results of a recent study of British interests and activ- 
ities in relation to Texas within the period from 1838 
to 1846. The materials for this were largely found 
in the diplomatic correspondence between British for- 
eign ministers and their agents in Mexico, Texas, and 
the United States ; in the recorded interviews with 
the representatives of these states in London; and 
in the private letters of many interested persons, 
addressed to the foreign office. All of this material 
is preserved at the Public Record Office in London, 
and with it, also, the complete records of the British 
consulates in Texas up to the annexation of that Re- 
public by the United States. 



FIRST INDICATIONS OF BRITISH INTEREST. 15 

It is not the intention to present a general picture of 
British diplomacy in this period, or even to explain 
British interests in Mexico where those interests do 
not have a direct bearing upon what was attempted 
in Texas or in regard to that State. Nor is it in- 
tended to dwell upon, or to explain, the objects and 
diplomacy of Texas aside from their relation to Brit- 
ish activities. The center of interest in this study is 
emphatically in the objects, activities, and accomplish- 
ments of the British goverment and its agents. 
Naturally the policy and acts of the United States in 
relation to Texas must be kept clearly in mind through- 
out, for an understanding of British action can be 
secured only by complete knowledge of the acts and 
efforts of the United States within the same period 
and by constant reference to them. It is fortunate that 
such matter was presented in a most scholarly and au- 
thoritative manner in 1906 by Mr. Reeves, and in at- 
tempting to follow the explanations here given of Brit- 
ish activities his volume will be invaluable. 

In tracing the history of British interest in Texas, 
it is at once to be noted that the inception of that in- 
terest was connected with the traditional British policy 
of supporting Mexico as a barrier against the United 
States. This policy had the support of Canning as 
early as_i825, and had been steadily continued by Brit- 
ish foreign ministers after his time. Meanwhile, Brit- 
ish commercial interests in Mexico were greatly ex- 
tended, and Mexican trade had constantly increased. 
A large part of the Mexican debt was held by British 
bondholders. When, therefore, Texas declared her in- 
dependence, on March 2, 1836, it was only natural that 
the British government should hope for a speedy re- 



1 6 FIRST INDICATIONS OF BRITISH INTEREST. 

conquest of the revolted province. This did not mean, 
however, that any active steps looking toward such 
a reconquest were taken by Palmerston, who was then 
foreign secretary, or that any such policy was publicly 
urged upon the English government. It was, in fact, 
quite generally recognized that the Mexican govern- 
ment had not given such evidence of strength as to 
warrant a positive belief in its permanence and sta- 
bility. Still, the interest of Great Britain seemed un- 
questionably to lie upon the side of Mexico rather than 
upon the side of Texas. It was well understood in 
England that Texas would soon attempt to secure from 
other states a recognition of her independence, and 
before any such overture had been made to Great Bri- 
tain the attention of the House of Commons was called 
to the situation in Texas by some of the avowed 
friends of Mexico. On June 5, 1836, Mr. Barlow 
Hoy brought up the question of the existence of slav- 
ery and the slave-trade in Texas, with a view to dis- 
covering whether or not the government had any 
purpose of interfering to check these evils. 1 Palmers- 
ton replied that Texas was in a state of revolt, thus 
implying that for the present Great Britain could make 
no suggestions. Two months later, on August 5, Hoy 
brought the matter more directly before the Commons 
by introducing a motion instructing the government to 
take such measures as might be necessary to secure 
the fulfillment of existing treaties with Mexico " and 
prevent the establishment of slavery and traffic in 
slaves in the province of Texas." 2 In a speech sup- 
porting this motion Hoy emphasized as the essential 

1 Hansard, 3d Ser., XXXIV, 1107. 

2 Hansard, 3d Ser., XXXV, 928-942. 



FIRST INDICATIONS OF BRITISH INTEREST. 17 

interests of Great Britain in Mexico, first, the large 
amount of British money invested in Mexican trade; 
second, the danger of the annexation of Texas by the 
United States, in which case England must consider 
" what vast commercial advantages the latter would 
gain over this country ; " and third, the probability that 
slavery would be permanently established in Texas. 
He asserted that it was wrong for Great Britain to 
" allow slavery to take deep root in situations with re- 
spect to which this country, had both the power and 
right to interfere in suppressing it." He concluded 
by urging Palmerston to send a naval force to aid 
Mexico in recovering control of the province of Texas. 
Other speakers urged that action was necessary in 
order to defend the commercial interests of Great 
Britain, and that England could not " allow the United 
States to pursue a system of aggrandizement." 

The reply of Palmerston indicated that no serious 
attention had been aroused by Hoy's motion, for it 
stated that that motion was partly unnecessary and 
partly premature. Palmerston expressed disbelief in 
the existence of any extensive African slave-trade with 
Texas, evaded entirely the question of slavery within 
Texas, and asserted confidence in the integrity of the 
United States government, though acknowledging that 
the people of the United States, as distinguished from 
the government, had given real aid to Texas. He did 
not believe that the United States intended to annex 
Texas, but he added that if, in the future, there should 
be any evidence of such an intention, it " ought seri- 
ously to engage the attention of the House and of 
the British public." 

The debate was of no real importance, nor does it 



15 FIRST INDICATIONS OF BRITISH INTEREST. 

indicate, perhaps, the positive sentiments or intentions 
of British officials. The fact that it is the only definite 
reference to Texas made for several years by the 
House of Commons indicates rather the general lack 
of public interest in the question. The tone of this 
brief debate, however, is interesting in that it shows a 
certain arrogant assumption on the part of Great Bri- 
tain that she could easily settle the matter if she should 
care to interfere, while the points brought out by the 
speakers indicate even thus early the two main ele- 
ments of later British opposition to the American an- 
nexation of Texas. One of these elements was phil- 
anthropic, being directed toward the question of 
slavery in Texas ; the other was purely commercial and 
selfish, and turned upon the rivalry of Great Britain 
and the United States in the commercial development 
of the Gulf of Mexico. The points thus brought for- 
ward were later frequently cited in American news- 
papers as evidence of the real intentions of Great 
Britain in regard to Texas, while Palmerston's hint 
that British interests could not permit annexation 
served to irritate further a hypersensitive American 
public. 

The recognition of Texas by the United States was 
delayed for some time upon various grounds, but was 
finally granted when a charge d'affaires was sent to 
that State, on March 7, 1837. Other countries were 
slower to recognize. It was undoubtedly a part of a 
plan for ultimate American annexation that British 
and French recognition of Texas should be secured, 
thus preparing the way for a denial of any right on 
the part of Mexico to resist annexation. Texas had, 
in fact, made a proposal to the United States for an- 



FIRST INDICATIONS OF BRITISH INTEREST. 1 9 

f 

nexation, and had been definitely refused by Forsyth, 
the American secretary of state. This was in August 
of 1837. Two months earlier, in June, General J. 
Pinckney Henderson had been sent to England for the 
purpose of securing English recognition. 3 He was 
well received, but the English government expressed 
no active interest in the matter, and finally, on Decem- 
ber 27, a definite refusal was given him. Meanwhile, 
however, the refusal of the United States to consider 
any annexation project and the subsequent with- 
drawal by Texas of its offer somewhat changed the 
situation. Palmerston was increasingly confident that 
American annexation plans were unlikely to meet with 
success. Yet he preferred to postpone British recog- 
nition, though willing to take steps looking toward 
it later on. Accordingly, he gave notice to Henderson 
that until the time for recognition should arrive, the 
trade of Texas " would be treated as a part of Mex- 
ico," and " vessels under the Texas flag or with clear- 
ances from Texas custom houses would be admitted 
into English ports under the terms of the commercial 
treaty between England and Mexico." 4 This peculiar 

8 Henderson was born in North Carolina in 1808, was ad- 
mitted to the bar in 1829, and, after several years of practice, 
removed to Mississippi in 1835. He soon became interested in 
the Texan revolution, joined the Texan army, and was ap- 
pointed a brigadier-general. In 1837 he was elected secretary 
of state, and in 1839 was sent to Europe to secure foreign 
recognition. On his return to Texas in 1840 he resumed the 
practice of the law, but in 1844 was sent to Washington by 
President Houston as a special minister to negotiate a treaty 
of annexation. In 1846 he was elected governor of Texas. 
In 1858 he was appointed senator from Texas, and died in the 
same year at Washington. 

"Worley, "Texas and British Designs," p. 5. In Texas State 
Hist. Assoc. Q., XI, no. 1. 



20 FIRST INDICATIONS OF BRITISH INTEREST. 

arrangement, by which a state regarded as in revolt 
from the parent state was given the trade privileges 
of the latter, did not satisfy the government of Texas 
in any respect, but was accepted as an indication of 
greater concessions to be made later. In truth, how- 
ever, the real reason for the arrangement lay in the 
necessity for it felt by the British trade interest itself. 
Meanwhile Henderson, though disappointed with the 
results of his British mission, had proceeded to France, 
and had secured the recognition of Texas from that 
power. 

The manuscript material in the British Public 
Record Office indicates clearly that in the years 1837 
and 1838 very little interest was attached by diplomats 
to the situation in Texas. Palmerston sent to the min- 
ister in Mexico but one instruction referring to Texas, 
and that was merely to notify him that Henderson, the 
Texan envoy, had arrived in London, and that the 
British government had not as yet reached any decision 
with regard to Henderson's proposals. Yet as early as 
1837 considerable newspaper gossip in America accused 
Great Britain of a plan to acquire Texas by means of 
a transfer of the province by Mexico to the bondhold- 
ers of the Mexican debt. The records of the foreign 
office contain no trace whatever of this purported 
sale or of any similar scheme. English interest was, 
in fact, almost wholly directed in this year toward the 
question of French reprisals then being undertaken 
against Mexico because of her refusals to adjust var- 
ious French claims. Palmerston, reflecting this gen- 
eral British interest, yet desiring at the same time to 
preserve the good-will of France, was distinctly em- 
barrassed by the French activities upon the coast of 



FIRST INDICATIONS OF BRITISH INTEREST. 21 

Mexico. British merchants were themselves extremely 
vexed at the delay of Mexico in meeting their own 
claims, 5 and to this extent they sympathized with the 
claims of French merchants and the action of the 
French government. When, however, the French gov- 
ernment sent a fleet to Mexico to blockade Mexican 
ports and force a settlement of French claims, the 
trade of Great Britain was seriously interfered with, 
and numerous complaints were made to the British 
government. 6 Before France had fully prepared this 
plan of bringing pressure to bear upon Mexico, an 
agreement had been reached with Palmerston by which 
it was understood that the British fleet -in the Gulf 
of Mexico was not to interfere with that of France, 
but the limits of French action had not been com- 
pletely defined. The theory of France, acquiesced in 
by Palmerston, was that the expedition of the French 
squadron and its acts upon the coast of Mexico did not 
constitute war. When the French squadron actually 
blockaded Mexican ports, however, it was difficult to 
consider the situation as other than a warlike one. 
British merchants asserted that if war did not exist, 
they had a perfect right to clear their vessels for 
Mexican ports, and that the French squadron had no 
right to interfere with the entry of British vessels into 
such ports. Palmerston at first refused to listen to 
this argument, but the complaints became so numerous 
that he finally stated that British vessels might clear 
for some nearby " neutral " port with the idea that if 
upon arriving at such port the vessel should find no 
actual blockade before the Mexican port it desired to 

6 F. O. Mexico, 117. 

"F. O. Mexico, 121, Dom. Var. 



22 FIRST INDICATIONS OF BRITISH INTEREST. 

enter, it might proceed upon its journey and depend 
upon British protection in case of interference by the 
French. 7 The use here of the word " neutral " was 
unfortunate, for the reply of the merchants promptly 
pointed out that if " neutral " ports existed in the case 
in question, then a state of war actually existed also 
between France and Mexico, and in that case only 
those Mexican ports actually closed by an efficient 
blockading squadron should be regarded as closed to 
British merchants. The difficulty of Palmerston was 
increased by the fact that in 1837 Great Britain had 
blockaded the coast of New Granada in exactly the 
same manner in which France was now blockading 
Mexico, and yet had asserted that no war existed. In 
the present case Palmerston finally took the advice of 
a queen's advocate, Hodson, and was told that in fact 
Great Britain had been at war with New Granada, and 
that France was now technically at war with Mexico. 8 

7 Ibid., Palmerston to Powles, November 15, 1838. 

8 Palmerston's action in regard to the French squadron upon 
the coast of Mexico is interesting. He had agreed with France 
not to interfere with this punitive expedition, and yet, at the 
same time, he did not wish it to appear to Mexico that he had 
made such an agreement. Great Britain was still regarded by 
Mexico as her chief support and most friendly adviser, and 
this was true in spite of recent irritating incidents which had 
arisen between the two countries. Palmerston therefore gave 
instructions to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty 
that the British squadron in the Gulf of Mexico, which was 
under the command of Sir Charles Paget, should not interfere 
with Admiral Baudin of the French navy, but that Paget 
was not to let Baudin know that he had such instructions. 
Paget was to cruise somewhere near the French squadron, 
keeping track of the operations of that squadron, and if he 
found that Baudin was going to bombard some Mexican 
fortresses upon the coast, then Paget was to withdraw con- 
veniently, or be called away. Palmerston knew, in fact, that 



FIRST INDICATIONS OF BRITISH INTEREST. 23 

The importance of this episode and of British inter- 
est in it, both public and official, when considered in 
relation to British policy toward Texas, lies in the 
evidence it presents that as yet Mexico and Mexican 
trade relations occupied the center of the British stage. 
Texas had so far secured but scant attention from the 
British public or government. From Mexico itself, 
however, there came indications that British agents 
were more interested in the Texas situation than was 
the home government. Pakenham, the regular minister 
in Mexico, was in England upon leave of absence dur- 
ing a large part of 1837 and 1838. 9 The reports of 
Ashburnham, Pakenham's substitute for -this period, 

the plan of the French squadron was to bombard San Juan 
de Ulua as a punitive measure against Mexico. It was thus 
a somewhat involved instruction that was given to Paget. He 
was not to interfere with Baudin, yet Baudin was not to know 
that he had such instructions. He was not to be present when 
Baudin actually punished Mexico, so that Mexico should not 
understand that an agreement existed between England and 
France. Thus the " honor " of the British navy was to be 
preserved, as well as its prestige in the Gulf of Mexico, and 
the friendly relations of Great Britain and Mexico were not 
to be endangered. F. O. Mexico, 121, Secret, Palmerston to 
Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, October 9, 1838. 

9 Sir Richard Pakenham, born in 1797, spent nearly all of his 
mature life in the British diplomatic service. He was educated 
at Trinity College, Dublin, and in 1817 was attached to the 
embassy at The Hague. After some years of service in 
European posts he became, in 1826, secretary of legation at 
Mexico, and in 1835 was made minister there. In December, 
1843, while in England on leave of absence, he was appointed 
minister plenipotentiary to the United States, retiring from 
this post in 1847, and retiring from the service rather than 
return to the United States, where he thought he had not been 
well treated. He later reentered the service in 185 1 as min- 
ister at Lisbon, but retired permanently in 1855. He died 
in 1868. 



24 FIRST INDICATIONS OF BRITISH INTEREST. 

furnish clear proof of the activity of Great Britain 
at this time in offering advice to the Mexican govern- 
ment, and even in attempting to impose a policy. The 
tone of British ministers in Mexico, apparent in their 
despatches, shows distinctly Great Britain's assump- 
tion of the right to advise and her exercise of that 
right in a way that would have been resented by a 
stronger power. This advice was constantly given 
upon questions of both domestic and foreign policy, 
yet Ashburnham clearly pictured the hopeless weakness 
of the Mexican government and the disturbing revolu- 
tionary elements, and frankly conceded the impossi- 
bility of a payment by Mexico to her English bond- 
holders. 

It is in this connection that the situation in Texas 
received notice, for Ashburnham favored British 
recognition of Texas upon the grounds that Mexico 
could not possibly reconquer that province and that 
Texas, if recognized, might perhaps do something for 
English creditors. He also pointed out that so long 
as any hope existed in Mexico of the recovery of Texas 
there would be disorders and disturbances within Mex- 
ico itself, and he volunteered the opinion that even 
if Texas were reconquered, Mexico " would be wholly 
incapable of checking the slave-trade there." 10 His 
despatch outlining these ideas was received at the for- 
eign office at the moment when that office was con- 
sidering the acts of the French upon the Mexican 
coast and the complaints of the British shippers arising 
therefrom. For this reason no attention was paid to 
it. In October, 1838, Pakenham set out upon his re- 

10 F. O. Mexico, 114, Ashburnham to Palmerston, June 24, 
1838. 



FIRST INDICATIONS OF BRITISH INTEREST. 25 

turn to Mexico, and the written instructions given to 
him treated mainly of the relations with the French 
and of the compromise which he was to suggest for the 
purpose of settling French-Mexican difficulties. He 
had, however, verbal instructions with regard to Texas 
which will appear in his acts in Mexico in the next 
year. 11 It is clear therefore that Palmerston was not 
ready as yet to take up seriously the question of the 
recognition of Texas. Henderson, after his first fail- 
ure in London, had gone to Paris, and succeeded a 
little later in securing French recognition. He then 
returned to Texas. It was at this point that diplo- 
matic representatives of the United States in Europe 
first evinced a direct interest in securing British recog- 
nition for Texas. Cass, the United States minister 
at Paris, urged Henderson, by letter, to secure the 
recognition of some continental governments if possible 
and thus bring pressure to bear upon England. But 
for some time nothing came of this suggestion. Thus 
the year 1838 closed without any evidence of a real 
interest in Texas on the part of Great Britain. 

During the summer of 1839 there began in Mexico 
that series of suggestions looking toward pacification 

11 The customary historical treatment of the American claims 
urged upon Mexico some years earlier is to assert that Presi- 
dent Jackson used unwarranted pressure upon Mexico in 
demanding satisfaction of such claims, and that he did this 
for the purpose of bringing about a relation between the 
United States and Mexico favorable to an American annexa- 
tion of Texas. Considered in the light of what France 
actually did in the year 1838 and of the support given to 
French action by Great Britain, the pressure exerted by 
Jackson does not seem excessive, and the accusation of an 
ulterior motive needs greater proof than has yet been given 
of it. 



26 FIRST INDICATIONS OF BRITISH INTEREST. 

and recognition which until 1846 occupies a large part 
of the correspondence from the British minister in 
Mexico. These suggestions were various. Some of 
them resulted in definite attempts upon the part of 
British agents to bring about a permanent peace be- 
tween the two states. All of them involved more or 
less the same ideas and somewhat the same plans, and 
the story of them will therefore require a certain 
amount of repetition. This is, however, necessary 
in order to understand clearly in each year just what 
was the attitude of the British government and its 
agents. 

Pakenham had arrived in Mexico early in the spring 
of 1839. I n May he received a letter from a Mr. 
Gordon, of New Orleans, 12 outlining a plan which was 
to be presented at the hands of a Mr. Bee, the Texan 
secretary of state under Lamar's presidency. Gordon 
was a representative of the house of Lizardi and Com- 
pany, a British firm which more than any other was 
held to represent the commercial interests of Mexico 
in London. Lizardi and Company were directly occu- 
pied also in attempting to secure payment for the 
English bondholders of the Mexican debt. Thus Gor- 
don, in writing to Pakenham, may be understood to 
have had in mind, first, the interest of the bondholders, 
second, the interests of Mexico, and only indirectly 
the interest of Texas. In his letter to Pakenham, Gor- 
don stated that he had no admiration for the Texans, 
but that there was no prospect of a Mexican reconquest 
of the province, and that Mexico must therefore make 
the best of a bad situation and drive the best bargain 
possible with the Texan government. He wrote that 

12 F. O. Mexico, 125, Gordon to Pakenham, April 29, 1839. 



FIRST INDICATIONS OF BRITISH INTEREST. 27 

Bee was prepared to offer five million dollars for the 
recognition of Texan independence, but upon condi- 
tion that the Texan boundary should be advanced from 
the Nueces to the Rio Grande. Gordon therefore 
proposed that Mexico should satisfy the claim of the 
English bondholders to the extent of five million dol- 
lars by locating lands for them within the disputed 
territory between these rivers, accepting the five mil- 
lion dollars from Texas, and then agreeing to the line 
claimed by Texas. This, he urged, would be a good 
business operation for Mexico, would give the bond- 
holders the exact territory they desired, and would be 
of great benefit to Texas inasmuch as it would bring 
into this particular territory a large number of English 
and Dutch settlers. 

Upon the receipt of this letter from Gordon, Paken- 
ham made inquiries of the Mexican government, and 
outlined the suggestions made in the letter, but he 
found that Bee had already been notified by that gov- 
ernment that Mexico would have nothing to do with 
any project involving the recognition of Texas, and 
that this reply had been made even without waiting 
to hear what Bee had to propose. Pakenham, in his 
despatch to Palmerston reporting this matter, stated 
that this had seemed to him a proper opportunity to 
carry out the verbal instructions given him by Pal- 
merston at their last interview just previous to Pak- 
enham's departure for Mexico. 13 The interview had 
occurred in October, 1838, and Pakenham's report of 
what he now urged upon the Mexican government 
thus indicates Palmerston's project in that month. 
Pakenham urged the importance of a prompt recog- 
13 F. O. Mexico, 125, Pakenham to Palmerston, June 3, 1839. 



28 FIRST INDICATIONS OF BRITISH INTEREST. 

nition of Texan independence, laying stress upon the 
advantage to Mexico when there should be a barrier 
state between it and the United States. Gorostiza, 
the foreign minister, replied that he agreed perfectly 
as to the importance of such an arrangement, but that 
the Mexican government dared not risk so unpopular 
an act, and he hinted that as a preliminary to a pos- 
sible future recognition Mexico might welcome from 
England a suggestion for a suspension of hostilities. 
In reply to this, Pakenham was very cautious, but 
stated that England would probably be willing to sug- 
gest an armistice if previously assured that Texas sin- 
cerely desired it. In regard to the boundary desired 
by Texas, Gorostiza asserted that Mexico would never 
consent to such limits, and that if a boundary were 
some day fixed, it would be desirable to have it " guar- 
anteed by some powerful European government." " I 
thought," wrote Pakenham, " I might at once assure 
him that no European power would be found willing 
to undertake the responsibility of such a guaranty." 
At the conclusion of his despatch, Pakenham summed 
up the situation : " Reconquest is admitted to be im- 
possible, and yet a feeling of mistaken pride, foolishly 
called regard for the National honor, deters the Gov- 
ernment from putting an end to a state of things highly 
prejudicial to the interests of Texas and attended with 
no sort of advantage to this Country." 

In spite of the unfavorable outcome of the interview, 
Pakenham believed that the offer of five million dollars, 
if really made, would prove too tempting a bait for the 
Mexican government. In his reply to Gordon 14 he 
spoke encouragingly of the Texan offer, and wrote that 

14 F. O. Mexico, 125, Pakenham to Gordon, June 2, 1839. 



FIRST INDICATIONS OF BRITISH INTEREST. 29 

Texas must " not be discouraged by the failure of this 
first attempt." Without question, Pakenham was him- 
self perfectly convinced of the impossibility of a recon- 
quest of Texas by Mexico, and he was at this period 
very much impressed with the potential strength of 
the new State. He believed that Texas would have a 
very rapid development, and that British interest de- 
manded active efforts to secure its friendship. He 
was, in short, at the moment wholly in favor of an 
independent Texas and of offering British aid to the 
State, being willing to go so far, if necessary, as to 
endanger the good feeling existing between England 
and Mexico. There is much more evidence along 
these lines in the following year, but it is certain that 
Pakenham, even in the summer of 1839, was a firm 
believer in the future of Texas. The verbal instruc- 
tions of Palmerston in October of 1838 indicate also 
that the British government, or at least the head of 
the foreign office, was already convinced that Mexican 
recognition of Texas must come. It is noteworthy, 
however, that there is nothing in this correspondence 
even hinting at the question of slavery in Texas as 
offering an excuse for a refusal upon the part of any 
power to recognize that State. 

The first written instruction upon the subject of 
Texas bears the date of April 25, 1839, and was sent 
by Palmerston to Pakenham after the receipt of Pak- 
enham's report of his overture of the preceding year. 15 
In this letter Palmerston entered at some length into 
the question of Texan independence. He argued the 
impossibility of a reconquest of the province, and called 
attention to the fact that the settlers in Texas were 

16 F. O. Mexico, 122. 
3 



30 FIRST INDICATIONS OF BRITISH INTEREST. 

largely Americans and would be sure to receive the 
support of the citizens of the border states if Mexico 
pressed the war. He asserted that the population of 
Texas was so wholly different from that of the rest of 
Mexico that Texas, even if reconquered, would always 
be a foreign element, and could never actually be 
assimilated. Mexico was urged to spend her energy 
rather in rendering productive other portions of her 
vast territory as yet undeveloped. This would be her 
true domestic policy, while her foreign policy would 
be best served by the existence of a buffer state be- 
tween herself and the United States. These were the 
customary arguments, or at least were to be those 
ordinarily used in bringing pressure to bear upon Mex- 
ico, but Palmerston urged also that now was the time 
to recognize Texas, since otherwise the people of that 
province " might throw themselves upon the United 
States for assistance, and their final incorporation with 
the Union might be a consequence of temporary co- 
operation." Palmerston expanded this argument in 
various ways, and concluded it by declaring that Texas, 
if independent, would really be thrown upon the sup- 
port of Mexico: — 

Such a State, being weaker than the N. American Union, 
would be more likely to connect itself with Mexico for de- 
fence, than to enter into League with the United States for 
aggression. 

In matters of Trade, also, its Interests would in many re- 
spects harmonize with those of Mexico, and taking therefore 
into consideration all the various bearings of the Question, it 
may well be doubted, whether, the country which now bears 
the name of Texas could be placed in a position more advan- 
tageous on the whole to the Interests of Mexico than by be- 
coming an independent State. 



FIRST INDICATIONS OF BRITISH INTEREST. 3 1 

In supplementary instructions sent to Pakenham, 
in this same letter, it appears that Palmerston did not 
really expect that Mexico would be willing to listen 
immediately to advice looking toward recognition, but 
that he did hope Mexico might accept an offer upon 
the part of Great Britain to exercise her good offices 
in bringing about a pacification. There is no docu- 
mentary evidence to show what was the real reason 
animating Palmerston in thus urging recognition upon 
Mexico. Presumably his reason was an acceptance 
of the inevitable and a desire to make the best of it. 
He had, of course, long before this heard from General 
Henderson all the Texan arguments in favor of inde- 
pendence, but had declined, as yet, to grant British 
recognition. On the other hand, Hamilton, who in 
this same year was to secure from the British govern- 
ment treaties which, when ratified, involved British 
recognition, had not yet arrived in England when this 
instruction was written. The English argument here 
is based largely upon a fear of the expansion of the 
United States toward the southwest. The argument 
urged upon Mexico that the trade interests of Mexico 
and Texas were identical and were, in a sense, opposed 
to the trade interests of the United States was not well 
founded, for Mexico had abolished slavery, while 
Texas, both before and after its declaration of indepen- 
dence, was importing a considerable number of slaves. 
Palmerston, however, had made no mention of the sub- 
ject of slavery, and it will be remembered that Ash- 
burnham had previously informed him that slavery had 
become a permanent institution in Texas. Free labor 
in Mexico and slavery in Texas prohibited any real 
community of trade interests. 



32 FIRST INDICATIONS OF BRITISH INTEREST. 

Soon after the receipt of Palmerston's instructions 
Pakenham reported a change in the government of 
Mexico. Cariedo, the new minister of foreign affairs, 
acknowledged that the arguments advanced by Pal- 
merston were sound, and stated that he was ready 
to take the risk of accepting Great Britain's offer 
of services looking toward an armistice if his colleagues 
would support him. Meanwhile, however, he urged 
that Pakenham should not press the matter until the 
new government had become more firmly established. 
Before this, Pakenham received a second letter from 
Gordon, at New Orleans, urging that a renewed ef- 
fort be made upon the line of Bee's overture. Gor- 
don stated that Texas could at any time get eight or 
ten thousand adventurers from the United States to 
join her army. He had told Bee that this scheme of 
granting to the British bondholders rights in the dis- 
puted territory of Mexico ought to be acceptable to 
the Texan government, and Bee had replied that he 
was sure no objection to it would be presented. With 
Gordon's letter to Pakenham there came one from Bee 
as well in which it was asserted that the Texan gov- 
ernment was rapidly finding support from British in- 
vestors and that a Texan navy would soon be in con- 
trol of the Gulf of Mexico. 16 Bee represented Texas 
as very anxious for peace but perfectly able to wage 
energetic war. 17 

18 F. O. Mexico, 126, Pakenham to Palmerston, September 12, 
1839; Gordon to Pakenham, August 2, 1839; Bee to Gordon, 
July 28, 1839. 

17 He reported that six vessels were being built at Baltimore 
and that the money for them had been advanced by an Eng- 
lish house, the Dawsons. He also stated that a Mr. Halford, 
an English merchant, had advanced $70,000 for the purchase 



FIRST INDICATIONS OF BRITISH INTEREST. 33 

During the course of September Pakenham felt sure 
that he would soon be authorized by Cartedo to pro- 
pose to Texas a cessation of hostilities, and that this 
was but a step in preparing the country for recogni- 
tion. If Texas were really willing to pay cash for 
her independence, Pakenham thought it possible that 
this might be secured with comparative ease. 18 In 
this as in the former case, however, Pakenham found 
himself being sounded upon the question of whether 
or not Great Britain would guarantee a boundary line 
between Texas and Mexico, and he again positively 
refused to entertain such a project. But. at the mo- 
ment, this second opening coming through Gordon 
and Bee had no result, for before the year was out 
Pakenham was engaged in what seemed a more prom- 
ising arrangement, suggested, this time, by authorized 
agents of the Texan Republic. Gordon's proposals, 
then, merely served to pave the way for those later 
made by General James Hamilton. 

During the early years, when British representatives 
in Mexico were busied in presenting to the Mexican 
government the advantages of peace with Texas, al- 
ways with slight encouragement, but with apparent 
confidence that ultimate success was certain, England 
herself was asking damages of the Texan government. 
The British claim was pending during 1838, 1839, and 

of a steamer, and that General Hamilton had secured from 
another English house a loan of half a million dollars. These 
matters were largely based upon rumors, and Bee evidently 
could not prove the truth of his declarations, but such state- 
ments were likely to have an influence upon British official 
agents. 

18 F. O. Mexico, 126, Pakenham to Palmerston, September 12, 
1839. 



34 FIRST INDICATIONS OF BRITISH INTEREST. 

1840, and was based on what were regarded as unjust 
acts of the Texan navy. These difficulties arose over 
the cases of the " Little Penn " and the " Eliza Rus- 
sell." The former was a British schooner which, on a 
trip from Liverpool to Tabasco, had the misfortune to 
run aground on the Alacranes shoal off the Yucatan 
coast. This was in midsummer of 1837. Lizardi and 
Company were the owners of her cargo, which was 
consigned to a citizen of Mexico. The schooner could 
not be saved, and two Mexican vessels were sent out 
to take off her cargo. One of these vessels, the 
" Abispa," was captured by two Texan ships of war, 
the " Brutus " and the " Invincible," and was sent 
into a Texan port, where the vessel and cargo were 
adjudged lawful prize. Lizardi and Company sub- 
mitted a claim for damages to the British government 
to the amount of £3640, and this was known as the 
claim of the "Little Penn." The "Eliza Russell" 
was also a British schooner bound from Liverpool to 
Sisal, Mexico, and her cargo was consigned to Mex- 
icans at their own risk. The vessel was captured on 
August 3 and sent into the port of Galveston, but 
was later released by order of the government. The 
delay, however, and some injuries sustained by the 
vessel led her captain to present a claim for £865 
damages, caused by the detention. Texas acknow- 
ledged that her officers had been at fault in this case 
and promised to pay the claim, but from various 
causes payment was long delayed and was not finally 
made until 1843. In the case of the " Little Penn " 
Texas maintained that no claim for damages was per- 
missible, and undoubtedly the connection of Lizardi 
and Company with Mexico — a fact well known to the 



FIRST INDICATIONS OF BRITISH INTEREST. 35 

Texan authorities — operated disadvantageously to the 
claimants. Palmerston had pressed both these claims 
upon the attention of Henderson in 1838 and again 
in 1839, but while using fairly vigorous language, he 
did not actually push the matter. On February 15, 
1840, he instructed Pakenham to press these claims 
upon the attention of General Hamilton, with whom 
Pakenham had been corresponding upon other mat- 
ters, but this instruction from Palmerston seems to 
have been a perfunctory formality to satisfy the claim- 
ants rather than a vigorous demand. 19 It also ap- 
pears from this instruction that Great Britain herself 
had reduced the amounts claimed by the owners of the 
vessels, plainly with a desire to be perfectly just and 
fair toward Texas. Unquestionably Palmerston was 
opposed to pushing any claims that could weaken 
British influence upon the government of Texas. 
Judged by the bulk of correspondence, the affair of the 
" Little Penn " was really important, and appeared 
to threaten friendly relations between Great Britain 
and Texas; in fact, it was never forcibly pressed by 
the British government, and did not seriously endanger 
those relations. 

18 F. O. Mexico, 133. 



CHAPTER II. 

The Negotiations of Treat and Hamilton. 

In December of 1839 General James Hamilton, of 
South Carolina, who had long interested himself (in the 
affairs of Texas and who had already acted as a Texan 
financial agent abroad, set out for Europe for the pur- 
pose of disposing of bonds of the Republic, and also 
with the plan of securing treaties of recognition with 
various powers. 1 Before undertaking the journey he 
had opened a correspondence with Pakenham, writing 
from New Orleans. Hamilton introduced himself to 
Pakenham by stating the results of his recent mission 
to France, largely taking to himself the credit properly 
belonging to Henderson of having secured recognition 

1 Hamilton was a man of unusual ability and energy, and 
played an important role both in his own State — South Caro- 
lina — and later in Texas. He was born in 1786, being the son 
of a favorite aide of Washington's, was educated for the law, 
and took part in state and national politics. He was mayor of 
Charleston, South Carolina, was a member of Congress from 
1822 to 1829, and was governor of his State, retiring when 
Hayne was inaugurated in 1830. Hamilton had supported 
Jackson's candidacy for the presidency, but was a strong 
states' right man and free-trader, and advised armed opposi- 
sition to the tariff of 1828. Disgusted with the failure of the 
nullification movement, he removed to Texas, and quickly 
became an important factor there, serving as the financial 
agent of the State in Europe, and proving exceptionally fertile 
in plans for securing moneyed support in European centers. 
In 1857 Hamilton was elected to the United States Senate 
from Texas, but lost his life in a collision at sea on his way 
to Washington, chivalrously refusing to enter a life-boat, and 
giving his place to a lady passenger. 

36 



THE NEGOTIATIONS OF TREAT AND HAMILTON. 37 

from that state. He narrated an interview which he 
had had with Palmerston in September of 1839, in the 
course of which Palmerston had declared his belief in 
the permanency of Texan independence, and had as- 
serted that Great Britain only awaited the results of 
her friendly offer of mediation to Mexico before recog- 
nizing Texas. He further stated that while in Lon- 
don he had been waited Upon by a committee repre- 
senting the Mexican bondholders, and had learned 
that Mexico had already given the bondholders a lien 
on the territory on the Rio Grande which Texas re- 
garded as a part of her own soil. Hamilton now pro- 
posed, therefore, that Mexico acknowledge the inde- 
pendence of Texas and receive from. Texas the sum 
of five million dollars, with the understanding that this 
amount should go directly into the pockets of the 
bondholders. The bondholders were then to release 
to the State of Texas the lands already granted to 
them by the government of Mexico. 

This proposition was evidently much the same as 
that which had been brought by Bee to Pakenham, but 
with the difference that in this case Mexico's profit 
in the matter was to be merely a release from five mil- 
lions of indebtedness instead of, as in the Bee proposi- 
tion, the actual handling of that amount of cash. 
Hamilton further suggested that peace negotiations be 
begun at once in London, so that " the Mexican bond- 
holders would thus on the spot be enabled under the 
protection of your Government to take care of their 
own interests." 2 Yet Hamilton was not prepared to 
state that Texas would positively acquiesce in such 
an arrangement. He posed here rather as a man 

2 F. O. Mexico, 134. 



38 THE NEGOTIATIONS OF TREAT AND HAMILTON. 

about to undertake a mission to England, who had dis- 
covered a way out of a difficult situation, and was 
presenting the scheme for Pakenham's consideration. 
Nevertheless, in this same letter he notified Pakenham 
that a Mr. James Treat was on his way to Vera Cruz 
and would have further information to place at his 
disposal. 

On December 12 Pakenham replied to Hamilton, 
expressing interest in the general plan suggested, but 
asserting his own conviction that all such plans for a 
definite conclusion of peace would be of no avail, and 
that the first logical and reasonable step to be taken 
was to arrange an armistice between the two nations. 
In spite of his own belief that matters could be satis- 
factorily arranged, Pakenham told Hamilton that 
Cafiedo had not yet promised to listen to any Texan 
proposition for an armistice, and had definitely as- 
serted " that no proposition for the alienation of the 
right of sovereignty would be entertained." 3 So far, 
however, the Mexican government had refused to put 
in writing its final determination one way or the other, 
and Pakenham still hoped that it would make conces- 
sions in some reasonable and logical way. A little 
later Hamilton was notified by Pakenham that Canedo 
had at last given him a written communication indicat- 
ing the willingness of the Mexican government to con- 
sider an offer of armistice from Texas. Commenting 
upon Mexican conditions, in a letter to Hamilton, Pak- 
enham was surprisingly frank; he expressed his belief 
in the weakness of the government, condemned its 
vacillation, and predicted its total inability to recon- 
quer Texas. He told Hamilton that use might be 

a F. O. Mexico, 134. 



THE NEGOTIATIONS OF TREAT AND HAMILTON. 39 

made of any information conveyed to him, save that 
the written communication of Canedo, offering to re- 
ceive a proposition of armistice, must be regarded as 
confidential, since it was essential to the prestige of 
the Mexican government at home that the offer should 
seem to come from Texas. 

All this correspondence was transmitted by Paken- 
ham to Palmerston on January 15, 1840, 4 and it is 
quite clear that Pakenham was more hopeful of a 
favorable outcome for Hamilton's scheme than he 
had been willing to admit to Hamilton himself. He 
did not think, however, that Mexico would be brought 
easily to a final relinquishment of sovereignty over 
the territory desired by Texas on the Rio Grande, nor 
did he believe that the Mexican government would so 
easily let five million dollars slip through its fingers. 
Apparently, Pakenham had less interest in securing 
repayment for the British bondholders than Hamilton 
supposed him to have. 

Palmerston gave a brief but complete approval to 
the acts and plans of Pakenham, emphasizing partic- 
ularly the necessity of an armistice as preliminary to 
a permanent peace. 5 In the meantime further letters 
had been exchanged between New Orleans and the 
City of Mexico. On January 2 Hamilton, before re- 
ceiving Pakenham's first letter, had written describing 
a trip to Austin and its results. He asserted that 
Texas was decidedly in earnest in its desire for peace 
and that it was willing to pay money in order to secure 
it, but its pride required that the money go to the 

4 F. O. Mexico, 134. 

6 F. O. Mexico, 133, Palmerston to Pakenham, March 16, 
1840. 



40 THE NEGOTIATIONS OF TREAT AND HAMILTON. 

English bondholders rather than into the hands of the 
Mexicans. He now wrote that he had full power to 
carry through and conclude a treaty, and he sent a 
memorandum, confidentially, of certain resolutions of 
the Texan Congress. He dwelt at length upon the 
sum of money to be granted, and maintained that it 
was well worth an effort on the part of the British 
government. He pictured Texas as holding her citi- 
zens in check for the present, but only for the present. 
He believed that, should Mexico refuse to negotiate, 
the rein would be loosened and Texas citizens per- 
mitted to cross the border and revolutionize the adja- 
cent provinces of Mexico. A day later, on January 3, 
he had received Pakenham's first letter of December 
12, and in reply stated emphatically that Texas would 
accept no armistice which did not include a secret 
article providing for a negotiation either at London or 
at Washington, as Mexico preferred. The secret joint 
resolution of the Texan Congress, transmitted by 
Hamilton, approved President Lamar's policy of peace, 
invested Lamar with power to appoint peace commis- 
sioners with authority to settle the boundary, author- 
ized the placing of the loan to carry out the financial 
terms of the treaty, and concluded in the following 
words : " Be it further resolved that the said commis- 
sioners appointed on the part of Texas shall, if prac- 
ticable, procure the guaranty of Great Britain, for 
the faithful performance of the Treaty by both 
Parties." 6 

Pakenham's report of the affair to Palmerston be- 

8 F. O. Mexico, 134. The document was signed by David S. 
Kaufman for the House of Representatives, by David G. Bur- 
net for the Senate, and was approved by Mirabeau B. Lamar. 



THE NEGOTIATIONS OF TREAT AND HAMILTON. 4 1 

trayed some apprehension in regard to Hamilton's 
fast-moving diplomacy as well as considerable skepti- 
cism as to the trustworthiness of his authority from 
Texas. 7 Personally, he believed it impossible at the 
moment to get from the government of Mexico a 
pledge for more than an armistice. His theory was 
that an armistice would help Texas toward ultimate 
recognition, and that recognition itself must come by 
a gradual process. Not having any evidence other 
than Hamilton's own word that he had authority to 
carry through the arrangement proposed, Pakenham 
refused to present, in his official capacity, the case as 
outlined by the Texan government. In the meantime, 
Mr. Treat, spoken of in Hamilton's earlier letter, had 
arrived and asserted that he himself had authority to 
enter into negotiations with Mexico, but Treat also was 
without written credentials. Treat's personality, how- 
ever, so impressed Pakenham that he wrote of him 
to Palmerston as " perfectly qualified for the task con- 
fided to him," and as having intelligence, good sense, 
and a good knowledge of the language and customs of 
Mexico, as well as an intimate acquaintance with con- 
ditions in Central America. Under the influence of 
this personal liking Pakenham ventured to secure for 
Treat an interview with Caiiedo, but this was unoffi- 
cial because of Treat's lack of definite credentials. 
Canedo offered to receive Treat officially if Pakenham 
would " undertake to guaranty the validity of his cre- 
dentials," but this Pakenham declined to do. He did, 
however, induce Canedo " to agree that whatever pro- 
posal Mr. Treat may be authorized to make will be 

7 F. O. Mexico, 134, February 9, 1840, with copies of his 
correspondence with Hamilton and of the Texan documents. 



42 THE NEGOTIATIONS OF TREAT AND HAMILTON. 

received from me if presented as on behalf of the 
People of Texas." 8 

One most interesting feature of these various pro- 
posals, whether from Mexico or from Texas, is that 
pertaining to the suggested guarantee by Great Britain 
of a boundary between Texas and Mexico. It is 
perfectly clear that this suggestion did not originate 
with Pakenham, but came in the one case from Mex- 
ico, in the other, from Texas. Pakenham did not for 
a moment permit either party to be deceived upon this 
point, and in writing of this latest proposal to Palmers- 
ton, he stated, " Without Instructions from Your 
Lordship to that effect, I shall encourage in no quar- 
ter the expectation that her Majesty's Government 
will consent to guaranty any transaction that may be 
concluded between this country and Texas." 9 

Palmerston was equally clear in his instructions to 
Pakenham upon this same point, for upon May 14, in 
reply to the communication from Pakenham just 
noted, he wrote, " I have at the same time to instruct 
you to explain distinctly both to the Mexican Govt, and 
to the Texan Agents that Great Britain cannot guaran- 
tee any arrangement between Mexico and Texas." 10 
Treat's arrival at Mexico did not mean the immedi- 
ate renewal of negotiations, for it was necessary to 
wait until he should have secured proper credentials. 
These came in April, and at the same time Pakenham 
received a personal letter from David G. Burnet, acting 
secretary of state for Texas, thanking him for his 
kindly services and the interest shown in Texas. 

8 F. O. Mexico, 134. 

8 Ibid. 

10 F. O. Mexico, 133. 



THE NEGOTIATIONS OF TREAT AND HAMILTON. 43 

Burnet stated further that both Treat at Mexico and 
Hamilton at London had full power to negotiate a 
treaty of peace, and that " any relative guarantee 
which you may feel it proper to offer to the Govern- 
ment of Mexico will be fully and faithfully ratified 
and redeemed by this Government." 11 

However authoritatively qualified, the post of Texan 
agent at Mexico was not an enviable one. The Mexi- 
can government was sure to present as many difficul- 
ties and hindrances as possible, and in particular to 
balk at any suggestion that carried with it an admis- 
sion of Texan independence. At the same time 
Canedo and his fellow-ministers saw the wisdom of 
such an admission, and were deterred from advocating 
a policy that meant peace with Texas only by their 
fear of a popular uprising in the country. To steer 
the government so cautiously as to secure a permanent 
peace with Texas, without threatening the continuance 
of the government itself, called for skill and courage. 
Political opponents had only to appeal to so-called 
national pride in order to stir the people and over- 
throw the ministry. The whole situation was an open 
book to Pakenham, yet he had faith in the outcome, 
and on May 18 he wrote to Palmerston that the first 
step had been taken by laying the matter before the 
Council of State, with the idea of securing from Con- 
gress authority to come to an arrangement with 
Texas. 12 Unfortunately, however, Treat had fallen 
dangerously ill, and even if he recovered it was prob- 
able that he would have to leave the country in order 
to recuperate. Treat's conspicuous ability in this truly 

"F. O. Mexico, 135, March 12, 1840. 
12 F. O. Mexico, 135. 



44 THE NEGOTIATIONS OF TREAT AND HAMILTON. 

difficult and delicate matter and his success in bring- 
ing the reluctant Mexican authorities to the point 
where they would at least consider Texan proposals 
were gratefully appreciated by Pakenham. Having 
previously doubted the successful issue of the negotia- 
tion to the point of recognition, Pakenham, with Treat 
as intermediary, became distinctly sanguine. 

Early in June, Cafiedo did in fact lay all the corre- 
spondence between himself, Treat, and Pakenham be- 
fore the Council of State, and recommended that steps 
be taken to arrange a peace. The committee of the 
council to which Canedo's report was offered sup- 
ported his recommendation, but the former secretary 
of foreign affairs, Gorostiza, opposed the report of the 
committee, obtained a majority of the council against 
it, and succeeded in putting through a resolution of 
his own which referred the whole matter to Congress, 
but with an emphatic disapproval on the part of the 
council " of any accommodation with Texas as an in- 
dependent Country." 13 This action was at first secret, 
but so many men were in the secret that rumors of it 
soon transpired, and the Chamber of Deputies de- 
manded information as to what was going on. Thus 
forced, the government was obliged to lay the whole 
affair before Congress. At the moment that Paken- 
ham wrote his account of these proceedings to the 
home government he still believed that the cabinet 
would carry its point, for he wrote that this specific 
attack would strengthen rather than weaken it in its 
original intention. 14 

18 F. O. Mexico, 136, Pakenham to Palmerston, July 5, 1840. 

34 Ibid. Throughout all of this correspondence Pakenham 

indicates his disbelief in the permanence of the existing Mexi- 



THE NEGOTIATIONS OF TREAT AND HAMILTON. 45 

The result of the public knowledge of the Treat 
negotiation was contrary to Pakenham's expectations. 
The government was not strengthened and did not fight 
but yielded to the public clamor. While Treat did not 
give up all hope, he did conclude that an armistice at 
least would be greatly to the advantage of Texas, if he 
could not get a definite treaty of peace. In August 
he informed Pakenham that he had received new 
instructions from his government authorizing him to 
treat for an armistice if a definite and permanent peace 
was not to be obtained, and that he might conclude a 
truce for one, two, or three years, if made terminable 
on six months' notice by either party. Pakenham was 
pleased with this new instruction from Texas, both 
because he felt it to be more reasonable in the existing 
situation, and also because it was directly in line with 
the advice which he himself had given. Treat was 
directed, however, to try first for some answer to the 
earlier proposals to which no reply had as yet been 
given by the Mexican government. Only in the case 
that Mexico ultimately refused the Texan peace pro- 
posals was Treat to present the idea of a truce. Treat 
therefore gave to Pakenham the Texan demand for 

can government, and this somewhat weakens the force of his 
reports that the arrangement with Texas would go through. 
He is constantly speculating as to the possible overthrow of 
the government by the revolutionary federalist party or, which 
would seem preferable to him, by a slowly developing mon- 
archical party. He even hints at the possibility that some Eu- 
rupean ruler will be placed upon the Mexican throne. 
Throughout the year 1840 his reports are full of the weakness 
and dishonesty of Mexican officials and of the Mexican gov- 
ernment; and he compares its inherent weaknesses with the 
potential strength of Texas. 

4 



4^ THE NEGOTIATIONS OF TREAT AND HAMILTON. 

an answer to its first proposals, with the request that 
he present it to the Mexican government. 15 

At the time when this arrangement was made and 
Pakenham had consented to act again as a go-between 
for Texas and Mexico, he was not quite sure of him- 
self in his personal relation with the government of 
Mexico. Earlier in the year there had occurred in 
California the arrest of a number of American and 
English residents upon an accusation of conspiracy 
to overthrow the government at Monterey. Both Pak- 
enham and the American minister had taken this matter 
up with energy, protesting vigorously against the illeg- 
ality of the arrest, and demanding reparation. Some 
slight official friction had occurred in the summer of 
1840 over this incident, and considerable public ex- 
citement was shown. Mexico had been forced to 
acknowledge the error committed and to send orders 
for the release of the prisoners. The incident was 
comparatively unimportant in itself, but it hampered 
Pakenham somewhat in his role of peacemaker be- 
tween the two governments. The answer of the Mexi- 
can government to Treat's demand for a reply was a 
refusal to enter into a negotiation. On September 21, 
therefore, Treat presented a memorandum indicating 
his intention to withdraw since nothing could be got 
from Mexico. As usual, this went through the hands 
of Pakenham, and when presenting it, Pakenham, with 
Treat's consent, suggested that an armistice be con- 
cluded for a definite period. This, Pakenham wrote 
to Palmerston, was " a proposition which in the present 
state of this Country ought, I imagine, to be considered 

15 F. O. Mexico, 137, Pakenham to Palmerston, August 22, 
1840. 



THE NEGOTIATIONS OF TREAT AND HAMILTON. 47 

by this Government as quite a Godsend." 16 The gov- 
ernment, however, appeared wholly indifferent, and 
several days elapsed before the matter was taken up at 
all. Treat naturally had insisted on the Rio Grande 
as the boundary line to be respected during the observ- 
ance of the truce. To this Mexico definitely objected, 
and Pakenham being engaged at the moment upon a 
protest of his own regarding the Californian prisoners, 
there seemed no possible outcome for the tiresome 
negotiation. At Pakenham's urgent request, however, 
Treat agreed to wait one week longer. 

The delay availed nothing. On October 26 Paken- 
ham wrote that Treat's mission had definitely failed, 
that ever since October 7 he (Pakenham) had been 
busily urging the government to consider an armis- 
tice, but that the government had now finally declared 
that it could " entertain no proposal for an armistice 
which shall not be presented with the previous sanc- 
tion of the Texian authorities," 17 the reason for this 
decision being the fear that the Texan government 
would not ratify an agreement, if one should be en- 
tered into. "And this," wrote Pakenham, " while there 
is actually a Texian Squadron cruising on the coast, 
which may at any moment commence offensive opera- 
tions, and the Mexican Government possess not a ves- 
sel of the smallest description, not even a boat, to op- 
pose them." 

The Mexican government added that even if an ar- 
mistice were feasible, the line of separation between 
the two states must not be south of the River San 

16 F. O. Mexico, 138, Pakenham to Palmerston, October 7, 
1840. 

17 Ibid., Pakenham to Palmerston, October 26, 1840. 



4^ THE NEGOTIATIONS OF TREAT AND HAMILTON. 

Antonio. " With pretensions so (irreconcilable and 
with so much obstinacy and infatuation on the part 
of the Government of Mexico, Your Lordship will not 
be surprised, and still less, I trust, attribute to any want 
of exertion on my part that nothing should have been 
effected." 18 

Pakenham was, in truth, bitterly disappointed that 
Treat's overture had resulted in failure. He felt that 
this failure might possibly be so construed as to re- 
flect upon his own diplomatic ability, and that Pal- 
merston, not understanding the shifting and uncertain 
quality of Mexican statecraft, would fail to give due 
credit for the energy he had displayed. Canedo, in 
his final note in reply to Pakenham's request for 
Treat's passport, harked back to the idea that Mexico 
would never enter into any negotiation having as its ob- 
ject the relinquishment of its sovereignty over Texas. 
The absurdity of this attitude, as Pakenham pointed 
out, was self-evident; the question of sovereignty was 
the real essence of the whole negotiation, and it had 
been freely discussed in the Mexican Council and actu- 
ally submitted, finally, to the Chambers. Cariedo's 
pretentious assertion, Pakenham wrote, " affords a 
fresh proof of the pusillanimous fear of responsibility 
and unpopularity which has influenced the conduct of 
the Mexican government throughout the whole af- 
fair." 19 A successful conclusion of this negotiation 
would have been a decided feather in Pakenham's cap, 
and his natural disgust when he saw that there was to 
be no result in what had seemed a promising negotia- 
tion was therefore the greater. Canedo might have 

18 F. O. Mexico, 138. 
10 Ibid. 



THE NEGOTIATIONS OF TREAT AND HAMILTON. 49 

pressed an unpopular policy upon Mexico with greater 
promise of success if it had been possible for Paken- 
ham to yield in the matter of the Californian prisoners. 
The California affair, however, should not be overesti- 
mated in its effect upon the Mexican public mind. It 
was but a small matter as compared with the question 
of the recognition of Texas. According to the evi- 
dence presented by the documents, Cariedo was really 
ready to agree to an armistice looking toward ultimate 
recognition of Texas, but found more opposition than 
he had expected, and lacked the courage necessary to 
carry the affair through. Possibly, even if he had 
fought for it, he could not have carried it to a success- 
ful issue, and even as it was he was thought too acquies- 
cent in his relation to Pakenham, and was accused by 
his political enemies of being the tool of England. 

Treat left almost at once, Pakenham's kindly services 
assisting him in his journey. Before his departure he 
gave the British agent an authorized promise on the 
part of Texas that if hostilities were actively renewed, 
Texas would not seek to extend its territory beyond the 
Rio Grande. 20 He also promised to urge upon the 
government of Texas a policy of forbearance and 
peace, and in so doing was carrying out the policy 
favored by Pakenham. The latter, on his part, told 
Treat that he might " inform the Authorities of Texas 
that I consider my commission as Mediator as still 
open, and that I shall be at all times ready to com- 
municate to the Mexican Government any pacific over- 
tures which they may think proper to make." 21 Un- 

20 F. O. Mexico, 138, enclosing Treat's note to Pakenham of 
October 14, 1840. 

21 Ibid., Pakenham to Palmerston, December 19, 1840. 



50 THE NEGOTIATIONS OF TREAT AND HAMILTON. 

fortunately, Treat could not carry to Texas these 
kindly offers, for he died on shipboard on the return 
journey. 

Before the news of Treat's departure from Mexico 
could have reached England, Palmerston had addressed 
an instruction to Pakenham notifying him of the 
treaties signed with Hamilton at London in November. 
The explanation made of the reasons leading Great 
Britain to take these steps is based upon the inability 
of Mexico to reconquer Texas, and upon the necessity 
for the treaties in order to protect British commercial 
interests. In London itself there was but little inter- 
course between Murphy, the representative of Mexico, 
and Palmerston. 22 All that appears for the year 1840 
in the records of the foreign office ds a protest from 
Murphy upon the British plan of recognizing Texas, 
and an answer from Palmerston giving the usual 
reasons for recognition and urging Mexico to change 
her views. 23 In the closing month of the year Pal- 
merston had some correspondence with a Mr. Robin- 
son, who was acting as chairman of the British com- 
mittee for the Spanish-American bondholders. In 
this correspondence Robinson asked the support of the 
government for a plan which the bondholders had 
agreed upon looking toward the location of twenty-five 

22 Murphy's activities in London seem to have been limited 
to a perfunctory performance of his official duties. He was at 
no time in close touch with British ministers, and in but one 
instance, to be noted later, did he show any energy. Possibly 
the frequency with which governments changed in Mexico 
hampered him. Certainly both Palmerston and Aberdeen pre- 
ferred to deal with Mexican questions through the agency of 
British ministers in Mexico, rather than through Murphy. 

23 F. O. Mexico, 140, Domestic, Mr. Murphy. 



THE NEGOTIATIONS OF TREAT AND HAMILTON. 5 1 

million acres of land in the territory now in dispute 
between Mexico and Texas. Robinson recited that 
by an act of Mexico in 1837 it had been provided that 
security for that portion of the Mexican debt called 
" deferred stock " should be offered to the English 
bondholders in the shape of one hundred million acres, 
located in various provinces of the Mexican Republic. 
The act had promised that of these lands, twenty-five 
million acres should be located " in the departments 
having the nearest communication with the Atlantic, 
and which may appear best suited for colonization from 
abroad." 24 Hence, the committee now urged the loca- 
tion of this portion of land in the disputed territory, 
and the benefits to Mexico, to Texas, and to the bond- 
holders were all stated at length, while advantage to 
the British government, it was urged, would result if 
such an arrangement should " lead to the introduction 
of British settlers in Texas and to a consequent fur- 
ther strengthening of British interests in that quar- 
ter." 25 This proposal was the result of the sugges- 
tions originating with Gordon, at New Orleans, and 
represents the interest taken in the matter in London. 
The hand of Lizardi and Company does not appear in 
this proposal when brought up in London, but unques- 
tionably this was but a part of the scheme originated 
by them. The proposal itself should be regarded 
merely as an effort on the part of the bondholders to 
recover some part of the principal long before ad- 
vanced to Mexico, and it cannot be counted as a 
weighty reason in inducing Palmerston to recognize 

24 F. O. Mexico, 142, Dom. Var., Robinson to Palmerston, 
November 30, 1840. 

25 Ibid. 



52 THE NEGOTIATIONS OF TREAT AND HAMILTON. 

Texas. Palmerston was in favor of the scheme in 
general, and instructed Pakenham to give it a friendly 
countenance and support, and to employ his " good 
offices with the Mexican Government in furtherance 
of the views of the Bondholders." 20 Having deter- 
mined upon recognition, however, Palmerston natur- 
ally welcomed an opportunity to benefit English mer- 
chants where he could do so legitimately. 

It now becomes necessary to look into transactions 
at the London end in the midyear of 1840. By July, 
Palmerston's mind was made up to recognize Texas. 
At that time he had been apprised of the correspon- 
dence between Hamilton and Pakenham and of Treat's 
arrival in Mexico, but of the reception accorded 
Treat's plan by the Mexican government he knew 
nothing. Soon after reaching London, Hamilton had 
had a short interview with Palmerston, and he then 
proceeded to the Continent to take up the matter of 
securing purchasers for Texan bonds. Late dn July 
he wrote to Texas that he was sure that England was 
preparing to sign treaties, and that upon his return to 
England no great delay would be experienced. He 
returned to London in September, but it was not until 
the middle of October that Palmerston was ready to 
consider seriously a definite treaty arrangement. On 
October 14 Hamilton wrote to Palmerston that he 
was authorized to sign a treaty of commerce and navi- 
gation if Great Britain would recognize Texan inde- 
pendence, and he transmitted with this letter a com- 
munication outlining the arguments which he hoped 
would win his case. This document is worth quoting 

29 F. O. Mexico, 133, Palmerston to Pakenham, December 15, 
1840, with copies of the correspondence with Robinson. 



THE NEGOTIATIONS OF TREAT AND HAMILTON. 53 

in full, as illustrating both Hamilton's method and the 
arguments which he believed would appeal to Palmer- 
ston. 

Reasons why Great Britain ought to recognize the Inde- 
pendence of Texas & form a treaty with her. 

ist. The future & rapidly increasing value of the Trade 
with Texas, under a judicious commercial Convention. 

2nd. By this means she secures a great Cotton producer 
and important consumer of her Manufactures, as her customer 
& a friendly neutral in the event of a war with the United 
States — 

3rd. The Recognition of Texas by Great Britain inevitably 
Superinduces peace between Mexico & Texas. 

4th. Peace at this moment between Mexico & Texas will 
inevitably insure the payment of a portion of the Mexican debt 
by Texas. 

5th. It likewise insures under the friendly mediation of 
England a permanent Boundary Line between Mexico & 
Texas, which will be inviolably observed by Texas, & repress 
the spirit of future conquest on the part of the Anglo-Ameri- 
can race — 

In case England does not recognize the following conse- 
quences are likely to follow — 

ist. In sixty days from this day Vera Cruz, Tampico & 
Matamoras will be blocaded by the Texian Squadron, which 
consists of one Corvette, two Brigs, three Schooners & one 
naval Steamer, now off the Coast of Mexico, while Mexico 
is destitute of all naval force whatsoever. 

2nd. If Texas is informed that Great Britain will not 
recognize her Independence & that consequently there is no 
hope of peace with Mexico, she will forthwith join the 
Federalists, revolutionize the northern provinces of Mexico & 
make such additions to her Territory as the laws of war 
would justify under the usages of civilized nations. 

3rd. Great Britain has an obvious interest in avoiding a 
discriminating duty which will be levied against the produc- 
tions of all nations which have not recognized Texas & formed 
Commercial Treaties with her on or before the ist of 
Feby. next. 

4th. If Her Majesty's Government should decline recog- 
nizing I must avail myself of the present situation of public 
affairs in Europe & make the most beneficial arrangement I 



54 THE NEGOTIATIONS' OF TREAT AND HAMILTON. 

can with some continental nation giving it exclusive com- 
mercial advantages for a valuable equivalent. 

5th. Texas greatly prefers a friendly alliance with England 
from all those considerations which are connected with a 
common origin — But if Great Britain refuses all international 
companionship with her, she will be driven to seek friendly 
& profitable associations elsewhere. 

Respectfully submitted 

J. Hamilton. 27 

It may well be doubted whether the arguments here 
advanced by Hamilton would have appealed to a man 
of more cautious temperament than Palmerston. They 
were, however, particularly well suited to a man of 
his type of mind and boldness of conception. After 
a number of succeeding interviews, Palmerston, on 
October 18, wrote to Hamilton that Great Britain was 
ready to negotiate the desired treaty if Texas would 
at the same time sign a slave-trade treaty giving to 
Great Britain the right of search. He stated that this 
would be " a sine qua non Condition of any other 
Treaty between Great Britain and Texas," 28 but he 
was careful to explain that this right of search dif- 
fered from that which Great Britain had exercised 
in former times, and that it was very necessary if the 
African slave-trade were to be suppressed. The un- 
usual length of Palmerston's explanation and the care 
taken by him in minimizing the actual operation of the 
right of search furnish evidence of his anxiety to 
conclude the other treaties with Texas and to recog- 
nize that State. 29 Apparently Hamilton offered no 

27 F. O. Texas, I. 

28 Ibid. 

28 Ibid. All of the correspondence between Palmerston and 
Hamilton is to be found in this volume. 



THE NEGOTIATIONS OF TREAT AND HAMILTON. 55 

objection to a slave-trade treaty, stating his approval 
on October 22. 

Palmerston's insistence upon a treaty looking toward 
the suppression of the African slave-trade was due to 
a variety of causes, some of them based upon the tra- 
ditional policy of Great Britain, some arising from 
conditions peculiar to the summer of 1840. Great 
Britain had been for a long period earnestly attempt- 
ing to suppress the slave-trade. Her initial efforts had 
not been supported by the other European powers, but 
after 1830 a series of treaties had been signed with 
various European states by which a reciprocal right of 
search was given, as a result of which the slave-traders 
had been deprived of the protection of European flags. 
It was, therefore, only a customary policy to insist 
upon signing a slave-trade treaty wherever it was 
thought possible to secure it. After 1835, however, 
British public interest in regard to the slave-trade had 
been less acute, and for that reason less pressure was 
ordinarily brought to bear upon the government in this 
connection than formerly. In 1840 interest in the 
slave-trade was revived in Great Britain, and several 
vigorous abolition speakers from America came to 
England to help in spreading this revival. Buxton, 
one of the most prominent of the English abolitionist 
leaders, had brought about the organization of a so- 
ciety which was known as the " African Colonization 
Society," having for its purpose the establishment of 
British colonies along the Guinea coast. These were 
intended to prevent the egress of slaves from the in- 
terior of Africa, and so to break the line of connection 
between the native chiefs who sold slaves and the 



56 THE NEGOTIATIONS OF TREAT AND HAMILTON. 

traders who purchased them. Also of indirect assist- 
ance to the abolition cause was the mission of a certain 
Mr. R. R. Gurley, secretary of the American Coloniza- 
tion Society, whose object in England was, nominally, 
to secure support for the American project of coloniz- 
ing free blacks in the State of Liberia, and actually to 
counteract the influence of northern abolitionists in 
Great Britain. So far as his cause was concerned his 
mission was a complete failure. It resulted rather in 
stirring up a more intense feeling among English aboli- 
tionists and contributing to the revival of interest in the 
suppression of the slave-trade. 30 

How far Palmerston was affected by this abolition 
discussion and excitement there is no record. Letters 
bearing on the slavery question came to him from 
both sides. Previous to the signing of the Texan 
treaties he had received from private and from official 
sources information as to slave conditions in the terri- 
tory, together with advice as to England's advantages 
in the event of Texan independence. Thus, a Mr. 
Nicholas Maillard had written on September 15, pro- 

30 Gurley, Mission to England in Behalf of the American 
Colonization Society. Washington, 1841. He arrived in Eng- 
land in July of 1840. The object of Gurley's trip to England 
was very largely to prevent, if possible, any influence from 
Buxton's book and society. Gurley saw in Buxton's plan a 
scheme to cripple Liberia. He so far failed in his plan, and 
aroused so much feeling, that the executive committee of the 
American Colonization Society recalled him, and later accepted 
his resignation. His book is a general defense of his acts in 
England, but it serves to emphasize the break which had come 
at this time in the former friendly relations of the American 
Colonization Society and abolition circles in England. Gurley 
also brings out clearly the renewed strength, in the summer 
of 1840, of the abolition movement. 



THE NEGOTIATIONS OF TREAT AND HAMILTON. 57 

testing against English recognition of Texas, and 
basing his protest largely upon the existence of slavery 
within that State. 31 On the other hand, a letter from 
Captain Hamilton of the British navy, written from 
Barbados in June of 1840, urged a speedy recognition 
of Texas, and another letter from one Sheridan was 
transmitted by Sir John McGregor, governor of Bar- 
bados, which outlined his ideas upon the same subject. 32 
Sheridan's letter was very long and was characterized 
by its comprehensiveness, its occasional picturesque- 
ness, and its judicial tone in exhibiting an effort to 
balance the pros and cons of the Texan situation. He 
was thoroughly awake to the notorious defects of char- 
acter in Texan citizens. They were, he wrote, " prin- 
cipally Bankrupts, Swindlers and Felons from the 
United States, occasionally diversified with an Oasis 
of respectability which only renders the Desert of 
Villainy around more conspicuous by contrast." The 
bowie-knife, which he described at length, was " the 
ordinary weapon of defence," Texan finances were in 
a desperate state, and the public services were inade- 

81 F. O. Mexico, 142. " The Government of the United 
States, have commenced pouring supplies into Texas, in order 
that she may be able to fulfill her engagements with the 
Federalists, and if Texas only gets sufficient slave labour to 
develop her resources, the Federalists must succeed eventually, 
when we shall see Slavery revived and perpetuated, and other 
Institutions still more injurious to our Interests, and repug- 
nant to our National principles, established throughout Mexico, 
whose dismemberment at this or any future period must 
prove most ruinous to British Interests in that quarter." 
Maillard was the author of a work on Texas, written to 
arouse sympathy with Mexico in her efforts to reconquer that 
province. 

82 F. O. Mexico, 142, Dom. Var. 



5^ THE NEGOTIATIONS OF TREAT AND HAMILTON. 

quately paid, except those of the members of Congress, 
who, " in consideration of their Gigantic labors, and 
the risk they run of being bowie-knived during debate 
(a custom of by no means rare occurrence)," re- 
ceived fairly reasonable salaries. But when he turned 
from a narration of events and conditions to the role 
of advocate and prophet, he became most enthusiastic, 
and acknowledged that the political leaders of the 
State were men of " talent, worth, and respectability." 
He urged that should England promptly recognize 
Texas, it would be quite possible to check the growth 
of slavery in the State, and ultimately to see it eradi- 
cated. He went even further and asserted that if 
Great Britain desired to make it a sine qua non that 
slavery be abolished, Texas would consent, if not to 
immediate abolition, at least to a scheme of apprentice 
emancipation. In conclusion, he spoke of the per- 
fectly explainable anger of Texas at the refusal of the 
United States to annex, and dwelt upon the great 
commercial interest of England in developing that 
State as a place for the supply of raw cotton indepen- 
dent of United States influence. He believed " that 
twenty years would not pass away before England (if 
necessary), might exclude every bale of cotton made 
in the States." 

From such letters as the preceding, Palmerston 
gathered general information as to Texan conditions 
at the time he signed the treaties. These treaties were 
three in number. The first, signed on November 13, 
was a treaty of commerce and navigation. Its pro- 
visions were similar to those commonly inserted in any 
treaty providing for commerce between two countries. 



THE NEGOTIATIONS OF TREAT AND HAMILTON. 59 

The second treaty, signed on November 14, was in 
form a " Convention containing Arrangements relative 
to the Publick Debt." 33 It recited that Great Britain 
had offered her mediation between Texas and Mexico, 
that Texas had accepted that offer, and that in case 
a successful mediation with Mexico was accomplished 
within six months after the convention was communi- 
cated to the Mexican government and a treaty of peace 
signed, Texas would assume one million pounds ster- 
ling of the foreign debt contracted by Mexico before 
January 31, 1835. The third treaty, for the suppres- 
sion of the African slave-trade, was signed on Novem- 
ber 16, and provided for a mutual right of search by 
a certain limited number of cruisers of each nation, 
with the further limitation that such right of search 
could be exercised only when specific warrants had 
been issued to the commanders of the cruisers indi- 
cated. 3 * 

These treaties were to be ratified within six months, 
and upon such ratification British recognition of Texan 
independence would, in fact, be assured. It is ap- 
parent that Palmerston believed that there existed no 
immediate danger of an American annexation of 
Texas, and that Texas herself desired independence of 
the United States. This belief is in part traceable to 
Hamilton's arguments. On the other hand, in regard 
to the question of the slave-trade, there was in Palmer- 
ston's mind at this particular moment a desire to bring 
pressure upon the United States in order to secure 
from that government at least a limited right of search. 

83 Sessional Papers, 1842, Commons, Vol. 45, for texts of 
first and second treaties. 
"Sessional Papers, 1842, Lords, Vol. 11. 



60 THE NEGOTIATIONS OF TREAT AND HAMILTON. 

Throughout the two preceding years the abuse of the 
American flag by the slave-traders had been steadily 
increasing, as had also the irritation felt in America 
at British interference with vessels sailing under it. 
The matter was approaching a crisis, and Palmer- 
ston unquestionably hoped to use this slave-trade 
treaty with Texas as an example of what the American 
government ought to be willing to concede. The recog- 
nition of Texas by Palmerston was, therefore, a result 
of a variety of motives, none of them in any sense re- 
jecting upon the diplomacy or the motives of the 
British nation, and all of them perfectly compatible 
with a friendly yet open rivalry with the United States 
for a controlling influence in the Gulf of Mexico. 



V 



. I 



CHAPTER III. 

1841. British Recognition Postponed. Kennedy's 
Mission to Texas. 

The year 1840 had seen the failure of Treat's mis- 
sion to Mexico and the preparation by the signing of 
treaties between Hamilton and Palmerston for a Brit- 
ish recognition of Texas. It could hardly be expected, 
therefore, that in the year 1841 Mexico would look 
with friendly eyes upon a renewal of overtures from 
Texas. Sufficient time had not yet elapsed to make it 
probable that a new negotiation could succeed where 
two had so recently failed. Both in Mexico and in 
England, also, conditions in domestic politics were ab* 
sorbing public attention to the exclusion of Texan mat- 
ters. Meantime Pakenham's conviction of the weak- 
ness of the Mexican state and of the probable rapid 
development of the revolted province was unshaken. 
Further evidence of his unchanged mind regarding 
Mexico is found in a long despatch to Palmerston, in 
which he outlined a plan for British acquisition of 
California. 1 Of this, of course, the Mexican govern- 
ment was wholly in ignorance. It was, however, cog- 
nizant of too many of Pakenham's acts and offers to 
be free from suspicion of English policy, and with the 
official announcement from London that Texas was 
about to receive British recognition an indirect news- 
paper attack was made upon England and her agents. 
The news reached Mexico in January, and in that 

1 See Chapter XI. 

5 61 



62 



BRITISH RECOGNITION POSTPONED. 



month and in February the newspapers were filled 
with indefinite charges and vague threats, all, ap- 
parently, directed against the English government, 
and betraying the sense of outraged national pride 
and that romantic patriotic bluster which was the 
country's striking characteristic as it was its greatest 
misfortune. This false patriotism, to which Paken- 
ham had already called attention, violently demanded 
that Texas should be reconquered, but Pakenham 
noted that the government took no steps toward at- 
tacking the revolted province. Occasionally the gov- 
ernment resorted to petty methods as an expression of 
Mexico's irritation with England. As an instance of 
this, Pakenham found the French flag in the place of 
honor at an official ball in March, with the British flag 
next below. Considering his country to be insulted, 
Pakenham felt called upon to protest, and he de- 
manded that the British flag be placed above that of 
France, adding, however, that he would not object 
if the United States flag were placed above those of 
all other countries, since the United States had been 
the first government to recognize Mexico. The officials 
present at the ball disclaimed any responsibility for the 
arrangement as it existed, but finally traced the matter 
to a French " artiste " who had had charge of the 
decorations. They refused, however, to make the 
change demanded by Pakenham, and that gentleman 
went up into a gallery, himself took down the British 
flag, and with it in his care left the ball, followed by 
all the English residents. Relatively unimportant, 
though reported by Pakenham in a serious vein, 2 this 

2 F. O. Mexico, 144, Pakenham to Palmerston, March 26, 
184 T. 



BRITISH RECOGNITION POSTPONED. 63 

incident serves to show the temper of the British 
representative at Mexico and something of the arro- 
gant treatment to which this much harrassed govern- 
ment was obliged to submit from British ministers. 

The flag affair was only another irritant to Mexico, 
and in May more newspaper articles appeared, criti- 
cizing the treaties between England and Texas. In 
one of these the exact language of a confidential note 
which Pakenham had addressed to the government 
on March n was repeated. The article in question 
met the armistice proposals of Pakenham's note, but 
asserted that the great underlying purpose of England 
in the Texas negotiation was not to aid Mexico but to 
check United States expansion; that Mexico, in 
English policy, was but a catspaw to be used at any 
moment when it suited English interests. There was, 
further, a sneering allusion to Great Britain's professed 
anxiety for the extinction of slavery, while she pre- 
pared to recognize Texas without referring to that in- 
stitution. The article did not indicate that Pakenham 
was the author of the proposals credited to England, 
but the use of his note naturally convinced him that 
responsibility for the publication must lie with some 
one high in authority in the Mexican government. He 
protested against such use of 'his diplomatic corre- 
spondence, but secured no satisfaction from the min- 
ister of foreign affairs. 3 

Up to the middle of June, Pakenham had not as yet 
made any formal presentation of the plan outlined in 
the second of the British-Texan treaties, signed No- 
vember 14, 1840, looking toward a mediation between 

* F. O. Mexico, 145, Pakenham to Palmerston, June 10, 1841. 



64 BRITISH RECOGNITION POSTPONED. 

Texas and Mexico. Without direct instructions from 
Palmerston to bring this matter up formally, he had 
not thought the time ripe for its presentation. The 
Texan government, however, had sent the then Texan 
secretary of state, Judge Webb, to Mexico for the 
purpose of proposing directly to Mexico terms in ac- 
cordance with the treaty signed at London. Webb 
was refused permission to land at Vera Cruz, and sent 
his documents and proposals to Pakenham, asking his 
aid in getting a hearing. This was on June I. Paken- 
ham did all in his power to assist in the matter, and 
sent a note to Camacho, the foreign secretary, stating 
the object of Webb's mission, and urging a hearing 
for him. Both by note and in a personal meeting with 
Camacho he expressed again Great Britain's desire 
for peace between the countries, but in spite of his best 
efforts and all his arguments, he could get no con- 
cession. 

Camacho, in his reply to Pakenham's communica- 
tion in Webb's behalf, did not limit himself to a mere 
refusal, but attempted a reproof of what he considered 
British hypocrisy in the recognition of Texas. " Mr. 
Pakenham cannot but be aware that ever since the in- 
surrection of the Department of Texas they have been 
introducing and still are introducing into it, innumer- 
able slaves; a traffic which shocks humanity; which 
reason alone, even were there none other, would ever 
prevent the Mexican Republic and her Government 
from lending themselves to an act amounting to a 
sanction and acknowledgment of Slavery." * 

Admitting his present failure, it only remained for 

*F. O. Mexico, 145, Pakenham to Palmerston, June 10, 1841. 



g BRITISH RECOGNITION POSTPONED. 6$ 

Pakenham to notify Webb of the purport of the 
Mexican answer, and suggest that until there should 
be an official communication to Mexico of England's 
action, there would be little hope of getting anything 
done. As in the case of Treat, he again urged a pacific 
policy for Texas, and assured Webb that he still re- 
garded himself as a mediator for that State. 

Pakenham reported the entire matter to Palmerston 
on June io, 5 and stated that he had no hope of securing 
peace " a? long as the Government of Mexico re- 
mained in the hands of the present rulers." A change 
of government was indeed imminent, and the air was 
full of rumors as to the time and occasion of the revo- 
lution that all felt was inevitable. Such a change 
seemed very desirable to Pakenham. He wrote, " The 
conduct of the present Government of Mexico has 
lately been such as thoroughly to disgust every well 
thinking person and every well wisher to this Coun- 
try." 6 The long-expected revolution which placed 
Santa Anna again in authority followed. 7 Pakenham's 

5 F. O. Mexico, 145. 

11 Ibid. At this time it became Pakenham's duty, in response 
to instructions from England, to remind the Mexican govern- 
ment of a number of British claims, and to demand some 
sort of promise to English merchants. Many of these claims 
had been acknowledged by Mexico, but payment had been 
indefinitely postponed, and having his attention again called 
to the matter, Palmerston, in 1841, turned the affair over to 
Pakenham, who made a general representation, and so re- 
ported. F. O. Mexico, 146, Pakenham to Palmerston, August 
30, 1841. 

T Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna was born in 1795 and died 
in 1876. The " grey wolf " of Mexico, he is usually regarded 
as having been an evil influence in his country; always an in- 
triguer and revolutionist, ambitious for power, at heart a 



66 BRITISH RECOGNITION POSTPONED. 

description of its causes emphasizes the general dis- 
satisfaction on the part of Mexico with the high pro- 
tective policy of its government, with the heavy 
tariffs on foreign goods, and with the ditties levied on 
international trade. It does not specify the antiforeign 
sentiment of the previous year as contributary to the 
causes of the revolution, and it thus appears that 
Pakenham's information as to ultimate causes had 
come from the members of the new government. In- 
deed, he was now quite hopeful that, under Santa 
Anna, Mexico would secure a more centralized and 
powerful government. 

While there can be no question that Mexico was 
always deeply concerned at the loss of Texas, and was 
anxious to find some honorable outcome of a difficult 
situation, the records of 1841 show plainly that during 
that year at least, other questions conspired to push 
into the background her relations with Texas. For 
the moment, indeed, Mexican protests and Mexican 
policy centered upon the domestic situation, and while 
indignation might be expressed at the readiness of 
England to recognize Texan independence, this was 
rather intended for the public ear than as a key to 
future policy. Nevertheless, from the increased pres- 
sure brought upon the English government by British 

genuine despot, he advocated now this course, now that. He 
was president in 1832 and again in 1835, when his establish- 
ment of centralism in place of federalism gave to Texas the 
excuse for revolution. Captured in the attack on Texas, he 
was sent to Washington, and on his return to Mexico found 
his popularity gone; but his defence of Vera Cruz against the 
French in 1838 brought him to the front again, and on Oc- 
tober 10, 1841, he became provisional president and remained 
in power until December, 1844. 



BRITISH RECOGNITION POSTPONED. 67 

merchants regarding their claims upon Mexico it is 
quite clear that those merchants were aware of the 
Mexican unrest and were fearful that the Mexican 
state was about to fall to pieces. The merchants se- 
cured but scant satisfaction from Palmerston. When, 
in the autumn of 1841, Aberdeen replaced him after 
the fall of the Melbourne ministry, a number of let- 
ters addressed to the foreign office accused Palmer- 
ston of negligence, and urged upon Aberdeen an honor- 
able support of British interests. He adhered, how- 
ever, to the policy of his predecessor, and simply re- 
peated the instructions previously given by Palmer- 
ston, calling the attention of the Mexican government 
to the claims of British citizens. 

At London as well as at Mexico conditions were un- 
favorable to a continuance of Texan negotiations on 
the lines started and for the objects sought by Pal- 
merston. The treaties signed by Hamilton were not 
yet ratified, and it soon appeared that Hamilton had 
sent the first and second treaties by one messenger, 
while entrusting the slave-trade treaty to another. It 
thus resulted that the Texan legislature sanctioned 
the treaties of commerce and of mediation with no ap- 
parent knowledge of the treaty for the suppression 
of the slave-trade. That treaty did not reach Texas 
until after the adjournment of the legislature. Under 
the circumstances Palmerston refused to ratify the 
other treaties, and, in order that they might not fall to 
the ground, arranged to postpone the date for the ex- 
change of ratifications. Hamilton's questionable pro- 
ceedings in connection with this matter subjected him, 
both then and later, to suspicions as to his motives, and 



68 BRITISH RECOGNITION POSTPONED. 

these suspicions were undoubtedly well founded. He 
had in fact been given no authority to negotiate a slave- 
trade treaty, and he may well have hesitated to send it 
to Texas. Having failed to hurry Palmerston into a 
ratification of the first and second treaties, Hamilton 
renewed his efforts when Aberdeen came into office, 
urging in excuse for the non-arrival of the slave-trade 
treaty previous to the adjournment of the Texan legis- 
lature that he had entrusted it to a man (not named) 
especially well qualified to press it upon Texas, but that 
this man had fallen ill in New York, and had not 
reached Texas until too late. The affair certainly had 
the appearance of a cheap trick or ruse, though it is 
difficult to believe that Hamilton really expected that 
the British government would exchange ratifications 
for only two of these treaties when all three were 
necessary to carry out the plan agreed upon. He 
actually urged this, however, and when both Palmer- 
ston and Aberdeen had refused, had the temerity (as 
will be noted later) to propose still another treaty, as a 
necessary inducement in order to persuade Texas to* 
ratify that upon the slave-trade. 8 

In the meantime, Melbourne's government found 
itself in such difficulties that no attention could be 
given to Texan treaties, and during the summer of 
1 84 1 it was evident that a change of administration 
must soon take place. The government was in fact 
discredited in all directions, having failed in details of 
home policy, and having gradually alienated most of 
its friendly allies upon the continent of Europe by the 
foreign policy pursued in relation to Egypt and 
Turkey. In spite of a series of defeats upon minor 

8 F. O. Texas, 2, Hamilton to Aberdeen, September 11, 1841. 



BRITISH RECOGNITION POSTPONED. 69 

questions, Melbourne and his colleagues still clung 
to office, and the change did not come until August 30. 
In the new government Peel became prime minister, 
and Aberdeen took Palmerston's place at the foreign 
office. For three months the fall of the ministry had 
appeared inevitable to the English public, and it was 
not strange that Hamilton had found it impossible in 
the last few months to secure from Palmerston any 
attention to Texan affairs. He at once appeared be- 
fore Aberdeen with renewed hope and fresh devices, 
to present the old arguments in some new form and 
to urge still another treaty upon the English govern- 
ment. This project, as Hamilton sketched- it, had for 
its object the establishment of such close trade rela- 
tions between Great Britain and Texas as, if adopted, 
would give to the former a decided preference over 
all other nations in Texan trade. Great Britain was 
to pay but one half the amount of import duty levied 
on similar articles from other states. Other special 
privileges were mentioned, among them the right of 
Great Britain to a free purchase of ship timber from 
the Texan forests, a point upon which Hamilton laid 
much stress. On the other hand, Texan interests were 
to be secured by a British guarantee of the bonds of 
the Republic of Texas, for which Texas would pledge 
" her Revenues, Customs, Taxes and the proceeds gen- 
erally of the Sales of her public Lands." In addition 
to the commercial advantages to England and her 
guarantee of a Texan loan, which are here introduced 
for the first time, other provisions of the treaty called 
for the assumption by Texas of one million pounds of 
the Mexican debt as the price of recognition, and also 
provided for the location 01 lands in Texas in favor 
of Mexican bondholders. 



70 BRITISH RECOGNITION POSTPONED. 

In pointing out the advantages of this arrangement, 
Hamilton repeated many of the arguments previously 
presented to Palmerston, but placed more emphasis 
than formerly upon the danger of an American annex- 
ation of Texas and the necessity of prompt action to 
avert this. He painted in glowing colors England's 
advantage in having a constant source of cotton sup- 
ply outside of the United Sjtates, and appealed Uo 
British jealousy of the United States and British fear 
of an attack upon Canada by that country. Texas in- 
dependent would be, he said, both an ally of England 
against the United States as regards Canada and an 
efficient barrier against American ambitions in the di- 
rection of Mexico. With arguments carefully balanced 
and stated to appeal to national jealousy, pride, and 
commercial advantages, there was still no discussion 
of the slavery question. There was no concession that 
Texas might ultimately abolish slavery, yet Hamilton 
had the effrontery to urge that a great philanthropic 
object was to be attained, since this treaty giving a 
British guarantee to Texan bonds would probably se- 
cure from Texas the immediate ratification of the 
slave-trade treaty. It is quite possible that Hamilton's 
object in delaying the transmission of that treaty was 
to use it in securing the adoption of this new conven- 
tion, 9 for in all his efforts Hamilton was as much in- 
terested in securing financial support for Texas as in 

8 F. O. Texas, 2. Several letters from Hamilton to Aber- 
deen refer to this matter, but the project itself and Hamilton's 
argument in support of it exist in the form of copies preserved 
by the foreign office, for Hamilton asked that both the 
project and his argument be kept a secret from all save the 
members of the English cabinet, and that his documents be 
returned to him. 



BRITISH RECOGNITION POSTPONED. 7 l 

obtaining recognition. He was a good financial agent 
but a poor diplomat, at least in England, where good 
faith was essential. / r- ■'. 

On October 4 Aberdeen finally replied, refusing to 
take up the matter and insisting that the three treaties 
already signed were all that Great Britain would ne- 
gotiate for the present. Though definitely declining to 
discuss further treaty arrangements, Aberdeen con- 
sidered Hamilton's projects of sufficient importance 
to present them to the other members of the cabinet. 
The opinion of one expert adviser in such matters, 
Henry Goulburn, then chancellor of the exchequer, is 
on record, and practically embodies the foreign secre- 
tary's policy of the next few months in the Texan 
matter. 10 Goulburn's advice assumed that it was essen- 
tially the purpose of Great Britain to preserve friendly 
relations with the United States and to avoid any ap- 
pearance of conflict with American interests. Aber- 
deen's official acts were quite in harmony with the 
points made, as was his intention, expressed a little 
later, of sending a man to America with power to ne- 
gotiate on all matters of dispute between the two 
countries, with the hope that all difficulties might be 
amicably adjusted. The greater portion of Goulburn's 
letter is devoted to an analysis of the finances of 
Hamilton's scheme, of which he distinctly disapproved. 
With reference to the feeling which might be engen- 
dered ?n the United States, he wrote: — 

If this [trade preference! can be done what will be the feel- 
ing of the United States at being excluded from the supply 
of a Country peopled mostly by her own subjects and governed 
by a constitution framed on the model of that of the U. S. 

10 F. O. Texas, 2, Goulburn to Aberdeen, October I, 1841. 



7 2 Kennedy's mission. 

Will it not engender a feeling of animosity towards us and 
strengthen that party in America who are labouring to exclude 
our manufactures from the markets of the United States who 
are now without doubt our best customers. And will not this 
feeling be aggravated by the idea put forth by General Hamil- 
ton that Texas is to furnish us all the Cotton and Tobacco 
that Great Britain can require. 

There was no reason to believe that Aberdeen's suc- 
cession to the ministerial post would mean any radical 
change in policy. If Goulburn's opinion was repre- 
sentative of the ministry and of Aberdeen, their official 
action was to be determined by caution and delibera- 
tion. Palmerston had prepared to recognize Texas 
when the ratification of treaties should be exchanged, 
and for the present Aberdeen was content to take 
matters as he found them. Also there were other ques- 
tions of more immediate importance to claim his atten- 
tion, and he was as yet unfamiliar with the situation 
in Texas. As there was still no evidence that Texas 
intended to renew her offer to the United States, there 
was of course no excuse for haste in preparing meas- 
ures to prevent American annexation. 

Shortly after Hamilton's project had been declined, 
Aberdeen received from a Mr. William Kennedy sev- 
eral letters which exhibited much knowledge of Texan 
affairs and offered the writer's services for the further- 
ance of British interests. Kennedy was a young man 
of education, who had gone with Lord Durham to 
Canada in 1838. When Durham resigned, Kennedy 
traveled through the United States and into Texas, 
spending a large part of 1839 there. He was popular 
with the Texans, was well treated by them and was 
very favorably impressed by the new State. As a re- 



Kennedy's mission. 73 

suit of his sojourn he published in 1841 11 a two-volume 
work on the past and future of that commonwealth. 
Kennedy's presentation of the case for Texas does not 
concern itself with sentimental or moral issues. His 
examination into the matter of annexation is a ques- 
tion of statecraft argued on the basis of national power 
and commercial advantages. Great Britain's present 
opportunity was twofold : to extend relations and to 
check American expansion to the southwest. He 
asserted very positively in his work that the antislavery 
sentiment in the United States was not the only 
hindrance to the American annexation of Texas, but 
that the high-tariff faction in the North "opposed it, 
and that Texas herself would necessarily have to adopt 
free-trade principles. Thus mj ybt Texas become, in 
the hands of England, a weapon to break down the 
protective policy of America. Yet in most matters 
Kennedy wrote in a very fair spirit with regard to 
America, and with keen analysis of conditions as he 
saw Ihem. His book attracted much attention in Lon- 
don, for it was the first one issued there upon Texas, 
was so well written as to be certain to exercise influence, 
and was full of exact and detailed information. 

Kennedy, then, having produced his book, and hav- 
ing already been recommended by Hamilton to Pal- 
merston's attention, offered his services to Aberdeen. 
His first proposal was that the government should pay 
his expenses to Texas to secure the ratification of the 
unlucky slave-trade treaty. Kennedy's popularity in 
Texas was so great, he assured Aberdeen, that he 

11 William Kennedy, Esq. Texas : The Rise, Progress, and 
Prospects of the Republic of Texas. Two volumes, London, 
1841. 



74 Kennedy's mission. 

would have little difficulty in accomplishing this. 12 
Receiving no reply to this letter, he wrote again on 
October 20, stating his most recent intelligence from 
Texas, the probability of the election of Houston as 
president, and the necessity that some English agent 
should get in touch with the new officials of the Texan 
government. He urged that England must be active, 
and said, " A new revolution has broken out in Mexico 
— military associations for the purpose of overthrow- 
ing British rule and influence in North America have 
been formed, from Mexico to Missouri, — the planters 
of Cuba are growing impatient of British interference 
in the Slave Trade." He was " thoroughly convinced 
that, unless English influence be employed in raising 
up a stable independent power in the South-Western, 
and North- Western frontiers of the Union, a very few 
years will suffice to place the whole of the territory 
they covet under the Sovereignty of the United States. 
— There lies the danger to the Maritime and Commer- 
cial supremacy of Great Britain." Even this vivid 
prophecy of a menace to British power brought no 
answer from Aberdeen, and on November 6 Kennedy 
wrote again; he referred to the slavery question, and 
predicted that it would not be difficult to secure the 
abolition of slavery in that State if England would 
help Texas and said that he (Kennedy) could be useful 
in this cause. Finally, on November 8, Aberdeen ap- 
pointed an hour for an interview, and within a few 
days Kennedy had received some sort of a commission 
to go to Texas and report upon affairs there for the 
benefit of the British government. 

The exact nature of Kennedy's mission is not evi- 
" F. O. Texas, 2, Kennedy to Aberdeen, October 12, 1841. 



Kennedy's mission. 75 

dent from the correspondence between Kennedy and 
Aberdeen, either at this time or later. His letters are 
merely reports, and do not indicate that he had author- 
ity to act in any official capacity. However, the ratifi- 
cation of the slave-trade treaty was finally secured dur- 
ing his residence in Texas, and Kennedy appropriated 
to himself much credit for it, and emphasized his per- 
sonal intimacy with Texan officials. With how much 
justice he assumed the possession of such influence it is 
impossible to say, for the ideas and suggestions of an 
agent may not necessarily be those of his chief. The 
agent's proposal does not in the least involve his chief's 
acceptance of a policy. Nevertheless, the selection of 
Kennedy to go to Texas and report existing political 
conditions throws some light upon Aberdeen's attitude. 
He certainly knew Kennedy's book, and the opinions 
expressed in it must have appealed to him in some 
degree, or he would not have selected its author as his 
first agent to be sent to Texas. Kennedy's letter of 
November 13 to Aberdeen showed that his instructions 
were general in scope, but that they at least required 
his arrival in Texas before the adjournment of the 
Texan legislature. The only possible object in this was 
the opportunity for Kennedy to use his personal influ- 
ence with the legislature to bring about the ratification 
of the slave-trade treaty. Meanwhile, until the treaties 
were ratified, the man who was to occupy the^principal 
diplomatic post in Texas, Captain Charles Elliot, could 
not be sent there, and was still detained in London. 13 

13 F. O. Texas, 3, Palmerston to Elliot, August 4, 1841. 
Elliot received notification of his appointment as charge 
d'affaires at this time. The nomination was then made, but 
it was not until the summer of 1842 that Elliot finally went 
to Texas. 



76 Kennedy's mission. 

Kennedy left London in November of 1841. He 
wrote four letters from America, and one upon his 
return to England. 14 Before he reached Texas on his 
tour of investigation a change of administration had 
taken place; Houston had succeeded Lamar as presi- 
dent of the Republic, and Anson Jones was made sec- 
retary of state. Kennedy's letter from Galveston, Jan- 
uary 10, 1842, merely reported the general financial 
depression prevalent throughout the United States, 
and explained that this very depression had been favor- 
able to Texas because of the increased immigration 
there. He argued that any idea of Mexican reconquest 
was folly, and he urged the necessity of prompt action 
by Great Britain to secure the friendship of Texas in 
order to thwart what was undoubtedly a tendency of 
the moment toward annexation. He believed that the 
ratification of the slave-trade treaty had been delayed 
at the specific request of Hamilton, but for what rea- 
son is not stated. On January 28 Kennedy wrote from 
Austin that Congress was in session, and that he had 
succeeded in acquiring a great influence with its mem- 
bers. He again asserted that Hamilton was the cause 
of the delay in the ratification of the slave-trade 
treaty, and that it was only after he (Kennedy) had 
urged immediate ratification that it was secured and 
the favorable vote taken on January 22. He urged 
that England go so far, if necessary, as to force 
Mexico to make peace, and that quickly, and he en- 

14 The first of these letters was dated December 10, from 
New York ; the second, January 10, from Galveston ; the third, 
January 28, from Austin ; the fourth, March 8, from New 
Orleans. They appear in F. O. Texas, 3. There is a fifth 
letter in F. O. Mexico, 158, Dom. Var., after his return to 
England. 



Kennedy's mission. 77 

closed a personal letter from Houston desiring Ken- 
nedy to inform the British minister that Hamilton 
alone was responsible for the earlier . failure to ratify 
the slave-trade treaty. Kennedy reported later that 
Hamilton had been dismissed in disgrace. If Aber- 
deen believed all of Kennedy's report, he understood 
that Hamilton was utterly discredited in Texas. 

After a tour in western Texas, Kennedy reached 
New Orleans in March, and from there went directly 
to England. It is perfectly clear from his letters that 
whatever his instructions were, he imposed himself 
upon the people at Austin as a representative of the 
British government, and stated that the policy which 
he urged upon the Texan government was such as 
would be sanctioned by Aberdeen. There is no evi- 
dence that he was authorized to take this stand, but 
on the other hand there was no reproof administered 
by Aberdeen. His last letter was written after landing 
in Liverpool on April 20. In it he vaunts his own 
influence in thwarting an annexation scheme in Texas : 
" I do not think I arrogate too much to myself in 
saying that the confidence reposed in me by the Gov- 
ernment and people of Texas materially contributed to 
allay the excitement in favor of an immediate annexa- 
tion to the United States. ... I obtained, at all events, 
a suspension of the question until the dispositions of 
Great Britain could be known." 15 Very soon after 

15 F. O. Mexico, 158, Dom. Var. In the same volume ap- 
pears a letter from Hamilton to Aberdeen, March 25, 1842, 
written from Charleston, South Carolina. In this, Hamilton 
makes a vigorous complaint of Kennedy, and charges him 
with having spread false reports as to his (Hamilton's) 
activity in London. Houston is attacked viciously also. The 
tone of the letter shows an extreme anger which must have 
6 



7& Kennedy's mission. 

his return to England, Kennedy accepted an appoint- 
ment from the Texan government as consul-general in 
London, but he held this for a short time only, resign- 
ing to accept the position of British consul at Gal- 
veston. 

As to Aberdeen's action in selecting Kennedy as his 
emissary at this time, it is a safe conclusion that he 
was sent over to Texas to gather useful information 
for England from all available sources. It is obvious 
that accurate information upon public or official mat- 
ters would be more accessible to a man who knew the 
country and was popular with the people than to a 
stranger. Possibly, too, Kennedy's influence may have 
been counted on as of some assistance toward the rati- 
fication of the slave-trade treaty. But that Aberdeen's 
policy at this time proposed British assistance toward 
the up-building of the Texan State or British pres- 
sure upon Mexico is most unlikely. It is improbable 
that Kennedy's mission signified a deeper purpose than 
appeared upon its face, and the logical conclusion must 
be that his comprehensive reports were rather to con- 
tribute toward determining a policy than to further one 
already agreed upon. 

injured Hamilton in the estimate of Aberdeen. There is a 

letter also from Hamilton to Kennedy, written on March 4 

from New Orleans, full of insults to Kennedy, and with a 
virtual challenge to fight a duel. 



CHAPTER IV. 

1842, January to June. The Montezuma and the 
Guadaloupe. 

The year 1842 marks the development of a definite 
British foreign policy with regard to Texas, though 
the earlier months of that year show Aberdeen tread- 
ing uncertainly in the path of his predecessor. Under 
Palmerston, Great Britain favored an independent 
Texas, openly, and occasionally at some risk to Eng- 
lish-Mexican relations. Presuming to dictate to Mex- 
ico, unsympathetic with its people, and lacking confi- 
dence in its government and future, Palmerston boldly 
embraced a policy which looked to the strengthening 
of the Texan State. Supported by Pakenham, whose 
enthusiasm and confidence regarding Texas were un- 
bounded, and believing in the people and the develop- 
ment and power of that State, Palmerston had been the 
more easily brought to a line of action which incident- 
ally served to stimulate resistance to United States ex- 
pansion. 

Aberdeen, on the other hand, was slow to find him- 
self, anxious to be just, and desirous of avoiding any 
rupture with Mexico. He determined eventually on 
a line of policy differing, to be sure, from Palmerston's 
in inspiration and motive, but somewhat resembling it 
in operation and effect. While each minister desired 
to preserve friendly relations with both states where 
possible, Aberdeen's policy was essentially and char- 
acteristically conservative, and showed a desire to see 

79 



SO THE MONTEZUMA AND THE GUADALOUPE. 

Mexico resume here earlier vigor and a readiness to 
assist her back to a dignified place among the new- 
world nations. This indicated not so much less faith 
in Texas as a greater belief in the inherent strength of 
Mexico, and a conviction that British interests were 
conserved where a reinvigorated Mexico could oppose 
itself to the United States, should occasion demand it. 
Such a policy necessarily meant gentler pressure upon 
Mexico to recognize Texas. The change of tone in 
British policy is indicated by the change of tone in 
Pakenham's reports, for throughout his career at the 
Mexican capital Pakenham very accurately reflected 
the attitude of the government at home. 

Up to 1842 Pakenham had given the Texan govern- 
ment credit for honorable and upright methods, and 
had been flattered by the willingness of Texan agents 
to submit to his advice. In February he was the sub- 
ject of a trick upon the part of Hamilton, who was 
making desperate efforts to regain prestige and influ- 
ence in the affairs of Texas. Though already dis- 
credited at home, according to Kennedy's report, Ham- 
ilton asked Pakenham to transmit to Santa Anna a 
sealed packet, describing it as merely a personal letter 
" of a confidential character." The packet contained 
in reality an offer of a bribe to Santa Anna if he would 
make peace with Texas. While Santa Anna was only 
amused at Hamilton's cleverness in getting this bribe 
before him, and related the matter to Pakenham as a 
joke, Pakenham himself was naturally very angry, and 
jumped to the conclusion that Texan agents were 
wholly unscrupulous. 1 

1 F. O. Mexico, 153, Pakenham to Aberdeen, February 17, 
1842. 



THE MONTEZUMA AND THE GUADALOUPE. ol 

In any case, Pakenham was now finding the new 
Mexican government more reasonable in its conduct of 
affairs than the previous government had been. A 
delicate situation had arisen in connection with the 
ill-fated and unauthorized Santa Fe expedition, in 
which some three hundred and twenty adventurers 
from Texas, seeking to revolutionize New Mexico, had 
been captured by Mexican troops in September, 1841, 
and sent to Mexico. Many of these claimed to be 
British citizens and traders, and denied having any 
part in a conspiracy to overthrow the government of 
New Mexico. Pakenham naturally doubted the hon- 
esty of such denials, but had to come forward and ask 
generous treatment for those who claimed his protec- 
tion. 2 Believing the prisoners to be lawless adven- 
turers, he was reluctant to act, and it was only after 
the American prisoners were released upon a threat 
from the American government that he bestirred him- 
self to insist upon the release of British prisoners. 
His action in the matter was characterized by great 
delicacy, however, and reflected the new gentleness of 
treatment which Aberdeen affected toward Mexico. 

While relations with Mexico were thus placed upon 
a better footing, those with Texas were endangered by 
Houston's declaration of a blockade of the Mexican 
coast. To Pakenham such a blockade seemed prepos- 
terous. Any effective blockade of such a stretch of 
coast he believed it absolutely impossible for Texas to 
maintain. In addition, he construed this Texan block- 

2 F. O. Mexico, 153, Pakenham to Aberdeen, January 31, and 
February 17, 1842. Among these prisoners was one Falconer, 
a brother-in-law of Roebuck, a prominent member of the 
British Parliament. 



82 



THE MONTEZUMA AND THE GUADALOUPE. 



ade as showing a lack of consideration for British in- 
terests in the Gulf of Mexico, and wrote that the block- 
ade was " a foolish attempt to intimidate and insult the 
Government of Mexico ; but what is more deserving of 
attention as far as we are concerned is the disregard 
for the interests of neutral trade manifested by the 
Government of Texas in resorting to a measure of this 
kind, and under such circumstances." Evidently Pak- 
enham expected Aberdeen to refuse to acknowledge 
the blockade and he urged immediate action, since, in 
the event of damages to British vessels as a result of 
the blockade, it would be impossible to obtain satisfac- 
tion from the Texan government. 3 He cited the in- 
stance of the " Eliza Russell " as a case in point. The 
explanation of Pakenham's attitude in this connection 
must be found in the changed point of view of the 
British ministry, as no action of Texas at this time 
would warrant so radical a change of temper. 

The blockade did indeed vex the British government, 
although at first the determination was made to recog- 
nize it, and notification that it existed was duly printed 
in the " Gazette." British merchants were not slow 
to protest, and such pressure was exerted that it is 
not strange that in September another item in the 
" Gazette " gave notice that Great Britain refused 
longer to recognize it. 4 Fortunately, before this 
date, and before Great Britain's action could be known 

a F. O. Mexico, 153, Pakenham to Palmerston, April 16, 1842. 

* F. O. Mexico, 158 and 159, Dom. Var. These volumes con- 
tain many letters of protest against the recognition of the 
blockade. The letters are numerous during May and June, 
and the Mexican and South American Association of Mer- 
chants in particular made vigorous protests, repeating them 
nearly every week. 



THE MONTEZUMA AND THE GUADALOUPE. 83 

in Texas, Houston, on September 12, had himself re- 
called the declaration of blockade. Without question 
the entire proceeding was a mistake. It served no 
purpose, and only resulted in a momentary irritation 
at London. It was fortunate for Houston's position 
that he had revoked the blockade before he knew of 
Aberdeen's refusal of recognition. Thus up to mid- 
summer of 1842 British policy was clearly directed 
toward maintaining friendly relations with Mexico, 
with slightly less deference to Texan interests. With 
no intention of sacrificing the interests of the newer 
state, and with a determination to keep within such 
bounds as would bear international scrutiny, there was 
a distinct emphasis upon British-Mexican friendship. 
In May of this year a situation arising out of the 
Texan-Mexican difficulties, and a direct result of the 
Texan blockade, called for the immediate attention of 
the British ministry. Aberdeen's conduct of this more 
or less intricate business carried the pro-Mexican 
policy so far that England was subjected to consider- 
able criticism, and Texas at least was left with the 
impression that British neutrality was more nominal 
than actual. In April of 1842 there was brought to 
light a contract between Murphy, the Mexican minister 
to Great Britain, and the English firm of Lizardi and 
Company for two vessels of war for the Mexican 
government. One of these vessels, the " Guadaloupe," 
was built at Liverpool, and was to be ready in June. 
The other, the " Montezuma," building at London, 
was to be delivered later. Both were iron war-ships, 
the crews were to be recruited in England, and they 
were to be sent to Mexico under the command of offi- 
cers in the English navy who had secured leaves of 



84 THE MONTEZUMA AND THE GUADALOUPE. 

absence for that purpose. Various Englishmen inter- 
ested in Texas believed that these vessels had been con- 
tracted for under Melbourne's ministry, and that the 
Admiralty was responsible for their plans and models. 
This seems wholly unlikely in view of Palmerston's 
friendly attitude toward Texas, and there is nothing 
in the correspondence at the Record Office to corrobor- 
ate such a suspicion. 

The first reference to the matter occurs in a corre- 
spondence between Murphy and Aberdeen in the spring 
of 1842. 5 This shows that Lizardi and Company had 
agreed to furnish the two steamers to Mexico and 
that delivery was to be made at Vera Cruz. It must 
be assumed that the attention of the foreign office was 
first attracted to the negotiation for the Mexican ships 
when, on April 28, a communication from Lizardi and 
Company was received asking permission to place can- 
non on board and otherwise arm the vessels. On May 
11 Aberdeen wrote Murphy desiring him to explain or 
confirm the statement of Lizardi and Company. In 
reply the Mexican minister vouched for the statements 
made, and asked that the ordnance office be instructed 
by Aberdeen to authorize the regular agents for the 
supply of guns to English vessels to furnish cannon for 

G The letters treating of these two vessels appear in various 
documents. The correspondence between Lizardi and Com- 
pany and the foreign office, and that between the foreign office 
and the ordinance office, is in F. O. Mexico, 158, Dom. Var. 
The letters between Murphy and Aberdeen are in F. O. Mex- 
ico, 157, Dom. Those between Smith and Aberdeen are in 
F. O. Texas, 5. In detailing this incident the footnote refer- 
ences will not be cited except where it is necessary to state 
the date of a letter. In each case the exact references may 
be found by referring to the general statement just made as 
to the place of correspondence. 



THE MONTEZUMA AND THE GUADALOUPE. 85 

these ships. To this request no immediate reply was 
made, and Murphy was left to draw what conclusion 
he might. It goes without saying that without Aber- 
deen's permission nothing could be done about arming 
the ships. 

In the meantime, Kennedy, acting as Texan consul- 
general in London, got wind of this affair and bestirred 
himself immediately. In conjunction with Ashbel 
Smith, the new Texan minister to Great Britain, whose 
arrival on May 10 was most opportune, a protest was 
prepared voicing what they assumed to be the Texan 
point of view and urging the detention of the vessels. 6 
This protest, presented to Aberdeen on May 30, was 
reinforced by a personal communication from Smith, 
who, in his official capacity, had other matters to 
present to the foreign secretary. Smith's errand to 
England charged him with the closing formalities in 
connection with the exchange of ratifications of the 
British-Texan treaties, and the discussion of that 

8 Ashbel Smith was born at Hartford, Connecticut, in 1805, 
and was educated at Yale, receiving his collegiate degree in 
1824 and his medical degree in 1828. He at once went south 
in search of practice and carried on his profession in North 
Carolina until 1836, at which time he removed to Texas and 
immediately became identified with political affairs there. 
President Houston selected Smith as the best man to be sent 
to England to secure the ratification of treaties and the friend- 
ship of Great Britain. Smith was recalled in 1844, and was for 
a short time secretary of state under President Anson Jones. 
He served in the Mexican War and again in the Con- 
federacy. After the Civil War he retired to a plantation 
near Galveston, resuming his practice only in times of emer- 
gency, as on the appearance of the yellow fever scourge. He 
wrote many scientific treatises, helped found the University 
of Texas, and was a regent of that institution. He died 
in 1886. 



86 THE MONTEZUMA AND THE GUADALOUPE. 

affair gave opportunity for a word in behalf of the 
protest. The important business of Smith's visit to 
London was, of course, the conclusion of treaty ar- 
rangements, and the fact that in the last ten days of 
May he addressed a number of letters to Aberdeen 
urging immediate ratification shows that he was bend- 
ing every energy toward gaining his end. Possibly 
he hoped to have finished with the treaties before 
pushing the other matter, and he may have feared that 
a criticism of British action might imperil the success 
of his real enterprise. This would account for the 
delay in presenting the protest. 

Between May n and May 31 no acknowledgment 
of Murphy's petition was made and no authority was 
given by Aberdeen for placing arms on board the ves- 
sels. On May 31, however, a letter was finally drafted 
in the foreign office which refused to authorize Lizardi 
and Company to arm the ships, but permitted the pur- 
chase of the arms themselves. To justify this ex- 
tremely fine distinction, Aberdeen argued that there 
was no reason to object to a purchase of arms if they 
were placed in the hold of the vessel and not mounted 
while the vessel was in an English port. The letter, 
which was addressed to Murphy, regretted the inability 
of the foreign office to grant the authorization asked, 
but instead of being despatched to Murphy it was 
promptly pigeonholed. Some ground of uncertainty 
or suspicion in Aberdeen's mind, perhaps due to the 
protest and visit of Smith on May 30, or to his various 
letters of the ten days preceding, may have operated to 
withhold the letter to Murphy. At any rate, Murphy 
was still kept in ignorance of Aberdeen's intention, and 
it was not until June 2 that any action was taken at 



THE MONTEZUMA AND THE GUADALOUPE. 8? 

the foreign office which served to enlighten him. On 
that elate Aberdeen finally transmitted to the ord- 
nance office a formal request to permit Murphy to 
purchase arms from the firm of Walker Brothers, of 
the Gospel Oak Iron Works. On June 7 the ord- 
nance office gave its authorization. This arrange- 
ment was really quite in harmony with the plan out- 
lined in Aberdeen's letter to Murphy of May 31, as 
it is evident that the minister still had in mind the 
plan of permitting arms to be placed on board the 
vessels in case they were not mounted and in position. 
But this same letter to Murphy was still" held back 
and, in fact, was retained at the foreign office for six 
weeks before being transmitted. 

With the consent of the ordnance office, prepara- 
tions regarding arms for the Mexican ships advanced, 
and by June 14 Smith became convinced that the 
government was taking no steps to prevent the depart- 
ure of the vessels. Apparently he had believed up to 
that time that, as a result of his interview with Aber- 
deen on May 30, the British government would have 
nothing to do with these vessels and would even pre- 
vent their sailing. Finding himself mistaken, he im- 
mediately renewed his protest, only to be informed by 
Aberdeen that the action of the British government 
was not inconsistent with its neutrality, and that he 
had refused permission to the vessels to arm in English 
ports. The " Guadaloupe " sailed for America the 
same month. 

Meanwhile, Smith and Aberdeen were fast coming 
to an agreement with regard to the Texan treaties, 
and on June 28 those treaties were finally ratified, 
thus completing British recognition of the indepen- 



88 THE MONTEZUMA AND THE GUADALOUPE. 

dence of Texas. Smith's conduct of this difficult affair 
was characterized by dignity and skill, and the fine 
diplomatic form of his correspondence won for him 
Aberdeen's warm personal approval. Succeeding 
Hamilton of doubtful methods and uncertain motive, 
his demeanor and success were the more noteworthy, 
and his correspondence was wholly different in tone 
from that of his predecessor. Smith did not drop the 
subject of the Mexican ships without another effort, 
and, after learning of the departure of the " Guada- 
loupe," he renewed his protest, indirectly accusing the 
British government of having really prepared these 
vessels and fitted them out in order to aid Mexico in 
striking a blow at Texas. Without waiting for the 
results of his communication, he then went to the 
Continent. 

Apparently Aberdeen was in a quandary. The 
" Guadaloupe " had left England in June. The offi- 
cers and crew were already enlisted for the " Monte- 
zuma," and she also was nearly ready for departure. 
English naval officers had secured the permission of 
the Admiralty to go out in command of the vessels. 
To the granting of this 'permission Aberdeen had 
made no objection, and the " Guadaloupe " had sailed 
under English officers. Later, however, a letter from 
the Admiralty to Addington shows that Aberdeen had 
expressed a desire for the recall of such permission, 
and on July 7 Aberdeen recommended that the leave 
of absence granted to the officers be stopped at once. 
This was done on July 8, but even in carrying out 
Aberdeen's suggestion the Admiralty opened a way for 
the officers by stating that there was no objection to 



THE MONTEZUMA AND THE GUADALOUPE. 89 

their retaining their situations on board their vessels 
if those vessels were unarmed. 7 

On July 15 Aberdeen's letter of May 31, containing 
permission to buy arms but not to mount them on 
board, was finally brought to light and transmitted to 
Murphy. On the following day, July 16, Aberdeen as- 
sured Smith by letter of his refusal to permit the arm- 
ing of the vessels. That he knew that guns were being 
placed on board at that very time there can be no 
doubt, and it is also clear that he preferred not to 
state the whole case to the Texan minister. It was 
necessary to steer a middle course to maintain the 
friendship of Mexico and at the same time make 
reasonable concessions to Smith's demands. He wrote, 
" The British Government are determined to maintain 
a strict neutrality in the contest between the two 
powers and not to give to the one a facility or advan- 
tage which is not equally conceded to the other." 
Adding further, " No English official holding the 
Queen's Commission will be allowed to serve in the 
Mexican Navy against Texas." 

To complicate further the already difficult situation 
of the " Montezuma " both for the foreign office and 
for the Mexican purchasers, the customs officials were 
notified of the boat's sailing and obliged to take a hand 
in the matter. General Hamilton, who was once more 
in England, presented to the customs officials an affi- 
davit stating that the " Montezuma " was about to sail 
in violation of the Foreign Enlistment Act. By that 
act " the treasury board was empowered to seize and 
confiscate vessels equipped, furnished, fitted out, or 

7 F. O. Mexico, 158, Dom. Van, Barrow to Addington, July 
8, 1842. 



90 THE MONTEZUMA AND THE GUADELOUPE. 

armed to make war against a country at peace with 
England." 8 The customs authorities decided that the 
law had been violated, and held the vessels until the 
matter could be referred to some superior authority. 
The facts in the case were that Lizardi and Company, 
acting under the authorization of Aberdeen given in 
the first week in June, had placed guns, ammunition, 
and other utensils of war in the hold of the " Monte- 
zuma," and had made such other preparations as would 
have permitted the mounting of these guns in a very 
short time. When the customs officials prevented the 
departure of the " Montezuma " and the Admiralty 
ordered Captain Cleaveland of the British navy to 
leave the vessel, both Lizardi and Company and Mur- 
phy thought themselves ill used by the English 
government, and on August 17 Murphy protested to 
Aberdeen, recalling to his attention the authorization 
of the ordnance office on June 7. Aberdeen's answer, 
on August 22, was that the foreign office had no con- 
trol over the customs officials in such matters, but an 
investigation would be made. Murphy regarded him- 
self as deceived, and protested that he had followed 
exactly the suggestions made by Aberdeen. Aber- 
deen's reply was that " it is not the fact of arms having 
been placed on board the ' Montezuma ' which has 
occasioned her detention ; but the circumstances of her 
general equipment and fitting up as a ship of war." 8 

8 Worley, 23. 

9 It appears in F. O. Mexico, 159, Dom. Var., that before 
Murphy protested against the detention of the " Montezuma," 
Aberdeen had heard of the matter and had investigated it. He 
was without question surprised at the action of the customs 
officials, and was somewhat troubled and annoyed by it. 
Aberdeen to Sir George Clarke, August 15, 1842. 



THE MONTEZUMA AND THE GUADELOUPE. 9 1 

In the end, after being held for nearly a month, the 
" Montezuma " was permitted to sail, but only after 
being stripped of most of her equipment and with her 
crew reduced to meet the requirements of an ordinary 
merchant vessel. Captain Cleaveland resigned his com- 
mission and went with the ship. Even this reduction 
in numbers and change in the equipment of the " Mon- 
tezuma " did not satisfy Smith, and just before the 
departure of the vessel on September 14 he again 
addressed a vigorous communication to Aberdeen, pro- 
testing against the departure of the vessel under any 
conditions. On September 19 Smith went so far as to 
assert that if the " Montezuma " were permitted to 
join the " Guadeloupe," the people of Texas would cer- 
tainly believe that Great Britain was seeking to aid 
Mexico. In his reply of September 27 Aberdeen de- 
fended his attitude with dignity and without apology, 
asserting that if the British government had desired to 
do so, it had a perfect right to permit Lizardi and Com- 
pany to arm the vessel, and that its refusal was un- 
mistakable evidence of its desire to preserve strict 
neutrality. 

That Aberdeen lacked perfect confidence in his own 
protestation may be assumed since at this very time 
in letters to the admiralty he expressed his vexation 
that the English officers had been permitted to go with 
the ships. On October 10 Smith presented to the for- 
eign office a very able and comprehensive argument 
directed against Aberdeen's interpretation of the duties 
of Great Britain as a neutral. A perusal of this com- 
munication reveals a familiarity with documents in 
the American embassy. This is not remarkable in it- 
self, as Smith was in fact in close touch with the 



92 THE MONTEZUMA AND THE GUADELOUPE. 

American minister at the time, yet the revelation of 
any such intimacy was a distinct tactical error upon 
his part if he desired to secure the friendship of Great 
Britain for Texas, and it did not take him long to 
realize this. After the exchange of a few more letters 
bearing upon the much discussed subject, Smith sud- 
denly dropped all communication with regard to the 
ships, and never again referred to them. Indeed, in 
a private letter to Houston he later acknowledged his 
error in continuing his protests after the vessels had 
departed, while Houston himself took the ground, and 
adhered to it ever afterward, that there had never been 
any occasion for protest. 

The question of international law here involved 
is precisely the same as later attracted wide-spread 
attention in the famous " Alabama " case during the 
progress of the American Civil War. In the present 
study, however, the chief interest hinges upon the 
probable motive of a foreign minister who with uncer- 
tainty and vacillation was seeking some guiding princi- 
ple in the matter of the ships. It is likely that the 
Texan declaration of a blockade had some part in 
persuading Aberdeen to wink at the semi-official assis- 
tance given to a strengthening of the Mexican navy. 
It is possible that he justified the purchase of arms for 
the ships merely as a matter of indirect protection to 
British trade. If Pakenham's interpretation of this 
incident was correct, then Aberdeen was influenced by 
both of these motives. Pakenham knew nothing of 
the fitting out of the ships until some time after the 
correspondence in regard to them had closed. On 
September 10 he wrote to Aberdeen 10 giving an ac- 

10 F. O. Mexico, 155. 



THE MONTEZUMA AND THE GUADELOUPE. 93 

count of the arrival of the " Guadeloupe," and stating 
that the English officers recently enlisted in Mexican 
service had been very careful to make it known that 
they had come without official British sanction. At the 
same time, British consuls were keeping in close touch 
with these English officers, and they were freely ten- 
lered such advice as might make them effective in their 
new capacities as officers of the Mexican navy. The suc- 
cess of this new Mexican naval force, commanded by 
English officers, Pakenham believed assured, and he 
predicted that the Texan navy would soon be swept 
from the Gulf of Mexico. He wrote that he expected 
soon to hear that the " Guadeloupe " " has captured 
or destroyed the Texas vessels." At the time he 
wrote this letter Pakenham certainly believed that the 
vessels were definitely intended by Great Britain to aid 
the Mexican government, and, consequently, that the 
British government, while technically neutral, was 
really hopeful of a Mexican victory over Texas. 

In fact, this seems the only reasonable explanation 
of Aberdeen's policy. That policy was wholly in line 
with what had gone before in 1842, and indeed the 
same policy was consistently maintained up to the ar- 
rival of Ashbel Smith. With the appearance of Smith, 
with his oft repeated protests, his personal influence, 
and his urgency in securing the ratification of the 
Texan treaties, there was a gradual divergence from 
what was probably the outlined course ; Aberdeen was 
forced to reconsider, he hesitated, and then adopted 
the policy of neutrality. Soon after came the signing 
of the Texan treaties, and Aberdeen, as was stipu- 
lated by these treaties, was obliged to go a step beyond 
mere indifferent neutrality in the effort to persuade 
Mexico to recognize Texas. This will appear later. 
7 



94 THE MONTEZUMA AND THE GUADELOUPE. 

No active steps were taken in this direction, how- 
ever, until after July. At this same time, also, it must 
be remembered that Aberdeen was vitally interested in 
the Ashburton negotiation in the United States, which 
had for its primary object the settlement of the vexed 
question of the northeastern boundary, but was in- 
tended also to secure, if possible, a removal of all 
causes of friction between Great Britain and the 
United States. Palmerston's retirement in England, 
and the appointment of Webster in America to the pos- 
ition of secretary of state had seemingly opened the 
way for a general adjustment of all difficulties pending 
between the two nations. The selection of Ashburton 
as the British negotiator of the proposed treaty was 
unquestionably intended to emphasize the conciliatory 
and friendly attitude of the government. 11 

Ashburton arrived in America in April, and his 
first reports were sanguine, stating the friendliness of 
his reception and the readiness of Webster to negotiate. 
He believed it possible to settle all matters in dispute. 12 

11 F. O. America, 378, Aberdeen to Ashburton, February 8, 
1842. This gives the instructions under which Ashburton left 
England. Aberdeen specified five points requiring negotiation, 
and stated thern in what he considered the order of their impor- 
tance: (1) northeastern boundary ; (2) Oregon boundary; (3) 
northwestern boundary, i. e., " frontier from Lake Huron to 
Lake Superior and from Lake Superior to the Lake of the 
Woods;" (4) the affair of the "Caroline;" (5) right of 
search. Aberdeen hoped that a treaty might be negotiated 
covering all these points. After Ashburton had sailed, sup- 
plementary instructions were sent him on March 31, but these 
in no way limited the scope of the negotiation. Thus, con- 
trary to Webster's assertions, Ashburton did have specific 
instructions. In the end he ventured to break away from 
them, when he came to realize that the negotiation would be 
more difficult than had been anticipated. 

u F. O. America, 379, Ashburton to Aberdeen, April 25, 1842. 



THE MONTEZUMA AND THE GUADELOUPE. 95 

This information was received in London just as the 
affair of the ships was coming to a head and almost 
coincident with the arrival of Ashbel Smith. There is 
no question that the negotiation in America had a direct 
bearing upon British policy toward Texas, and that 
the rosy prospect reported by Ashburton increased 
Aberdeen's disinclination to pursue Palmerston's policy 
of aiding in the creation of a powerful, independent 
state in Texas. 13 Both from the point of view of 
established British policy in support of Mexico and 
with the object of creating no embarrassments for 
Ashburton's negotiation, Aberdeen preferred to 
strengthen Mexico rather than Texas. A few weeks 
later, however, it had become evident that Ashburton 
had greatly overestimated the probable success of his 
mission, and that far from settling all points in dis- 
pute with the United States, he would be forced to 
content himself with a solution of the northeastern 
boundary difficulty and of a few minor questions. 
Even in the matter of the boundary Ashburton finally 
exceeded the limit of concessions permitted him by his 
first instructions. The treaty was indeed hailed in 
England as wholly satisfactory, and much credit for 

13 Alexander Baring, first Baron Ashburton, was born in 
1774 and died in 1848. His selection as British negotiator in 
1842 was definitely intended to indicate England's friendly 
and conciliatory policy toward the United States, for Ash- 
burton was well and favorably known in America. As a 
young man he had represented in Philadelphia his father's 
financial house, and had married in 1798 Miss Bingham, a 
belle of the city. He had a better acquaintance than most of 
his countrymen with American conditions, and frequently 
opposed, both in the press and in Parliament, British restric- 
tions on American trade. Ashburton's selection was popular 
in the United States. 



g6 THE MONTEZUMA AND THE GUADELOUPE. 

it was claimed by the ministry. In reality it was a 
distinct disappointment to Aberdeen, not so much be- 
cause of any yielding on the boundary question as be- 
cause of the failure to settle other matters. He knew 
by the first of June that the scope of the treaty would 
be greatly limited, and with this knowledge recognized 
the failure of his plan to place relations with the 
United States upon the basis of extreme friendship. 
A natural reaction brought him more and more to the 
idea of an independent Texas as a necessary barrier 
to American expansion, and thus gradually he recurred 
to Palmerston's plan. If Ashburton had succeeded in 
carrying through the original purpose of the British 
ministry and had settled all matters in dispute between 
the two countries, it is possible that Aberdeen might 
never have entered upon any plan to prevent the 
American annexation of Texas, though still distinctly 
opposed to it. But with the failure of the larger plan, 
he was more ready to become active in preventing that 
annexation, and to aid in the establishment of a power- 
ful and independent Texan State. 



CHAPTER V. 

1842, July to December. First British Offer of 
Mediation. Elliot in Texas. 

The exchange of ratifications which finally made 
the British-Texan treaties effective took place in Lon- 
don on June 28, 1842. It is worth noting that, as the 
wearisome negotiations looking to ratification were 
progressing in England, sentiment for Texas, or at 
least confidence in Texas, was on the wane in many 
quarters. England's duty, then, of urging upon 
Mexico the recognition of the new state was likely 
to be more perfunctorily than heartily discharged. 
In some measure this was due to rumors from 
Texas of the insecurity of the government and the 
lack of character and discipline in the motley Texan 
army. Pakenham's reports from Mexico during the 
greater part of 1842 were all such as to confirm this 
rather vague distrust of the Texan Republic, and as 
early as April of that year they expressed the belief 
that Texas was no longer to be regarded as a powerful 
state, and that the Texans were themselves weary 
of independence and were looking toward annexa- 
tion to the United States. Pakenham sent this 
information immediately after receiving a private 
letter from Kennedy, who was then in Texas, and 
without the knowledge that Kennedy had been 
commissioned by Aberdeen to report upon Texan 

97 



98 FIRST BRITISH OFFER OF MEDIATION. 

affairs. 1 In June, Pakenham sent to the foreign office 
an account of a New Orleans newspaper attack upon 
the British government. This paper accused England 
of encouraging Mexico in a vigorous opposition to the 
United States, and further, spread the rumor that Eng- 
land had guaranteed a loan of six million dollars to 
Mexico to enable her to reconquer Texas. 2 Pakenham 
denied the first accusation absolutely, stating that he 
had consistently endeavored to encourage harmonious 
relations between the United States and Mexico. In 
regard to the loan he admitted that these rumors had 
indeed some foundation, and gave the details of an offer 
that had been made to Mexico to raise thirty million 
dollars in England, half of which was to be paid in 
bonds of the old Mexican debt, while fifteen millions 
in cash were to be transferred to the Mexican govern- 
ment. The purpose of this plan was wholly commer- 
cial. In return for the loan, Mexico was to repeal im- 
port duties on cotton goods and to discontinue govern- 
mental support for the manufacture of cotton goods in 
Mexico. The plan provided that Great Britain was to 
guarantee the loan. Pakenham had definitely en- 
couraged the promoters of this scheme because he 
thought it would result advantageously for British 
trade. He had no confidence that the British govern- 
ment would guarantee this loan, but hoped some 

1 F. O. Mexico, 153, Pakenham to Aberdeen, April 7, 1842. 

2 Newspapers throughout the United States copied this 
statement, alloting much space to it and to similar rumors, 
and thus giving wide publicity to the notion that Great Britain 
was preparing to interfere in Texan affairs. Similar rumors 
had appeared before this, but none purporting to be based on 
such reliable information, and none furnishing such exact 
details, a9 in this case. 



FIRST BRITISH OFFER OF MEDIATION. 99 

other nation might. He was not so blind as to sup- 
pose for a moment that Mexico would use such a loan 
merely in the development of her general resources, 
but understood perfectly that money so secured would 
be immediately used in the preparation and equipment 
of an army to reconquer Texas. He was none the less 
in sympathy with the plan on that account, and, be- 
lieving also that the home government would not with- 
hold its sanction, he thought such a plan permissible 
and in line with British political interests. 3 

This plan for a loan is cited here, not because it 
brought any direct result, but because it indicates the 
trend of a policy. If Pakenham is to be regarded as 
reflecting what he understood to be Aberdeen's policy, 
then it is evident that the cardinal principle of that 
policy demanded, first, support for the Mexican gov- 
ernment. That much outside sentiment also favored 
governmental support of Mexico, even at the expense 
of Texas, is attested by the large number of unofficial 
letters addressed to the foreign office about this time. 
Among these, for example, was one from Captain H. 
Martin, an officer in the British navy, to Sir Robert 
Peel, written on July I, 1842, from Hamburg, urging 
upon the government the definite policy of strengthen- 
ing Mexico and refusing recognition to Texas. The 
writer interpreted a recent speech by Peel in Parlia- 
ment to mean that England would refuse such recog- 
nition until Texas should have abolished the slave- 
trade. He reasoned that Texas was but waiting for 
British recognition to stir new trouble with Mexico 
and force the United States into a policy of annexa- 
tion. Martin's information and his predictions were 

* F. O. Mexico, 154, Pakenham to Aberdeen, June 2, 1842. 



100 FIRST BRITISH OFFER OF MEDIATION. 

based upon letters received from Santa Anna, of whom 
Martin could speak from personal acquaintance, and 
he concluded his letter by urging Peel to break away 
from the follies of Palmerston's foreign policy. 4 Mar- 
tin wrote but two days after the treaties had been 
ratified, and of course could not know that the recog- 
nition he desired to avert was already a thing accom- 
plished. His letter was but one of the many offering 
gratuitous advice to the government at a time when 
its policy in regard to Texas had not been unfolded. 
Many of these communications contained informa- 
tion and expressed ideas which had a real bearing upon 
the questions involved and would undoubtedly influ- 
ence the ministry. The public was not in the con- 
fidence of the government, and until the treaty 
ratification was announced could interpret no definite 
intention from Aberdeen's official acts. The writers 
undoubtedly hoped to influence his policy. Yet the 
public itself was hardly more in the dark as to Aber- 
deen's ultimate purpose than he himself seems to have 
been. From whatever point of view the question is 
approached, and from all available information, it 
seems certain that until the ratification of the treaties 
Aberdeen was in doubt as to just what policy it was 
best to pursue. This is borne out by the facts cited in 
connection with the " Guadeloupe " and the " Monte- 
zuma," by the protests from Murphy and Smith re- 
spectively and Aberdeen's letters in reply, by Paken- 
ham's correspondence, and by letters from private 
persons. 
With the ratification of the treaties one feature of 

*F. O. Mexico, 158, Dom. Var. 



FIRST BRITISH 9FEEB OT MEDIATION. IOI 

British policy became clearly marked, and the ne: 
sary instructions from the foreign office fulfilling Eng- 
land's share in the compact were promptly sent. 
rdeen's instruction to Pakenham. dated July I, 
was very- carefully worded. 5 While the argurr.tr. :- 
presented differ very slightly from those advanced by 
Palmerston, which so angered the Mexican govern- 
ment and people., the form of the instruction was much 
more considerate and courteous. Pakenham wa- 
tell the Mexican Cabinet "that it is the earnest desire 
of H. M. Govt, to see peace permanently established 
between Mexico & Texas, that considering the po 
ful support with which Texas is likely to meet from 
the People — I speak not of the Govt. — of the Unil 
States, and the unlimited means of recruiting her 
forces both by land and Sea, which are within the 
reach of Texas by reason of her proximity to that 
Country, the sentiments of whose Citizens in ger. 
are strongly in favour of the Texians. H. M. Govt, 
can not but perceive all the difficulties which are 
likely to surround Mexico in her renewed attempt to 
recover possession of the sovereignty of Texas 
Thus Aberdeen acquitted the United States govern- 
ment of any duplicity in connection with Te 
Aberdeen believed also that Texas might actually be- 
come the ally of Mexico at some time in the future. 
and it is interesting to note that he believed the United 
States destined to break up into separate ^:i:es. 
'* Furthermore, a Nation which must, and will, one 
day become populous and powerful, would be thus 
interposed between Mexico and the United Sta:es : 

5 F. O. Mexico. 152 



102 FIRST BRITISH OFFER OF MEDIATION. 

and, in all probability, looking towards remote times, 
that Nation will become the ally, and main protec- 
tion of Mexico either against the United States, or 
against those States conterminous with Texas, into 
which that portion of the United States may in future 
times have separated." In addition to the warning 
given to Mexico for its own salvation, Mexican pride 
was appealed to in Great Britain's expression of her 
friendship and her paramount interest in Mexico. 
" The Mexican Govt, must be conscious that Great 
Britain can have no other object than to counsel that 
line of conduct which is sincerely and honestly be- 
lieved by them to be most advantageous to Mexico. 
Our inclinations and our interests equally concur in 
making us desire to see Mexico peaceful, prosperous, 
and happy: and, under the impression of these senti- 
ments, H. M. Govt, advise that course which they 
consider most fitted to bring about such a result." 

The ratification of treaties on June 28 forced this 
formal and perfunctory instruction of July 1. It was 
wholly in line with Aberdeen's state of mind at the 
time. In the fortnight that succeeded the forwarding 
of this instruction several events of lesser consequence 
in London may be recalled. It will be remembered 
that the foreign office, on July 8, withdrew a permis- 
sion given earlier for English officers to go out with 
the " Montezuma," that on July 15 Aberdeen finally 
sent to Murphy the long-delayed letter of May 31, 
stating the decision reached with regard to the arming 
of the " Montezuma," and that on July 16 he addressed 
a note to Smith, asserting that England's policy was 
one of strict neutrality. Recalling the persistence and 
energy of Smith at the time, his frequent protests, and 



FIRST BRITISH OFFER OF MEDIATION. 103 

the demands made upon Aberdeen's tact and skill in 
connection with the Mexican ships, and recalling also 
that just at this time it was evident Ashburton's mis- 
sion to America would be only partly successful, it 
is easy to see that the fortnight following the first 
instruction to Pakenham was charged with activities 
foretelling a more definite policy. These events and 
considerations resulted in the sending on July 15 of a 
second instruction to Pakenham upon the question of 
Mexican recognition of Texas in which Aberdeen ex- 
hibited a real anxiety for fear some folly on the part 
of Mexico would drive Texas into the arms of the 
United States. All of the old arguments were re- 
peated, but were here stated in much more emphatic 
language. 6 In particular, Aberdeen laid stress upon 
the difficulties of a Mexican reconquest of Texas, and 
prophesied that annexation to the United States would 
be a not impossible result. " You will represent to 
them the impossibility of preventing the interference 
of the People of the United States in this Contest: 
and you will endeavour to convince them that in the 
present state of publick feeling in that Country, 
neither the Supreme Government at Washington, nor 
the Local Governments of the States, however well 
disposed they might be to do so, could put a stop to 
that interference." 

He added, " even supposing the Mexicans should 
be able to overcome the difficulties which would be 
opposed to them by this increased assistance on the 
part of the United States, the result, after the most 
brilliant successes of the Mexican Arms, would prob- 
ably be, that the Texians would be compelled to in- 

"F. O. Mexico, 152. 



104 FIRST BRITISH OFFER OF MEDIATION. 

corporate themselves with the United States." In 
conclusion, Aberdeen warned Mexico that Great 
Britain would not assist her in any contest in which 
she became engaged with the United States : " Nor 
should they allow themselves to suppose that they can 
at any time count upon succour from Great Britain 
in their struggles with Texas, or with the United 
States. Great Britain is determined to remain strictly 
neutral." The sending of this second instruction so 
soon after the first can have no other explanation than 
that for some reason Aberdeen was exercised and 
anxious upon the subject of annexation. This was 
probably the result of the discovery that Smith was in 
close touch with the American minister in London, 
and that in his protest against the arming of the 
" Montezuma " many of the documents cited in sup- 
port of his case were drawn from the archives of 
the American ministry. Aberdeen was not convinced 
that American annexation was imminent. But in this 
month of July his position, which had hitherto been 
characterized by indifference or at least uncertainty, 
was rapidly shifting toward that held by Palmerston. 
Up to this time, however, it is perfectly clear that 
British policy under Aberdeen was based less on any 
belief that the Texan State would be of service to 
England than upon the conviction that a Mexican 
recognition of Texas was essential to the consolidation 
of Mexico itself. British interests in America de- 
manded a strong barrier to the south of the United 
States, and Mexico seemed most likely to furnish this. 

Upon the receipt of Aberdeen's first instruction, 
Pakenham at once placed the matter before the Mex- 
ican Cabinet. 7 The foreign minister, Bocanegra, ex- 

'F. O. Mexico, 154. 



FIRST BRITISH OFFER OF MEDIATION. 105 

pressed in " vehement " language his sense of the in- 
jury to Mexico in Great Britain's recognition of Texas, 
and stated that Mexico would henceforth suit her 
commercial policy to her own needs and not to the 
needs of such half-friends. Santa Anna was more 
courteous, but replied to Pakenham " that the Govern- 
ment and people of Mexico had, since some time past, 
come to a deliberate and conclusive resolution upon 
the subject of Texas from which they could not now 
recede." 8 Pakenham appreciated fully that this first 
instruction from Aberdeen was but a formality re- 
quired by the treaty with Texas, and, satisfied that his 
duty was fulfilled in presenting the matter* to the gov- 
ernment, he made no effort to push it. He was, in 
fact, convinced that Santa Anna's government rested 
upon a purely military basis, that even in Mexico such 
a government could not exist long without a plausible 
excuse, and that this excuse lay in the projected recon- 
quest of Texas. And indeed the reconquest of Texas, 
if the attempt were made with energy, seemed far from 
an impossibility even to Pakenham. His knowledge 
of the weakness of Texas was based upon " the ac- 
counts which have been constantly received of the 
unpromising condition of that Country, the apparently 
hopeless derangement of its finances, and the failure 
which seems to have attended the attempt to organize 
an efficient and disciplined Military force composed of 
volunteers from the United States." 9 Possibly it was 
merely the wisdom of the diplomat that recognized the 
hopelessness of Great Britain's demand upon Mexico, 
and that, in reports to the home government, empha- 



F. O. Mexico, 154. 
Ibid. 



O 



106 ELLIOT IN TEXAS. 

sized an alternative policy, or at least its possibility. 
His despatches, however, give the impression that he 
was really sincere in ceasing to be an advocate for 
Texas and indirectly urging support of the Mexican 
government. But Pakcnham was too thoroughly 
trained in diplomacy and understood too well his rela- 
tions to those in authority at home to press any plans 
that might conflict with those of his superiors. 

Until now the main centers of interest and of action 
in British-Texan relations had not been in Texas itself, 
but in London and in Mexico. Save for the semi- 
official tour of Kennedy, no diplomatic representative 
of Great Britain had as yet gone to Texas, but the 
time had now arrived when one must be sent. The 
commission of Captain Charles Elliot to act as charge 
d'affaires in Texas bore date of August 20, 1841, ten 
days previous to the resignation of Melbourne's cabi- 
net. His appointment was confirmed by Aberdeen, 
but his departure was to be postponed until England 
should receive notice that Texas had ratified the 
treaties. It was not in fact until Kennedy's return 
from Texas that that notice could be sent to Elliot, on 
May 27, 1842. After that, personal matters further 
delayed Elliot in setting out, and it was June 1 before 
he started upon his mission, reaching Texas on August 
23. Under an amended commission he was given the 
title of consul-general as well as charge d'affaires. 
He was by no means an inexperienced official, having 
already served in various positions, though up to this 
time in such as required administrative rather than 
diplomatic ability. Born in 1801, he was the son of 
Hugh Elliot sometime minister to Saxony and the inti- 
mate friend of the younger Pitt. Pie thus inherited 



ELLIOT IN TEXAS. IO7 

a claim to place and influence, and was rapidly pushed 
forward. His uncle, Gilbert Elliot, had been much 
associated with Burke, and both uncle and father 
were profoundly affected by the political theories of 
the French Revolution, writing and speaking much on 
the questions of the day, usually on the conserva- 
tive side. Thus naturally came those philosophical 
and humanitarian conceptions which inspired Charles 
Elliot's activities in Texas. Entering the navy 
in 1815, he had been rapidly advanced, but in 1828, 
while still nominally in the navy, he had been 
assigned to administrative posts, and thereafter con- 
tinued in that service. From 1830 to 1833 Elliot was 
Protector of Slaves in Guiana ; in 1834 he became sec- 
retary to the Trade Commission to China; in 1837 he 
was appointed chief superintendent and plenipoten- 
tiary at Canton. This was just the period when China 
had officially determined to put a stop to the opium 
traffic, then largely in the hands of British merchants 
and importers. The result of Chinese restrictions on 
the trade was much smuggling, so that in the end the 
Chinese government demanded that all opium in the 
hands of British merchants be surrendered. Elliot, in 
order to avoid a general massacre of foreigners, com- 
plied with the demand, and handed over some four 
hundred million pounds worth of opium, which was 
then burned. There was of course intense excitement, 
English residents w . j denied supplies, and Elliot, by 
leading an attack on Chinese war-junks, precipitated 
the " Opium War " which resulted so disastrously to 
China. The treaty which followed was arranged by 
Elliot, but was later disavowed by both Great Britain 
and China, and Elliot was recalled. Discredited by 



io8 



ELLIOT IN TEXAS. 



failure, but not officially disgraced, he was sent to 
Texas merely to find a place for him — an excellent 
proof that Texas was not then considered an important 
post in British diplomatic policy. It must be remem- 
bered, however, that his appointment was originally 
made long before a strong man seemed needed in 
Texas, and that Aberdeen, in sending him, simply con- 
ferred upon him a post already promised. Such was 
the man who was to guide British action in Texas. 

Elliot's first instruction from Aberdeen required 
him to make demands upon Texas in regard to the 
" Eliza Russell " and " Little Penn " claims, and to 
protest against the Texan blockade. 10 Thus this in- 
struction, dated July I, two days after the exchange of 
ratifications with Smith, was written on the same day 
that Aberdeen transmitted to Pakenham his first and 
purely perfunctory instruction to suggest peace to 
Mexico. Aberdeen's indifference on July i thus led 
him to use Elliot to ask redress from Texas, and El- 
liot's first activity was far from conciliatory. It may 
be doubted if he relished the performance of a duty so 
unlikely to secure the good-will of Texas. His first 
interview with Houston, however, convinced him that 
there would be no difficulty about the blockade, and 
Houston's assurance that he had no complaint to make 
in regard to the armed vessels was cheering. 11 In 
acknowledgment of Elliot's report of this interview, 
Aberdeen expressed pleasure at Houston's attitude 
and statements, and assured the Texan government 
that England would exert herself to secure peace from 
Mexico. 12 For some months after his arrival Elliot 

10 F. O. Texas, 4, Aberdeen to Elliot, July I, 1842. 

11 F. O. Texas, 3, Elliott to Aberdeen, August 29, 1842. 



ELLIOT IN TEXAS. 109 

was in ill health, and displayed no great activity. He 
reported merely incidentally, and therefore perhaps the 
more effectively, that Texas could never be recon- 
quered, and that the predatory border attacks by 
Mexico were extremely unwise, that they accomplished 
nothing for Mexico and were a constant source of ir- 
ritation in Texas. In these earlier reports he did not 
even mention the topic of annexation. Indeed, Elliot's 
ill health during these months limited him to an exami- 
nation of the ground and a superficial acquaintance 
with the situation. 

By November his health had much improved, and 
by that time, also, observation and contact and a de- 
lightful optimism had all combined in the evolution of 
a grand scheme which is the chief topic of one whole 
volume of his letters. While the plan involved Great 
Britain's assistance in creating in Texas a strong, inde- 
pendent State, thereby assuring permanent British in- 
terests in Texas, there were other conditions and 
ramifications which made it inappropriate for Elliot 
to write in detail of his plan to Aberdeen. Instead of 
this, his letters were sent to Addington, a personal 
friend and a permanent under-secretary in the foreign 
office, whose long term of service under succeeding 
ministries made him the most trusted and influential 
member of the permanent staff. Elliot's letters to 
Addington, though nominally personal letters, were 
devoted to urging a definite plan of campaign in 
Texas, and they make up the greater part of Elliot's 
correspondence in 1842. Their incorporation in the 
volume containing his despatches indicates that they 
were regarded in the light of official correspondence, 

u F. O. Texas, 4, Aberdeen to Elliot, October 3, 1842. 
8 



HO ELLIOT IN TEXAS. 

though they were not formally addressed to the foreign 
secretary. 13 The first of these letters is dated Novem- 
ber 15. 14 It contains Elliot's interesting account of 
Houston's remarkable career, and expresses a real 
admiration for the character of the man, his abilities, 
and his integrity. 15 This estimate was based upon 
many conferences with Houston, for they had become 
intimate friends, and it is more than probable that 
many of the suggestions in Elliot's letters had their 
inception in this warm friendship. From the begin- 
ning of this close association it is apparent that Elliot 
believed in Houston, and that, as the intimacy pro- 
gressed and permitted close opportunities for studying 

18 The first impression upon looking at these letters is that 
they would never be of any influence because of Elliot's 
illegible penmanship. Possibly a friend with experience and 
practice may have been able to decipher them fairly readily, 
but for any one else their reading involves laborious effort. 
The letters do, however, furnish valuable and interesting 
contemporary information upon governmental conditions in 
Texas. Elliot was very intimate with the leading men of that 
government, and his estimates of the abilities and intentions 
of such men as Houston, Jones, Ashbel Smith, and others, 
render his letters decidedly entertaining. 

11 F. O. Texas, 4. 

15 Houston's remarkable history was already well known in 
the United States, and through Kennedy and Elliot it soon 
became a matter of wonder and comment in England. The 
qualities that carried Houston from one dramatic incident to 
another, his energy, lawlessness, fondness for wild frontier 
life, bravery in battle, his success in politics, renunciation of 
official position and return to frontier life when he lost the 
love of his wife, his reappearance in the Texas struggle and 
rapid elevation to leadership there — all combined to throw 
a halo of romance about Houston that strongly appealed to 
the imagination of Englishmen. Houston's story, indeed, had 
great influence in making Texas and Texan conditions known 
in Great Britain. 



ELLIOT IN TEXAS. Ill 

his friend, his confidence in Houston's sincerity in- 
creased. If Elliot was correct, there was but one 
man in Texas capable of dealing with the situation 
there, and that man, the president, aspired to be the 
founder of a great and independent state. The cor- 
roding evil in this promising state, and the chief ob- 
stacle to its greatness and independence, according to 
Elliot, were one and the same — the institution of 
slavery. The plan which he unfolded bore especially 
upon the extinction of slavery, and combined with the 
philanthropical measure certain great practical ad- 
vantages that might be secured for British commerce. 
In this first letter he stated very explicitly what his 
plan was : — 

My scheme supposes another Convention in this Country. — 
Slavery to be abolished; the entire abolition of political disa- 
bilities upon people of Colour, perfectly free trade to be de- 
clared to be a fundamental principle; the right of voting to 
depend upon a knowledge of reading and writing, and a 
pretty high money contribution to the State, . . . stringent 
legislation against squatting, in the form of a land tax and 
otherwise; improvements upon the well established failure 
and folly of a yearly elected Legislature and other liberality 
of the rhodomontade school. It seems to be scarcely doubtful 
that the Northern and North-Eastern parts of Mexico, 
from Tampico on the North-East Coast, to San Bias on 
the West (involving the most important parts of the Country) 
would soon find it their interest to join a state founded upon 
such principles, or at all events constrain their own Govern- 
ment into the adoption of an equally liberal scheme of com- 
mercial policy. Foreign Merchants, Foreign Capital, and 
foreign enterprise and principles would soon find their way 
into these great and rich regions by peaceful means, and the 
power of the United States on this Continent would be 
gradually balanced, and yet without motive for collision ; 
Indeed it seems possible enough that the North Eastern States 
would not be disturbed to see the power of the South and 
West effectually limited, and a bound marked beyond which 
Slavery could not advance. 



112 ELLIOT IN TEXAS. 

Elliot was therefore emphasizing commercial advan- 
tages to Great Britain that would result from the es- 
tablishment of a powerful and independent Texas, with 
the added possibility of a boundary line so extended 
as to take in a large slice of Mexico. It is not sup- 
posable that a new convention would have introduced 
Elliot's millennium, or that the rulers of a country 
whose population looked forward to annexation by 
the United States would abolish slavery, guarantee 
free trade, and extend the franchise to the blacks. 
The belief that the border Mexicans, whose chief 
interest had been in guerilla warfare with their north- 
ern neighbors, would voluntarily subject themselves to 
Texan authority was even more absurd. All this 
seems much too fantastic to deserve serious considera- 
tion, yet Elliot sincerely believed that these ideas could 
be carried out by the use of money to compensate the 
slaveholders in Texas, and that England could well 
afford to advance that money in the shape of a loan. 
In concluding his letter, however, he stated that this 
was but his private plan, and that officially and pub- 
licly he would of course take the ground that while 
Great Britain abhorred the institution of slavery for 
herself, she had no desire to interfere with it in 
other countries. 

Elliot's suggestion of active British operations in 
Texas to secure the abolition of slavery there is of 
the greatest interest, for it was the first instance of 
British official expression in this connection. There is 
no evidence that the general plan was suggested to 
Elliot by Houston, yet in the light of the intimate 
relations existing between them it is impossible to 
suppose that Elliot would have put forward such a 



ELLIOT IN TEXAS. I 13 

plan if he had not discussed it at length with the 
president of the Texan Republic. Indeed, their rela- 
tions were so close that such conferring may well be 
taken for granted. If Houston inspired Elliot's sug- 
gestion, what was his object? The theory of Reeves, 
in his admirable course of lectures given in 1906 on 
the diplomacy of Tyler and Polk, is that Houston 
probably used the suggestion of interference by Eng- 
land to frighten the United States, and intentionally 
advertised the close relations between England and 
Texas in order to urge the United States to action. 
Reeves, however, believes that Houston, did not so 
direct his policy until the next year, 1843. In support 
of this is the fact that up to November of 1842 no 
trace of any suggestion by British officials in authority 
that Texas abolish slavery is to be found, nor up to 
that time had there been even any suggestion to Mexico 
that she make the abolition of slavery in Texas a 
condition of recognition. This being true, Elliot's en- 
thusiasm for the cause of abolition immediately after 
coming in contact with Houston may well seem sig- 
nificant, and may be pointed to as conclusive evidence 
of Houston's desire to make a tool of England. On 
the other hand, in defence of Houston's integrity and 
his honest desire for Texan independence, it must be 
admitted that it would have been perfectly logical for 
him to advance this very proposal in order to arouse in 
England a real interest in that independence. In the 
absence of positive evidence to overthrow it, Reeves's 
theory will doubtless find acceptance, and especially 
since it is the traditional view. Yet it can be seen 
that some testimony points toward a real desire for 
independence, and at this place in the narrative it 



I 14 ELLIOT IN TEXAS. 

seems well to leave the question of Houston's motives 
undetermined. The matter of motive is not perhaps 
essential to a study of British-Texan relations. Yet 
the puzzling question of Houston's intentions, and the 
many different interpretations that have been placed 
upon his conduct in his effort to guide the destinies of 
Texas, must always arouse interest. It may be said 
at once, however, that throughout all these negotia- 
tions, and even after the final annexation of Texas by 
the United States, both Elliot and Aberdeen believed 
absolutely in the sincerity of Houston and in his desire 
to establish an independent state. 

Enclosed in Elliot's letter of November 15 was a 
personal letter from Houston, dated November 5, in 
which Elliot was requested to secure permission from 
Aberdeen to act as the agent of Texas in securing 
peace from Mexico. 16 Elliot replied to Houston that 
he would quite willingly act in that capacity, but must 
await authority from London. In his letter of De- 
cember 11 Elliot reported that the tone of Ashbel 
Smith's communication on the affair of the " Monte- 
zuma " had greatly angered Houston, who had asked 
him (Elliot) to express to Aberdeen the regret of the 
Texan government in regard to the whole matter. 
Houston's courteous apologies and his general com- 
plaisance were simplifying Elliot's undertaking and 
stimulating his hopes. In this same letter he further 
elaborated his plan, and stated that the possibility of 
its accomplishment was becoming more and more 
apparent. A week later, December 16, rumors of an- 
nexation prevalent in Texas were troubling him, and 

16 F. O. Texas, 4. 



ELLIOT IN TEXAS. IIS 

he felt that delay in the execution of his plan would 
be fatal. He wrote: 

" I cannot help thinking that money lent to put an 
end to slavery in a SouthWest direction in America 
and to give a place and position to the coloured races, 
would render as profitable returns as money spent in 
fortresses and military works on the Northern frontier 
of the United States." " 

Elliot emphasized more and more the humanitarian 
and philanthropic side of his plan, yet always coupled 
that aspect of his case with the distinct financial ad- 
vantages to Great Britain. On December 28, writing 
again to Addington, he made a careful analysis of 
President Tyler's annual message to Congress, and 
interpreted it to mean that England was to keep her 
hands off Texas and Oregon, though there was cer- 
tainly nothing in the message itself to warrant such 
interpretation. This warning, to Elliot's mind, was 
impudent presumption. At the same time he wrote 
that the Treaty of Washington recently signed by 
Ashburton and Webster was far from being regarded 
as a permanent settlement of the points in dispute be- 
tween the United States and Great Britain. In the 
United States, on the contrary, it was considered as 
offering a respite only, and was certain to be followed 
by the renewal of a policy hostile to Great Britain 
when such a policy should seem most profitable. 
These arguments and the analysis given to Tyler's 
message were, of course, intended by Elliot to 
strengthen his plan for Texas. 

Elliot's interesting personality combines the charac- 
teristics of the political dreamer and the honest philan- 

17 F. O. Texas, 4. 



u6 



ELLIOT IN TEXAS. 



thropist with that strong underlying patriotism which 
is always to be reckoned with in the Englishman of 
his type. Unfortunately, the qualities of real states- 
manship essential to the realization of high ideals, 
especially the capacity to grapple with details and to 
give to environment and inherited instincts their proper 
value, were wholly lacking. He was genuinely a phi- 
lanthropist in his desire to better the condition of the 
colored race, but he was also very genuinely an op- 
ponent of American expansion, and desired to see his 
own country assume a position upon the American 
continent that should check the further territorial ad- 
vance of the United States. Like many of his coun- 
trymen, he had an inherited dislike for the United 
States, and a fear of its future greatness was his 
bogy. 18 

18 Elliot represented very well that type of mind which is 
actuated by mixed motives ; in this case moral sentiments and 
ideas of national profit were not necessarily conflicting senti- 
ments, but it was impossible to discover which dominated. 
He was in sympathy with that sentiment in England which 
had caused a majority in Parliament to vote against a reduc- 
tion of the sugar duties, on the ground that to reduce those 
duties would encourage the institution of slavery. On the 
other hand, the real fear of the future growth of the United 
States is shown in the works of every English traveler who 
visited America between 1835 and 1845. The writers perhaps 
describe the wonders and the beauties of America, probably 
express amazement at its rapidity of growth in population 
and in prosperity, and charitably find excuses for crudities 
encountered, but all of them are really appalled at the progress 
of the United States, and are forced to apprehensive specula- 
tion upon the future power of America. The most striking 
illustration of this is the one furnished by Warburton, in his 
" Hochelaga." Warburton, who published his book anony- 
mously, planned his American travels systematically, first 
visiting Canada, whose scenes and people and conditions he 
describes with care. He then came into the United States, 



ELLIOT IN TEXAS. 117 

None of the communications addressed by Elliot to 
Addington received any official answer from Aber- 
deen, nor is there anything in the records to show that 
any answer whatever was returned to him. In the 
meantime, Kennedy, throughout the summer of 1842, 
had been urging upon Aberdeen that he be sent in 
some capacity to Texas. Kennedy did not, however, 
make any suggestions of a political nature, and when 
in the latter part of July he was appointed consul at 
Galveston, he was really more interested in a commer- 
cial venture there than in his official duties. His 
formal appointment was given him on September 29, 
but in a separate instruction of the same date he was 
emphatically and particularly warned to confine him- 
self to his purely consular business and to leave diplo- 
macy and policy to Elliot. 19 Later this restriction was 
very burdensome to Kennedy and he tried in a variety 
of ways to evade it, but he was never permitted to 
play any part in political affairs. Kennedy sailed from 
England on November 16, and so did not reach Texas 
until the beginning of 1843. 

For the year 1842 there remains to be considered 
only the plan for a tripartite intervention by which 
England, France, and the United States were to urge 

intending to spend a year or so in travel, but he was so sur- 
prised and impressed that he cut short his trip in order to 
return to London and publish a warning to his countrymen in 
the hope of arousing their attention to the terrifying rapidity 
of American advance, and to urge upon the British govern- 
ment that it bestir itself and take some step to guard against 
this new and threatening danger in the West. Elliot's letters 
convey much of this same impression. The prosperity of these 
years seemed to foreshadow a power and expansion in the 
United States which became a haunting fear with him. 
"F. O. Texas, 3. 



Il8 ELLIOT IN TEXAS. 

peace upon the government of Mexico. Ashbel Smith 
at London had been instructed by Jones, the Texan 
secretary of state, to make a proposal for such an 
intervention to the governments of England and 
France. This was the occasion of his journey to 
Paris in the midst of the troubles of the " Montezuma " 
and immediately after the ratification of the Texan 
treaties in June of 1842. He went to Paris then, in 
July, and secured from Guizot a promise to join in 
such tripartite intervention. The French ambassador 
in London proposed the measure to Aberdeen, but 
Aberdeen declined it on October 15. His excuse for 
refusing to join with the other two powers in the 
proposed intervention was that while the relations with 
England and Mexico were on a strictly friendly basis, 
those of the United States and Mexico were at the 
moment very critical. He did not feel, therefore, that 
he could sacrifice English relations with Mexico by 
joining with the other two powers. Aberdeen also 
stated that the proposed measure would have no result, 
since Great Britain had already in 1842 made two pro- 
posals to Mexico that she recognize Texas, and Mexico 
had declined. The incident of the tripartite interven- 
tion has often been overestimated by historians, both 
as a matter of importance in the historical study of the 
relations between England, Mexico, and Texas, and as 
indicating a selfish line of policy pursued by Great 
Britain. It was really much less significant than it 
seemed. No great emphasis was placed upon the mat- 
ter by Jones in his instruction to Smith, by Smith in the 
proposal to Guizot, or by the French ambassador in 
suggesting it to Aberdeen. All these men seem to have 
regarded it as a measure which was worth an effort 



ELLIOT IN TEXAS. 119 

but of which there was really little hope. In respect 
to the selfish policy of Great Britain in this connection, 
surely Aberdeen might think that if Mexico did not 
accept the advice of that European power which stood 
in most intimate relations with her, she would not be 
likely to accept a suggestion made by the three powers. 
If, then, the plan was so unpromising of result, Aber- 
deen was perfectly justified in guarding British in- 
terests in Mexico by refusing to take a step that might 
irritate that government. 

The year 1842 closed in Texas with Elliot on the 
ground, hopeful of his plan, enthusiastic over the pos- 
sibilities of the Texan State in the future, and in his 
letters urging vigorous action by Great Britain to 
support the cause of Texan independence. Kennedy 
had not yet arrived, and British diplomatic policy so 
far showed no decided change of attitude toward 
Texas. The year had, however, witnessed a distinctly 
altered position on the part of Pakenham, whose re- 
ports from Mexico indicate an utter indifference to 
the movement toward Texan independence. In Eng- 
land, Ashbel Smith had made an excellent impression 
upon Aberdeen, and was proving himself an efficient 
and capable diplomat. Both in London and in Texas 
the official heads of that State inspired confidence. 
Houston had won Elliot's friendship, and by letters 
sent through Elliot directly to Aberdeen had secured 
the confidence of that minister. Anxiety with re- 
gard to a possible American annexation was expressed 
from but one direction. Elliot saw that there was 
probability or possibility of such action, and he urged 
it as a reason for British activity. It might well ap- 
pear to Aberdeen, however, as merely an argument put 



120 ELLIOT IN TEXAS. 

forward to hasten the adoption of Elliot's scheme for 
Texas, and everything points to a sense of security 
upon Aberdeen's part. He felt that he was in control 
of the situation, and had no fear of American annexa- 
tion, or at least he believed that there was no necessity 
for alarm and no fear of immediate danger from the 
United States. 

In the midst of the flood of worthless books on 
America from the pens of English travelers there 
occasionally appeared one of notable merit, valuable 
today for its record of careful observation, and of 
contemporaneous importance because of the influence 
exerted by it upon its readers. Such a book was pub- 
lished in London in 1842. The author, James Silk 
Buckingham, had journeyed through the Southern 
States in 1839-1840, and his descriptions of travel in 
America had a larger contemporary circulation than 
those of any other Englishman. 20 His two volumes, 
entitled " The Slave States of America," appeared in 
London in 1842, and the opinion that he there ex- 
pressed had weight in official circles and with the 
British reading public. Slavery as an institution was, 
of course, Buckingham's keenest interest, and his book 
treats of it most thoroughly. An ardent abolitionist 

20 Buckingham was a man of some political importance, but 
was principally known for his radicalism and for his interest 
in social questions. As a newspaper editor in India he had 
been expelled for the vigor of his censures upon the abuses 
of government there. Returning to England, he was elected 
to the first reformed Parliament, from Sheffield. He was 
much in the public eye as a lecturer on temperance, and was 
always a bold critic of public morals. Three volumes on 
America, treating of the Northern States, had previously been 
published by him, and others, on the West, came out shortly 
after those on the South. 



ELLIOT IN TEXAS. 121 

himself, he found it difficult to listen with patience to 
what he considered the illogical arguments in defense 
of slavery met with throughout the entire South. 
Such reasons as all Southerners presented he could 
meet with the stolidity of an Englishman of fixed con- 
victions, yet he saw no happy outcome for the abolition 
agitation. Believing firmly in the high moral ground 
upon which the institution was attacked, he yet directly 
stated that he did not believe that agitation would be 
of any use whatever in changing slave conditions in the 
Southern States. In his despair of bettering these 
conditions by agitation, Buckingham voiced not alone 
his own but the general opinion of all English travel- 
ers who went into the South and could see for them- 
selves. And he further believed that a hopeless and 
useless continuance of British agitation might embitter 
the relations between Great Britain and the United 
States. 

Buckingham's picture of Texas, its rapid develop- 
ment, and the substantial character of its population, 
was most interesting. He believed that the distinctly 
disorderly element of the earlier period was rapidly 
giving place to a solid and worthy community, and the 
future of Texas was rosy. He wrote that ambition 
for annexation in Texas was waning; that Texas 
feared the Northern States would never permit her 
entrance into the Union with slavery, while, as a slave- 
holding state, she would never consent to enter with- 
out it. In short, such was the difficulty of the situa- 
tion that the result would be an independent state, 
rich, new, and powerful. How convincing such pub- 
lished statements were one cannot judge, yet the dic- 
tum of a book descriptive of a new and compara- 



122 ELLIOT IN TEXAS. 

tively unknown country would carry more weight and 
find readier acceptance than if concerned with more 
familiar ground. So little was known of Texas that 
any source of information was eagerly seized, and 
the probability is that the general public based its 
conclusions very largely on such books as those of 
Kennedy and Buckingham, while the government 
would depend to a great extent on official sources for 
its knowledge of conditions. Nevertheless, it is un- 
likely that the ministry itself would wholly ignore 
facts and sentiments presented so intelligently and 
with such unanimity of belief. Even with conserva- 
tive allowance for prejudice and exaggeration, it is not 
unreasonable to suppose that these volumes had a 
certain influence on officials. The works of Bucking- 
ham and Kennedy, therefore, are really important 
factors in estimating what was English opinion at the 
time, and both these men had expressed a belief in the 
future greatness of Texas and in her importance to 
British interests. 



CHAPTER VI. 

1843. The Robinson Armistice and the London- 
Abolition Meeting. 

The closing act of the year 1842 in relation to Texas 
was the refusal of Aberdeen to join with France and 
the United States in a triple intervention to be urged 
upon Mexico. Aberdeen had suggested as a substitute 
for this plan that the representatives of England and 
France should each urge upon Mexico the advisability 
of making peace, but that they should not act in con- 
cert. This proposal had been accepted by France, and 
instructions to act on behalf of his own country only 
were sent to Pakenham. while the French minister in 
Mexico received like instructions. To Pakenham the 
proceeding seemed quite useless, and upon consulta- 
tion with the French minister it was decided to take 
no action at the time. In his report to Aberdeen Pak- 
enham justified his apparent disobedience on the 
ground of the absolute inutility of the act. and he re- 
ceived Aberdeen's approval for withholding the matter 
from Mexico. 1 It was unfortunate for the interests of 
Great Britain in Mexico that Pakenham at this junc- 
ture was recalled to London, and that Percy Doyle 
took his place. Pakenham was to be promoted to the 
ministry at Washington. While his own appointment 
to the L'nited States was permanent, that of his succes- 
sor was not, and in all probability Doyle was regarded 

1 F. O. Mexico, 161, Pakenham to Aberdeen. Februarv 24 
1&43. 

123 



124 THE ROBINSON ARMISTICE. 

merely as a stop-gap until a suitable appointment could 
be made. Doyle himself, however, was ambitious for 
the permanent position, had no misgivings as to his 
capacity, and regarded himself as of full ministerial 
rank. It therefore fell to Doyle, unluckily, to conduct 
the delicate negotiation which came up in 1843 looking 
toward an armistice between Mexico and Texas. 

For the first three months of the year 1843 Elliot in 
Texas was still firm in his adherence to the plan out- 
lined in his earlier letters to Addington. Frequent 
letters in support of his great plan for a reorganized 
Texas were being transmitted, with increasing insis- 
tence on British advantages and an ever decreasing 
confidence in governmental sympathy as the months 
went by and brought no reply. It was true that mail 
facilities were disappointingly slow and inadequate in 
those days, and Elliot, comforting himself with all the 
possibilities of delays in transmission, still found great 
satisfaction in his picture of a Texas without slavery 
where British commercial advantages should be greatly 
extended. At all times he was kee.ily alive to the 
danger of annexation to the United States, and in his 
letters laid great stress upon such a possibility unless 
England could assist in securing peace promptly. 2 In 
constant correspondence with Houston, the freedom 
and confidence of their intercourse is indicated in the 
boldness with which Houston outlined his ideas to 
Elliot. - On January 24 Houston, writing from Wash- 
ington, Texas, to Elliot, urged that England force 
Mexico to make peace, and that speedily. 3 

2 F. O. Texas, 6, Elliot to Aberdeen, January 28, 1843. 
8 F. O. Texas, 6. Houston's original is enclosed in a letter 
from Elliot to Aberdeen, February 5, 1843. 



THE ROBINSON ARMISTICE. 1 25 

He said : " There is a subject now mooting in Texas 
which it seems to me will appeal directly to Her Ma- 
jesty's Government. I mean that of annexation to the 
United States. Some of our journals are much in 
favor of the measure. I find from the uncertitude 
of our situation that nine-tenths of those who con- 
verse with me are in favor of the measure upon the 
ground that it will give us peace. Upon this point 
of our national existence I feel well satisfied that 
England has the power to rule." 

Houston further asserted in this letter that the whole 
of the United States was rapidly becoming a unit in 
favor of annexation, and that should annexation be- 
come a fact the territory included would mean not 
only Texas but the Bay of San Francisco and the Pa- 
cific Coast in general. He asserted that annexation 
would soon be the policy of both political parties in the 
United States. " Annexation is to be a question with 
the political parties and aspirants in the United States. 
My own opinion is that both parties will advocate the 
policy. To defeat this policy it is only necessary for 
Lord Aberdeen to say to Santa Anna, ' Sir, Mexico 
must recognize the independence of Texas.' Santa 
Anna would be glad of such a pretext. He could 
then say to the Mexicans — You see how I am situated. 
I cannot go to war with England, our last friend, with 
a probability of war with the United States and 
France." 

According to American historians generally, the 
month of February, 1843, in which this very frank 
note is dated, marks a definite change of policy with 
Houston. In 1842 Texas took the initiative in two 
separate efforts looking to United States annexation, 

9 



126 



THE ROBINSON ARMISTICE. 



but without success. The historical inference has been 
that Houston, until February, 1843, was ready at any 
time to renew overtures, but that in that month he 
definitely dropped the plea for annexation, and em- 
barked upon a policy in which Texas should no longer 
pose as a suppliant. This involved arousing the an- 
tagonism of the United States to Great Britain in order 
to force the United States to make overtures to Texas. 4 
It is impossible to find confirmation, however, for these 
hitherto accepted historical conclusions. An examina- 
tion of the correspondence between Elliot and Houston 
at this period and in the months preceding and of 
Elliot's letters to Aberdeen does not indicate that Feb- 
ruary, 1843, saw an y change in Houston's plans. Re- 
ferring to the earlier letters immediately succeeding 
Elliot's arrival, as well as to those of the winter fol- 
lowing, it can be seen that Houston's point of view in 
February was equally his point of view in November 
of 1842 ; that Texan independence was his theme from 
the moment Elliot set foot in Texas ; and that his desire 
for British intervention to secure peace had been re- 
peatedly urged. Whether or not Houston was sincere 
in his desire for an independent Texas, he was at least 
perfectly steadfast and consistent in his plea for Elliot's 
support from the beginning of their intercourse. The 
importance of this lies in the fact that Houston's asser- 
tion to Elliot of his desire for an independent Texas 
was just as emphatic before he knew of Tyler's re- 
fusal of Texan overtures as after that refusal. 

When the end of March brought no reply to his 

* Reeves, 119, cites the despatch of Jones to Van Zandt of 
February 10, 1843, indicating this policy, and says that it was 
a new policy. 



THE ROBINSON ARMISTICE. 127 

letters advocating a live British campaign in the affairs 
of Texas, Elliot began to be genuinely anxious. He 
was reluctantly forced to conclude that his letters had 
failed to interest Aberdeen in his plan, and he was 
much disappointed. While he still believed the aboli- 
tion of slavery in Texas feasible, and still asserted that 
it would not be difficult to secure, he decided to shift 
the emphasis and to urge the necessity for the immed- 
iate exertion of pressure upon Mexico by England. 
Temporarily, then, Elliot was obliged to give up the 
role of philanthropist in order to emphasize the com- 
mercial interests of Great Britain and the necessity for 
action to prevent American annexation. In this con- 
nection he wrote long accounts of the practical abilities 
of the Texans, eulogizing their good qualities and 
making light of their crudities. 5 

These people are rough and wild, but their constancy and 
courage are admirable. I hardly know any more fearful and 
indeed humiliating subject of reflection than the comparative 
helplessness of our own poor English people, when we find 
them thrown amongst these scheming, enterprising, and it is 
most distressing to add, almost invariably much better in- 
formed persons than themselves. The truth is that the 
poorer classes of English people are broken in, or should I 
say broken down to do but one thing in the world ... in 
this country they make but sorry work of it in taming the 
wilds, compared with the American races. The training of 
our political and social mechanism (and my experience has 
taught me, military too) unfits men for rough uses and 
reverses. It must all work together perfectly smoothly and 
successfully, or it will hardly work at all. These strange 
people jolt and jar terrifically in their progress, but on they 
do get, and prosper too, under circumstances when our people 
would starve and die. 

The first four or five months of Elliot's residence 
were spent in becoming adjusted, and his services had 
6 F. O. Texas, 6, Elliot to Addington, March 26, 1843. 



128 THE ROBINSON ARMISTICE. 

been confined to the cultivation of friendly relations 
with Houston and Jones and to the reporting of con- 
ditions as he saw them in Texas. On March 29 Elliot 
had just learned of what came to be known as the 
Robinson plan, so called by diplomats at this time, 
which was intended to secure an armistice between 
Mexico and Texas as a forerunner of ultimate peace. 
The general outline and scope of the plan it is best to 
understand at the beginning, especially as much misin- 
formation as to its origin has been prevalent. It de- 
rived its name from a Texan prisoner in Mexico, 
Robinson, who obtained an audience with Santa Anna, 
and reported to him that a large party in Texas desired 
reannexation to Mexico on terms of local self-govern- 
ment and nominal Mexican sovereignty. Santa Anna 
commissioned Robinson to make overtures along these 
lines to the Texan government, releasing his prisoner 
for that purpose ; illness fell upon Santa Anna soon 
after, and nothing tangible came of the effort from the 
Mexican end. Meanwhile Robinson had arrived in 
Texas and informed Houston of Santa Anna's desire 
for an armistice. 6 

The statement has commonly been made that either 

* J. W. Robinson was well known in Texas, having served 
as lieutenant-governor in 1835. He had been captured by- 
Mexican troops at San Antonio de Bexar in March, 1842, and 
sent to the city of Mexico. Robinson wrote to Santa Anna on 
January 9, 1843, with the result that he was given an inter- 
view and soon released. (Bancroft, XVI, 372.) Bancroft 
regards the whole matter as a mere ruse by Robinson to se- 
cure his liberty, but in Texas opinions were expressed both 
for and against his plan. See Niles' Register for April 15, 
1843, giving a letter from Robinson to the Galveston Times. 
The Times was contemptuous, but the Galveston Civilian ap- 
proved the plan. 



THE ROBINSON ARMISTICE. 120, 

Elliot or Doyle was responsible for this plan, and that 
they eagerly supported Santa Anna's efforts toward an 
armistice, even if they did not inspire them. Elliot's 
correspondence of this period absolves him, however, 
from all responsibility in the matter, and shows a dis- 
tinct disinclination to offer his services in furthering it. 
He distrusted Santa Anna's genuineness in the matter, 
and in his report to Aberdeen so stated the affair that 
Aberdeen himself was not impressed, regarding it as 
too vague to be promising. Elliot's report of Robin- 
son's scheme was extended to include comment and 
rumors of American annexation, and Aberdeen's re- 
ply, on May 18, treated of these, and not of the 
armistice. He wrote : — 

With regard to the project for the annexation of Texas 
to the United States, which has formed the subject of some 
of your recent communications to this Office, Her Majesty's 
Government do not think it necessary to give you any In- 
structions at the present moment on that subject, further than 
to desire that you will assure the President of the continued 
interest which the British Government takes in the prosperity 
and independence of the State of Texas : and of their full 
determination to persevere in employing their endeavours, 
whenever they see a reasonable hope of success, to bring 
about an adjustment of the differences still existing between 
Mexico and Texas, of which they so much lament the 
continuance. 7 

Later in the same month, May, 1843, Pakenham 
arrived in England, and personally presented at the 
foreign office despatches he had prepared in Mexico 
and addressed to Aberdeen, bearing upon the matter 
of the projected armistice. His information was based 
upon an interview with Santa Anna in which the Mexi- 
can president outlined the Robinson plan as previously 

T F. O. Texas, 6. 



I30 THE ROBINSON ARMISTICE. 

stated, but this interview had been followed by Santa 
Anna's illness, during which Pakenham left Mexico. 
There had been no details, and Pakenham made his 
report without comment, save to say that he believed 
the Texans were truly weary of independence, and 
that a few months would see Texas annexed either to 
the United States or to Mexico. Pakenham's presenta- 
tion of the Robinson plan did indeed insure sufficient 
interest on Aberdeen's part to inspire fresh instruc- 
tions to the British representatives both in Texas and 
in Mexico. In those sent to Elliot 8 he expressed his 
conviction of the genuineness of Santa Anna's offer 
and his desire to see a favorable outcome. He argued 
that the offer meant virtual independence, and that 
a mere matter of technical sovereignty ought not to 
prevent acceptance by Texas. At the same time he 
was very careful to instruct Elliot that Great Britain 
would not make herself in any way a party to this 
transaction or incur any responsibility in regard to 
it, although she was perfectly willing to use her good 
offices " in an entirely neutral and impartial sense, in 
order to bring about a peaceful and equitable adjust- 
ment of the differences existing between Texas and 
Mexico." But while instructing Elliot to urge upon 
Texas an acceptance of the Robinson plan, Aberdeen 
instructed Doyle, now acting as charge d'affaires in 
Mexico, that the plan did not go far enough, and that 
Mexico's best policy would be to make a complete and 
full acknowledgment of Texan independence at once. 9 
In this instruction Aberdeen for the first time brought 
up the question of abolition. He wrote, " It may 

8 F. O. Texas, 6, June 3, 1843. 
8 F. O. Mexico, 160, July 1, 1843. 



THE ROBINSON ARMISTICE. 13 l 

deserve consideration whether the abolition of Slavery 
in Texas would not be a greater triumph, and more 
honourable to Mexico, than the retention of any sov- 
ereignty merely nominal." 

Aberdeen's purpose is plain. He was urging upon 
each state greater concessions than either had been 
willing to make, in the hope that a compromise might 
be effected which would result in a real conciliation. 
It may be taken for granted, however, that Aberdeen 
did not expect Texas to consent to any arrangement 
which should not explicitly stipulate a recognition of 
her independence. 

In the meantime, Elliot, in a long interview with 
Houston, had gone over again the whole bearing of 
the Robinson plan, and Houston had raised many ob- 
jections to it. He argued most vigorously against 
Santa Anna's proposal for an armistice, and protested 
against its being given English support. The report 
of this conversation is embodied in a letter which 
Elliot wrote to Pakenham, on April 14, while under the 
impression that Pakenham was still in Mexico. 10 On 
May 13 Houston wrote from Washington, Texas, 
to Elliot, again urging upon him the only course which 
could be effective in bringing peace to Texas. The 
Mexican proposal of an armistice would accomplish 
nothing, and Texan independence would be assured 
only through immediate recognition. England could 
impose this course upon Mexico and thus eliminate 
the question of American annexation. Houston im- 
pressed upon Elliot the ever increasing difficulties 
which the annexation problem presented to him, espe- 
cially as the desire of Texas to be annexed seemed 

10 F. O. Texas, 6. 



132 THE ROBINSON ARMISTICE. 

only less than the determination of the United States 
to annex. Elliot held this letter for some time before 
transmitting it to Aberdeen, and on June 8, when he 
did finally send it, expressed the greatest anxiety that 
it be kept with complete secrecy. 11 His reply to Hous- 
ton contains a statement regarding slavery which, from 
the correspondence, seems totally irrelevant; neverthe- 
less, Elliot pledged his word that at no time had he 
received any instructions to urge abolition upon the 
Texan government, and " that the subject of slavery 
in Texas had never been mentioned to me in any des- 
patch from Her Majesty's Government, or by word 
of mouth." It does not appear from Houston's letter 
why this assertion should have been drawn from Elliot. 
It may have resulted from a conversation between the 
two men rather than from written correspondence. 

In the interchange of letters between Houston and 
Elliot, as well as in the interviews to which the corre- 
spondence refers, there seems to be abundant proof 
that Houston first opposed English efforts to force 
the armistice. In his very first letter to Elliot (re- 
ported to Pakenham in April) Houston begged Elliot's 
good offices to discourage any British backing for 
Santa Anna's plan. Again in May his letters ex- 
pressed anxiety for fear of United States annexation, 
to avert which he asked Great Britain to drop the pro- 
posal for armistice and to force Mexico to a recogni- 
tion of Texas. From his first knowledge of the pro- 
jected truce, he steadfastly demanded that England 
repudiate the plan. Nevertheless, it has been gener- 
ally believed that the negotiations connected with the 
Robinson plan were only another instance of clever 
11 F. O. Texas, 6. 



THE ROBINSON ARMISTICE. 133 

strategy and doubtful sincerity on Houston's part. 
It has been supposed that, instead of being opposed to 
the armistice, he really encouraged it, thereby gaining 
a weapon to hold over the United States. On this 
hypothesis, Houston was only playing with England, 
and hoping for such advances from that country as 
should the sooner bring the United States to terms 
with Texas. Such an interpretation is at least based 
upon wrong premises, i. e., that English agents sug- 
gested the project, and that Santa Anna "was pre- 
vailed upon by Doyle " to permit the overture. 12 It 
is true that this was the impression given out by Texan 
officials. The plan had originated with Santa Anna, 
neither Doyle nor Elliot was enthusiastic over it at 
first, and both acted with much hesitation. 13 

Early in June Elliot received Aberdeen's first official 
instructions relating to the Robinson plan, and obeyed 
them by presenting a formal document which advised 
the Texan government to concede Mexican sover- 
eignty and thus secure the benefits of practical inde- 
pendence. 14 Upon the same date, however, a personal 

"Reeves, 122. 

13 The theory of Reeves regarding Houston's activities here 
is that Houston was fortunate in being able to make use of 
this armistice scheme. It is quite true that later he did seem 
to make use of it in the sense indicated by Reeves. The fact, 
however, that when the scheme first came up Houston was 
distinctly opposed to it and anxious that England should not 
support it is fairly good proof that Houston's use of the 
scheme was rather the result of later opportunity and, more 
probably, of pressure brought to bear upon him, than that the 
whole plan was 1 initiated by him. Here again we have seem- 
ingly excellent evidence of Houston's sincerity in his desire 
for independence. For Reeves's interpretation, see his Diplo- 
macy under Tyler and Polk, 119 seq. 

"F. O. Texas, 6, Elliot to Doyle, June 21, 1843. 



134 THE ROBINSON ARMISTICE. 

letter to Doyle expressed Elliot's conviction that the 
only possible solution lay in the immediate recognition 
by Mexico of Texan independence. In defence of 
this belief he availed himself of all of Houston's argu- 
ments, and cited his facts from conversations with 
the Texan president. The first formal document 
which he had presented to the Texan government was 
followed on July 24 by another in the same vein, 16 
in which he did not advise the concession of Mexican 
sovereignty but argued its advantages to Texas. 
That Elliot's expressions to Doyle should be so at 
variance with the expressions and intentions of his 
official letter to the Texan government betrays no 
disloyalty to his chief, but indicates confidence that 
Aberdeen's instructions were purely perfunctory, and 
that the foreign office had no expectation that such a 
plan would be acceptable to Texas. At the Mexican 
end the armistice negotiations were delayed by Santa 
Anna's illness. Upon his recovery he sent for Doyle, 
and at their first interview told him of the plan as he 
had outlined it to Pakenham. As a result of the inter- 
view, Doyle consented to suggest an armistice to Elliot 
and to ask him to put the matter officially before 
Houston. 16 Lacking definite instructions from Aber- 
deen, however, Doyle felt the delicacy of his position 
and undertook the negotiation with considerable hesi- 
tation. He acted in the matter rather as an agent for 
Santa Anna than as a British diplomat, and his des- 
patches, which give with detail the steps of the negotia- 

16 F. O. Texas, 6, Elliot to Jones. 

16 F. O. Mexico, 162, Doyle to Aberdeen, May 25, 1843. 
Houston had of course heard of the plan long before this and 
told Elliot of it. 



THE ROBINSON ARMISTICE. 135 

tion, show that he was really a middleman in the 
whole transaction. He neither originated nor urged 
it, but, animated by an ambition to be as serviceable 
as his predecessor, he undertook the part assigned him 
by Santa Anna, finding his justification in the fact that 
it looked toward a Mexican-Texan peace, and hoping 
his action would win the approval of Aberdeen. 
Houston's action on the armistice antedated the re- 
ceipt by Elliot of instructions in regard to the matter, 
and came as a result of Doyle's agency and the cer- 
tainty that some step would have to be taken. On 
June 13 he proclaimed a cessation of hostilities and 
appointed commissioners to meet those -from Mexico. 
This was done in spite of the fact that it seemed to 
lead up to an inevitable dead-lock. It was popularly 
known that Mexico would consider no arrangement 
with Texas which did not recognize Mexican sov- 
ereignty. There was also the perfectly understood 
fact that Texas would repudiate any possible scheme 
which implied an acknowledgment of such Mexican 
sovereignty. This impossible situation has led histor- 
ians to believe that Elliot was here again merely a tool 
in the hands of Houston to arouse anti-British senti- 
ment in America. It must be remembered, however, 
that Elliot's statement to the Texan government, made 
a little later, was but a formal act in obedience to 
Aberdeen's first instruction concerning the Robinson 
plan; again, that Elliot personally was convinced that 
back of Aberdeen's formal instruction was a real in- 
tention to force upon Mexico a recognition of Texas ; 
and further, that the intimate relations existing be- 
tween the two men presupposes Houston so deeply in 
Elliot's confidence that he would read England's pur- 



I36 THE ROBINSON ARMISTICE. 

pose in this instruction quite as Elliot did. If, as 
Elliot believed, Aberdeen intended to force Mexico 
to peace measures despite all Mexico's protestations 
to the contrary, Houston, who had urged such action 
from the beginning of his intercourse with Elliot, and 
shared Elliot's point of view, should be acquitted of 
charges of duplicity in accepting the situation. 

The communication which Santa Anna requested 
Doyle to make was sent to Elliot in due form in 
May, and was followed by Houston's proclamation 
of armistice on June 13, already referred to. That 
proclamation was forwarded to Doyle, who trans- 
mitted it to Santa Anna. It was accepted, and Gen- 
eral Woll of the Mexican army was notified on July 
12 to cease all preparations for hostilities. With this 
apparent acquiescence, Santa Anna gave no sign of 
yielding an inch in the matter of the nominal sov- 
ereignty over Texas, and again insisted that a final 
peace would be obtained only through a Texan ac- 
knowledgment of Mexican sovereignty. Doyle re- 
garded this insistence without anxiety, supposing it to 
arise from the necessities of the political situation in 
Mexico. 17 

Information in regard to this much discussed armis- 
tice reached the United States representatives only 
after Houston had determined to act. It was in June 
that Anson Jones, the Texan secretary of state, told 
Murphy, the United States agent in Texas, of the 
plan as given and of Houston's decision in regard to 
it. Through Murphy, who was greatly disturbed 
over the whole affair, an account of the matter reached 
Upshur, the American secretary of state, and of course 
17 F. O. Mexico, 163, Doyle to Aberdeen, July 30, 1843. 



THE LONDON ABOLITION MEETING. 137 

President Tyler. The effect of this news in United 
States official circles was stirring, though an account 
of its receipt and comment upon it must properly be 
deferred until later. 

Thus by the middle of 1843 steps had been taken 
which appeared upon the surface to tend toward the 
accomplishment of a permanent peace. At this point, 
in order to comprehend the attitude and instructions of 
the English government, it is necessary to give atten- 
tion to affairs in London, where events largely affect- 
ing the progress of the armistice project were occur- 
ring. By this time Aberdeen was really keenly inter- 
ested in the negotiation, though he had shown so 
much indifference when it first came up. After 
Elliot's first letter, Pakenham's appearance and com- 
munications had really impressed him with the oppor- 
tunity the plan offered, and when, in July, a commit- 
tee of Texans and Americans convened in London to 
discuss the abolition of slavery in Texas, Aberdeen's 
interest was fully aroused. The committee meeting 
followed shortly upon a general antislavery convention 
in London, where British abolition sentiment as well 
as abolition sympathy from all quarters found free 
expression. Among the delegates ( though in no sense 
an accredited delegate from Texas) was a certain S. 
P. Andrews, a lawyer from Houston, Texas, reputed 
a strong abolition agitator. Andrews, it was reported, 
made a proposition to Aberdeen that " Great Britain 
should advance a loan to Texas to be applied to the 
purchase and emancipation of Texas slaves." 18 The 
matter appeared in Aberdeen's instructions to Doyle, 
on July 31, 1843. 19 In this instruction Aberdeen re- 

18 Reeves, 126. 

18 F. O. Mexico, 160. 



I38 THE LONDON ABOLITION MEETING. 

ferred to the meeting of the committee, which he 
called the " Tappan " committee, and transmitted to 
Doyle the answer of the foreign office to Tappan: 20 
" You will perceive that Mr. Tappan is informed in 
that letter that if the State of Texas should confer 
entire emancipation on all persons within its territory, 
and make that decision permanent and irrevocable, 
H. M. Govt, would not fail to press that circum- 
stance upon the consideration of the Mexican Govern- 
ment as a strong additional reason for the acknowl- 
edgment by Mexico of the independence of Texas." 

Aberdeen went on to state that he had no assurance 
that Texas would undertake to abolish slavery, but that 
the armistice made it seem probable that peace was 
near; the subject in fact was one so close to the heart 
of the British people that Doyle must not fail to press 
it upon the Mexican government. He wrote that he 
was " satisfied that it might be a point well worthy of 
the favourable consideration of the Mexican Govt., 
whether it would not be wiser and more consonant 
to their true interests, and even to their dignity, to 
waive the vain and objectionable condition of nominal 
supremacy over Texas which they have included in 
the propositions submitted by them through Mr. Rob- 
inson to the Govt, of Texas, and rather to substitute 
for it that of the absolute abolition of the principle of 

20 There were four brothers Tappan resident in the United 
States, all interested in the abolition movement, but it has 
been impossible to determine with certainty which one of 
them was received by Aberdeen. Arthur Tappan had the 
leading reputation as an abolitionist, having founded the New 
York Emancipator in 1833. He was also one of the founders 
of Oberlin College, was president of the Anti-Slavery Society, 
and was much hated by southern advocates of slavery. 



THE LONDON ABOLITION MEETING. 139 

slavery, and properly regulated emancipation of slaves 
in Texas. 

" H. M. Govt, desires that you should press this 
point earnestly on the attention of the Mexican Govt." 

It will be recalled that in an earlier communication 
in regard to the Robinson plan, on July i, Aberdeen 
had directed Doyle to press upon Mexico the question 
of slave emancipation in Texas. His later and more 
definite instruction may reflect the more immediate 
influence of the abolition convention, but it shows the 
temper of the British foreign secretary and, in some 
measure, the temper of British subjects. If Great 
Britain could prevail upon Mexico to take the initial 
step leading to abolition in Texas, the triumph would 
be great, no matter through what agency it was 
brought about. 21 

Aberdeen's meeting with the abolition committee was 

no secret, and it is not surprising that it created great 

excitement. To Americans or Texans, to abolitionists 

or slaveholders, it was a matter of moment that the 

director of English foreign policy should busy himself 

with any organization looking toward emancipation of 

slaves anywhere in the New World. Reports of his 

action, many of them untrue or exaggerated, were, of 

course, immediately sent out from England to the 

21 In May, 1843, the southern newspaper press got hold of 
rumors in regard to Elliot's grand scheme for a reorganized 
Texas and for the abolition of slavery. The matter appeared 
in the New Orleans Bee, and that paper became much exer- 
cised over " abolition plots," making a vicious attack on both 
Elliot and Houston. A letter to the Bee from a Galveston 
correspondent stated that Elliot had no share in the scheme, 
but it is interesting to note that the rumored "plot" followed 
exactly the essentials of the plan advocated by Elliot in his 
letters to Addington. Niles' Register, June 10, 1843, p. 231. 



I40 THE LONDON' ABOLITION MEETING. 

countries most nearly concerned. In both the United 
States and Texas they were received, naturally, with 
popular indignation, while in each case the government 
withheld its judgment until it should have official in- 
formation. 

An American, Duff Green, a general in the United 
States army and a Southerner, was in England at the 
time, and promptly made use of an opportunity where 
British interference could be charged. He it is who 
is credited with writing to Upshur upon the matter 
and suggesting that England's abolition plans be used 
to arouse the friends of American annexation. With 
Ashbel Smith, the Texan representative in England, 
however, there was no anxiety to make political capital 
out of the episode, and he immediately took steps to 
learn the truth of the various rumors, in order to re- 
port correctly to the Texan secretary of state. In a 
conference with Aberdeen he stated plainly that Texas 
would never for a moment consider the abolition of 
slavery, and on August 1 he addressed a note to Aber- 
deen intended to record the objections of Texas to 
any such plan : — 22 

In making the present communication the Undersigned begs 
to disclaim intimating the opinion that there exists any dis- 
position on the part of Her British Majesty's Government to 
interfere improperly in the affairs of Texas, an opinion which 
would be wholly inconsistent with the frank and friendly 
tone of his Lordship's remarks in the interview the Under- 
signed had the honor to hold with his Lordship on this sub- 
ject; nor does the Undersigned wish or expect to interfere 
with the liberty of British subjects to discuss the matter in 
question or any other matter, but his object is to place on 
record the explicit disapproval by the Texian Government of 
all proceedings having for their object the abolition of slavery 
in Texas. 

23 F. O. Texas, 8. 



THE LONDON ABOLITION MEETING. I4 1 

While Smith's note states very clearly^that British 
interference with a Texan institution would never be 
tolerated, it diplomatically ignores the possibility that 
Aberdeen could act improperly in the matter. On the 
day previous, however, he had written to Anson Jones 
an account of the interview with Aberdeen, in the 
course of which he had asked if it were true that 
Great Britain was preparing to secure the abolition of 
slavery in Texas by making a money compensation 
to the slaveholders. " His Lordship replied in effect : 
That it is the well known policy and wish of the 
British Government to abolish slavery everywhere — 
that its abolition in Texas is deemed very desirable. 
. . . He added that there was no disposition on the part 
of the British Government to interfere improperly on 
this subject, and that they would not give the Texian 
Govt, cause to complain. He was not prepared to say 
whether the British Govt, would consent hereafter to 
make such compensation to Texas as would enable the 
slaveholders to abolish slavery. The object is deemed 
so important, perhaps he might, though he would not 
say certainly." 23 

While the exact wording of Smith's report to Jones 
is in strict agreement with his official communication 
to Aberdeen on August I, the two documents certainly 
differ in emphasis and in the impression conveyed. 
The note to Aberdeen emphasizes Smith's perfect 
understanding that British policy intends no improper 
interference in the affairs of Texas. The report to 
Jones lays stress on Aberdeen's inclination to help, 
if not to " interfere," in securing the abolition of 
slavery, and the very uncertainty of Aberdeen's in- 

23 Quoted by Reeves, 127. 



I4 2 THE LONDON ABOLITION MEETING. 

tentions, as noted in the report, would naturally tend 
to increase American suspicions. The reason for the 
difference of emphasis in these two documents was 
probably Smith's own uncertainty as to British plans, 
rather than any purpose to magnify British antislavery 
activities in Texas. 

Duff Green's letter, obviously prepared to arouse 
anti-English sentiments to the utmost, laid great em- 
phasis on England's interest in abolition, and even went 
so far as to state that the project of a loan noted in the 
conferences between Aberdeen and the antislavery 
committee referred also to a moneyed support to be 
given in order to prevent the annexation of Texas to 
the United States. 24 Such a statement was entirely un- 
warranted, and nothing in Aberdeen's statement to 
Smith or in his report to Doyle on the Tappan com- 
mittee can be found to justify it. There is indeed 
no evidence that he ever really considered the project 
of using money to purchase abolition in Texas. 
Green's report when it was finally made public, accom- 
plished its purpose and aroused the expected excite- 
ment in the United States. The attitude of the British 
government in this matter of abolition was of great in- 
terest to the people on both sides of the Atlantic. On 
August 18 it was the theme of a debate in Parliament, 
when Lord Brougham interpellated the ministry on the 
subject of British interests in Texas. He asserted 
that Mexican recognition of Texas might be used to 
force abolition on that State, and that this, in turn, 
would react against slavery in the United States. 
Aberdeen's reply was an evasion rather than an explan- 
ation, and he refused to present the papers called for 
M Reeves, 127. 



THE LONDON ABOLITION MEETING. 143 

by Brougham. He did say, however, that this 
refusal " did not arise from indifference, but from quite 
a contrary reason." 25 Such treatment of the question 
could not bring satisfaction in any quarter. Indeed, 
both friends and enemies of Texan independence were 
left to believe that Great Britain was really preparing 
some measure to bring about abolition in that State. 26 
Upon the receipt in the United States of the various 
rumors involving British interference, formal instruc- 
tions to investigate and report upon the matter were 
sent to Everett, the American minister in London. 
Everett was to obtain from Aberdeen a statement 
relative to his conference with the antislavery com- 
mittee, and, if possible, to get from him an announce- 
ment of British plans. In accordance with these 
directions, Everett secured an interview with Aber- 
deen, and came away from it convinced that the 
whole affair was a mare's nest, and that Great Britain 
had no intention whatever of stirring the subject of 
slavery in Texas. On November 16 Everett reported 
to Upshur : — 

25 Hansard, 3d Sen, LXXI, 917. 

28 Von Hoist, II, 624 seq., correctly states that this reply 
by Aberdeen naturally created suspicion in America, even 
though the suspicion itself may not have been well founded. 
With such evidence as was at his command, Von Hoist con- 
cludes that there was no real ground for believing that Great 
Britain was pursuing any active policy looking toward aboli- 
tion. He is careful, however, to state that Great Britain's 
previous activities in colonial affairs and her well-known 
interests in Mexico and Central America, as well as her gen- 
eral opposition to the expansion of the United States, all 
tended to justify the suspicions of Tyler and Calhoun. In 
Von Hoist's opinion, Great Britain suffered here for her 
previous sins. 



144 THE LONDON ABOLITION MEETING. 

The subject of domestic slavery was never so much as 
mentioned or alluded to by the British minister to the 
government of Texas, except to disclaim in most emphatic 
terms any intention on the part of England to interfere with 
it here. Indeed, that constituted no part of the policy of 
that far reaching nation. She might be willing to tickle the 
abolitionists (a somewhat venomous but very respectable or 
influential class of her citizens) but had no idea of going in a 
crusade with them to abolish slavery in Texas, or anywhere 
else. Her Texas policy was to build up a power independent 
of the United States who could raise cotton enough to supply 
the world; of which power slavery would be a necessary ele- 
ment. And this not primarily to injure the United States, 
but to benefit herself, not from enmity to Brother Jonathan, 
but love to John Bull, and so with France. 27 

Indeed, the substance of Everett's report was that 
Aberdeen explicitly denied ever having taken up with 
Texas the matter of abolition. This official report to 
the United States thus acquits Great Britain of im- 
proper interference, and doubtless Everett expected 
it to allay suspicions of Aberdeen. In Texas also it 
was necessary that Aberdeen be exonerated from sus- 
picion of a direct effort to influence affairs in that 
State, and the foreign office immediately put itself 
upon record in the matter. As a result of a confer- 
ence between Smith and Aberdeen, following the par- 
liamentary debate of August 18, Aberdeen transmitted 
to Smith a definite reply to his communication of 
August i. This note was writen on September n, 
1843. 28 In it Aberdeen stated that the British govern- 
ment had no wish to interfere with Texas. " Nothing 
can be further from their intention than thus to inter- 
fere in the internal affairs of Texas. But at the 

27 Cited by Reeves, 133, from the official correspondence oi 
Anson Jones. 

28 F. O. Texas, 8. 



THE LONDON ABOLITION MEETING. 145 

same time that the Undersd makes this declaration, he 
believes that Mr. Smith is fully aware of the continued 
anxiety of H. M. Govt, to see Slavery abolished, not 
only in Texas, but in all parts of the World : and it is 
a matter of no surprise to the Undersd that private 
Individuals, who are impressed with the same feelings, 
should exert every effort in their power to attain an 
object so desirable." 

While both Aberdeen's reply to Everett and his note 
to Smith disclaimed any intention of interfering in 
Texan affairs, they are both stamped with the hope of 
securing abolition in Texas. That Aberdeen definitely 
hoped to see abolition an accomplished' fact in Texas 
is certain, and so far as his personal sentiments in the 
matter, and, indeed, the general sentiments of the great 
majority of the English people, are concerned, he left 
no one in doubt at any time. He took great care 
always to emphasize the sincere British interest in the 
world-wide abolition of slavery. While avowing his 
deep personal sympathy with the cause of abolition, 
his emphatic disclaimer of active or official interfer- 
ence in Texas to bring about a result for which all 
Englishmen hoped, served to call attention to his fine 
sense of the limits of international prerogative. His 
denial that Great Britain had ever suggested to Texas 
any plan looking toward emancipation of the slaves 
was convincing to most people, and his differentiation 
between personal sentiments and national privilege 
quite effectually blinded the public to the fact that any 
other measures might be under way to accomplish the 
main purpose. Aberdeen's instructions to Doyle, how- 
ever, show that there was a specific project on foot 
intended to achieve indirectly a result which could not 



14^ THE LONDON ABOLITION MEETING. 

otherwise be reached. Nevertheless, both Smith and 
Everett accepted Aberdeen's explanations and denials, 
and neither of them at first suspected reservations or 
other means to attain British ends. 

Thus there was a basis of truth in all the various 
American suspicions of British policy. It is cus- 
tomarily stated that the substance of the American 
plan in the spring of 1844 was to urge that "Texas 
must be annexed as a measure of self protection to the 
United States against the encroachments of Great 
Britain " in the commercial field, and that " Texas must 
be annexed to the United States in order to protect the 
slave interests of the Southern States, so jeopardized 
by Great Britain's advocacy of abolition in Texas." 29 
These two points are exactly the ones upon which 
Kennedy and Elliot had centered most of their atten- 
tion in outlining a plan of British action. To neither 
of these agents had Aberdeen made any reply. If 
their suggestions impressed him at all, he used them j 
only in instructions to Doyle, whose directions were 
that Mexican recognition be made contingent upon 
abolition in Texas. Yet, after all, this was only an 
effort to secure in roundabout fashion what Elliot ad- 
vocated in Texas. In his purpose and in his mode of 
procedure there was, of course, nothing dishonorable 
in the conduct of Aberdeen, and nothing for which 
the British government could be called to account 
in case it were perfectly understood that she was 
attempting to prevent the annexation of Texas to 
the United States. More than that, also, such a policy 
at this time was perfectly consistent with an honest 
conviction in Aberdeen's mind that to prevent Texan 

^Reeves, 128. 



THE LONDON ABOLITION MEElino. 



147 



annexation was in reality a kindness to the United 
States itself. The difficulty in the whole matter is, 
however, that while Aberdeen was pursuing this policy 
of preventing the annexation of Texas and at the same 
time attempting the abolition of slavery in Texas, he 
was denying accusations of Calhoun which charged 
him with precisely this line of action. Great Britain 
had a perfect right in defense of her own interests to 
oppose the expansion of the United States. She also 
had a perfect right to hope for the abolition of slavery 
everywhere, and to use her influence in securing it in 
a new state. Calhoun said that England was making 
efforts to prevent United States expansion, and that 
England was also attempting to further abolition in 
Texas and in America. Both of these statements 
Aberdeen denied, or at least he denied that British 
policy had gone farther than an expression of a philan- 
thropic interest. If the matter were summed up as a 
straightforward contest for power between Great 
Britain and the United States, then in the light of 
present-day judgments both the methods and the aims 
of British policy were more honorable than were those 
of the United States. But in fact the ministry of Great 
Britain denied the existence of such British policy, and 
in this denial the judgment of history may discover a 
justification for the extreme suspicion of American 
statesmen. 30 

80 It should be borne in mind, also, that those American 
statesmen who were most interested in the annexation of 
Texas, and first of all Calhoun, were conscientiously con- 
vinced of the justice of the institution of slavery, and were, 
therefore, acting under what were to them conscientious 
motives. This was certainly not true of all who favored the 
annexation of Texas, but there can be no question that it was 



//■ 

1 I 



I < 



I48 THE LONDON ABOLITION MEETING. 

The connection between the agitation of abolition 
ideas in London and diplomatic activities in Mexico 
and Texas was established when, on August 14, Doyle 
informed Santa Anna of Houston's acceptance of the 
armistice and his appointment of peace commissioners. 
Doyle, in presenting the information, urged that Mex- 
ico abandon the idea of retaining sovereignty over 
Texas. 31 His action was the result of Aberdeen's in- 
struction of July i, 32 which antedated the conference 
with the antislavery committee, the later instruction in 
which Aberdeen reported the interview with Tappan 
not having been received. At the same time that this 
later instruction was sent to Doyle, July 31, a copy of 
it was forwarded to Elliot, 33 together with an account 
of the meeting with the Tappan committee. Elliot 
was rejoiced, finding in these new instructions the 
probable realization of his dreams. He was wholly 
delighted, and he jumped to the conclusion that Aber- 
deen had finally awakened to the necessity for prompt 
action and intended now to force Mexico to make 
peace. His first impression was that the plan could 

true of Calhoun. The fact is not necessarily honorable to him, 
but the conviction under which he labored should have been 
remembered by those who at the time never failed to impute 
evil to him. The very openness of the assertion, first by 
Upshur and Tyler, and later by Calhoun and Tyler, that Great 
Britain was planning the abolition of slavery in the United 
States, and that this was a just ground for American anger 
at Great Britain, indicates the moral sincerity of all three men. 
They believed in the institution of slavery, otherwise they 
would never have been so foolish as to cite a British attack 
upon that institution as the ground for a prompt annexation 
of Texas. 

31 F. O. Mexico, 163, Doyle to Aberdeen, August 29, 1843. 

82 See before, p. 130. 

83 See before, p. 137. 



THE LONDON ABOLITION MEETING. 149 

be carried through, but that it must be put into im- 
mediate operation. He wrote to Aberdeen that the 
" proposal of Mexico to acknowledge the independence 
of Texas upon the condition to which your Lordship 
has adverted" would prevent any new slaves being 
brought in, and would quickly result in the extinction 
of slavery. 34 He also dilated upon the great advan- 
tages to England. " If the principle of free labor can 
be established here, what with the opportunity of pro- . 
curing labor from Mexico, and by immigration from 
other quarters, and the increasing supply and improve- 
ment of the staple from India, there would very soon 
be an end of the remunerative production of Cotton 
by Slave Labor in the United States." With, free 
labor would come free trade. Elliot felt that the 
American protective system was doomed to a speedy 
death, and the far-reaching effect of the suggested 
Mexican ultimatum for peace he could already see. 
Ten days later he wrote a long letter to Doyle, send- 
ing it by one of the Texan commissioners of armistice. 
In this Elliot outlined in bold fashion the objects to be 
labored for: — 35 

I trust that Mexico will be true to the great cause of hu- 
manity and to Itself, on this momentous occasion. The mere 
announcement of their just and honorable determination that 
a land which was free under their rule should not be turned 
into a Pen of Slaves for the convenience of persons possessing 
such property in the exhausted Slave States of the North 
American Union would of itself be a very important step 
towards the establishment and security of the due and needful 
weight of Mexico in the affairs of this Continent. They have 
but to signify that the sine qua non conditions of the ac- 
knowledgment of Texas by Mexico are decided and approved 

** F. O. Texas, 6, Elliot to Aberdeen, September 30, 1843. 
88 F. O. Texas, 6, October 10, 1843. 



I50 THE LONDON ABOLITION MEETING. 

measures for the early and final disappearance of slavery here, 
and formal adherence to the declaration of Mexico that the 
Independence is recognized and understood to be complete, 
whilst Texas remain a Separate Nation, but of non effect in 
the case that it should annex itself to any other Country, with- 
out the consent of Mexico. 

It will be seen that Elliot's enthusiasm had quite 
carried him off his feet, and indeed his definite formu- 
lation of a program for Mexico goes much farther 
than has generally been supposed; yet it is to be re- 
membered that in thus writing to Doyle he merely ex- 
pressed his own desires, and that this letter had no 
official significance. The query at once arises whether 
Elliot may not have had some private authority that 
encouraged him in making these sweeping generaliza- 
tions. There is no evidence whatever to confirm any 
such suspicion. Moreover, his action here is entirely 
in character; a dreaming intriguer, political theorist, 
and philanthropist, he suddenly felt himself within 
reach of the realization of long-cherished ideals, and 
he lacked the statesman's poise. His diplomatic re- 
sponsibilities were lost sight of in his personal elation, 
and he was merely voicing his personal opinion. 

While British influence in Mexico and Texas was 
being exerted toward peace in these countries, by way 
of abolition if possible, every effort was made in the 
United States to find out the true condition of affairs. 
Upshur, on August 8, had written to Murphy, the 
American representative in Texas, sending him the 
contents of the Duff Green letter, and asking for in- 
formation. Murphy in reply was confident that there 
was no need of alarm about British plans for abolition 
in Texas, and advised Upshur not to use the abolition 
cry against Great Britain, but to base his attack on 



THE LONDON ABOLITION MEETING. 1 5 l 

British policy upon the ground that it was attempting 
to secure from Texas a consent to reannexation to 
Mexico. This, Murphy wrote, could be consistently 
assailed as a step backward in civil government, re- 
ligion, and political liberty. 36 Murphy's unique sug- 
gestions were, however, ignored by Upshur, who pre- 
ferred rather that Great Britain should answer to the 
charge of British interference in" the institution of 
slavery. The American offer of an annexation treaty 
followed. On October 31, 1843, Elliot wrote to Aber- 
deen, stating that Houston had shown him a despatch 
from the Texas agent at Washington, Van Zandt, 
giving the outlines of that offer. 37 Houston expressed 
himself as greatly disturbed, and he wished Elliot to 
assure Aberdeen that if Mexico would speedily recog- 
nize the independence of Texas, the United States offer 
of annexation would be declined. " Her Majesty's 
Govt, might rest assured that with the Independence 
of Texas recognized by Mexico, He would never con- 
sent to any treaty 'on this project of annexation to the 
United States, and He had a conviction that the people 
would sustain him in that determination. He had for- 
merly been favourable to such a combination ; But the 
United States had rejected the proposals of this 
Country in its time of difficulty ; neither was the sub- 
sequent conduct of that Government calculated to in- 
duce the Government and people of Texas in this 
mended state of things, to sacrifice their true and last- 
ing advantage to the policy of party in that Country." 
Thus Elliot quoted Houston and expressed conviction 
in his sincerity; yet, in his reply to Houston himself 

88 H. R. Ex. Doc. No. 271, 28th Cong., 1st sess. 
37 F. O. Texas, 6. 



I5 2 THE LONDON ABOLITION MEETING. 

he was much more cautions than usual, merely stating 
that he had no instructions as to British policy toward 
any projected American annexation. 

Elliot was in fact surprised and perhaps chagrined 
at the American offer to annex Texas. While clamor- 
ing for British action to forestall annexation, and even 
fearing that the Texan public still favored an Ameri- 
can connection, he had not considered the possibility 
of an offer from the United States, and he was there- 
fore greatly disturbed. So far as Elliot was con- 
cerned the unexpected had happened. His only com- 
fort lay in the non-committal attitude of Texas and 
the evident intention of Houston to postpone action. 
Van Zandt was instructed to inform Upshur that 
Texas would consider the question of annexation only 
when the United States Senate should act and some 
definite proposal should be made to Texas. Elliot 
felt, however, that matters were in a critical state. 
Unfortunately, just at this juncture he fell ill, and had 
to go to New Orleans to consult a physician. While 
there he found mental relief in some social contact 
with Henry Clay, whom he met for the first time. 
Clay's assurance that the United States Senate would 
unquestionably block any scheme looking toward 
Texan annexation brought great satisfaction to Elliot's 
troubled mind, and helped to restore the confidence 
and hope which had so recently been shaken. 38 The 
year 1843 tnus closed with Elliot in New Orleans, 
and Texas waiting for action on the part of the 
United States. 

In Mexico, also, there was a similar cessation of 
diplomatic activity. Here, however, the cause was a 

M F. O. Texas, 6, Elliot to Aberdeen, December 31, 1843. 



THE LONDON ABOLITION MEETING. 153 

personal quarrel in which Doyle had become involved 
with the Mexican government. After the armistice 
negotiations were begun it did not seem possible for 
either Doyle or Elliot to be of much service in the 
affair. In the final result they counted for nothing, 
but the armistice was continued until July of 1844. 
Immediately after Doyle had successfully carried 
through his part of the negotiation he was forced to 
report to Aberdeen a rupture of diplomatic relations 
with the Mexican government, occasioned by very 
nearly an exact repetition of the flag incident in the 
time of Pakenham. It involved an altercation with 
Mexican officials at a public ball, a demand by Doyle 
that an English boat flag, exhibited among a group of 
Texan " trophies taken in war," should be removed 
from the wall, and a withdrawal of Doyle and all the 
English present when the demand was refused. Pak- 
enham was more fortunate, however, in the former 
incident, for he succeeded in getting the flag and taking 
it away. Doyle's position was more humiliating, as he 
had to leave the flag hanging and demand its restora- 
tion to him after he had left the ball. The affair oc- 
curred on September 28, and created so much public 
excitement that war with England came to be talked of 
as a possible result. 39 Doyle's dignity demanded the 
restoration of the flag before he should resume rela- 
tions with the Mexican government, while the govern- 
ment refused the flag to any demand save that of the 

39 The story of the flag incident is in F. O. Mexico, 164, 
Doyle to Aberdeen, September 29, 1843, and F. O. Mexico, 
165, Doyle to Aberdeen, October 30, 1843. It is pretty evident 
that Doyle had been reading Pakenham's correspondence, and 
felt that he must follow Pakenham's example. His misfor- 
tune was his inability to capture the flag. Failing that, he 
thought his only alternative was to sever diplomatic relations. 



154 THE LONDON ABOLITION MEETING. 

British foreign minister. Mexico made an official ex- 
planation to Great Britain through its representative 
in London, and Aberdeen accepted that explanation, 
and ordered Doyle to resume diplomatic relations. At 
nearly the same time Bankhead was appointed to the 
post of minister at Mexico, and was somewhat hur- 
riedly despatched to that point. At the time, with 
the armistice in effect and negotiations at a standstill 
between Texas and Mexico, Doyle's conduct here had 
no immediate bearing on affairs. It will be seen later, 
however, that this unfortunate incident was not with- 
out influence when the new minister entered upon his 
duties. Upon Bankhead's arrival in Mexico there was 
renewed hope in England of establishing a permanent 
Mexican-Texan peace, but the inevitable result of the 
Doyle rupture had so far weakened British influence 
in Mexico that Bankhead's task was much more diffi- 
cult. Aberdeen unquestionably felt that for a- time 
Mexico must be treated with the greatest delicacy if 
British influence were to be maintained, and Bank- 
head's whole conduct for the first few months after 
his arrival in Mexico was apparently inspired by exces- 
sive consideration for the Mexican government. But 
for the last months of 1843, an ^ until Bankhead's 
arrival, Great Britain was without influence in 
Mexico. 40 

40 In his desire to pacify Mexico, Aberdeen even intermitted 
for a time the customary urging that Mexico pay her debts 
to British merchants. This irritated the merchants, and they 
joined in representations to the foreign office, lauding Doyle's 
action in the flag affair as necessary if British honor were to 
be upheld. F. O. Mexico, 170. 



CHAPTER VII. 

1844, January to June. The Calhoun-Pakju^ham 

Correspondence. Aberdeen's Plan to 

Prevent Annexation. 

The year 1844 witnessed England's most direct effort 
to prevent Texan annexation to the United States, and 
in the early months the outlook for ultimate success 
seemed promising. Early in the year Elliot twice wrote 
to Aberdeen that any immediate danger of annexation 
was over, 1 and his letters evinced his now restored 
confidence in the probabilities of peace and indepen- 
dence for Texas. He assured Aberdeen that the 
president of the Texan Republic was just as anxious 
as ever to maintain the independence of the State. 
Shortly after this, Elliot was compelled by the illness 
of his child to leave Texas again, and save for a brief 
return in the month of April he was not present at his 
post until late in the year. He journeyed to Virginia, 
and there, in the vicinity of Washington, was able to be 
in close touch with Pakenham, the new British minis- 
ter in Washington, and could keep himself informed 
of the events at the United States capital. 2 

X F. O. Texas, 9, Elliot to Aberdeen, January 15, and 
February 17, 1844. 

2 Copies of all the important correspondence between Aber- 
deen and Pakenham were sent to Elliot, and thus are to be 
found in the documents of Elliot's consulate in Texas. These 
documents were all removed to London when Texas finally 
ceased to be an independent republic. 

»5S 



156 CALHOUN-PAKENHAM CORRESPONDENCE. 

Although the cessation of hostilities between Mexico 
and Texas was regarded by the foreign office in Lon- 
don as a step gained, the satisfaction was short-lived 
owing to the .American proffer of annexation which so 
promptly fallowed it. Still, while the Texan refusal to 
act airtil the United States Senate should formally 
sanction the offer was reassuring, diplomatic affairs 
moved rapidly in this new country, and Aberdeen 
felt that he must be on the alert. The public clamor 
aroused by his conference with the antislavery com- 
mittee in the summer of 1843 na ^ been unpleasant and 
caused him anxiety, and when he learned through 
Pakenham and others of the consequent irritation in 
the United States, he endeavored to dispel the storm of 
criticism he had provoked. On December 26, 1843, 
he addressed a communication to Pakenham with in- 
structions to present the same to Upshur. This was 
the first of those letters which were afterwards pub- 
lished and came to be known in history as the Cal- 
houn-Pakenham correspondence. Pakenham, how- 
ever, did not obey this instruction immediately, and 
the letter was not presented to the American govern- 
ment until the following February. Meantime, 
Aberdeen received a copy of President Tyler's annual 
message to Congress outlining a policy of annexation ; 
and, highly indignant at some of the phrases it con- 
tained which hinted at British interference in the af- 
fairs of Texas, he again wrote to Pakenham. In this 
letter of January 9 Aberdeen frankly expressed his 
indignation at the tone of the president's message, and 
assigned to Pakenham the ungrateful task of enlight- 
ening Upshur upon the point. He concluded : " I 
have now to desire that in executing that Instruction, 



CALHOUN-PAKENHAM CORRESPONDENCE. 157 

you will take the opportunity of observing to the Sec- 
retary of State, that the language of the President, 
when speaking of the measures which the U. States 
may hereafter have occasion to adopt, ill accords with 
this condemnation of the supposed designs of other 
powers. You will state to Mr. Upshur, that H. M's. 
Govt, would have been glad if they could have dis- 
covered in the Message greater evidence of that disin- 
terested policy, the presumed absence of which in 
other quarters, the President has thought necessary 
to call to the Notice of his Countrymen." 3 

This instruction served only to relieve the British 
secretary then and to throw light on the British atti- 
tude later, for it was never presented by Pakenham, 
and is therefore not included in the published corre- 
spondence. It shows that Aberdeen was thoroughly 
angry, and that he did not hesitate to resent unjust 
accusations from the American president. In his let- 
ters, and in his general denial of charges insinuated in 
Tyler's message, Aberdeen laid great stress upon the 
slavery question always. He denied that Great Britain 
had any intention of attempting to secure abolition in 
Texas by improper or indirect methods, and he con- 
veyed the impression that British sins, from the Amer- 
ican point of view, were all embodied in her abolition 
hopes and sentiments. With each protestation he man- 
aged to explain the energies of Great Britain upon the 
basis of her antislavery theories and to solidify Ameri- 
can opposition upon the same score. Thus it was pos- 
sible to distract attention in the United States from any 
definite British effort to prevent United States annexa- 
tion of Texas. Plans looking to this very desirable 

S F. O. Texas, 20. Copy sent to Elliot. 



158 CALHOUN-PAKENHAM CORRESPONDENCE. 

end were, however, under consideration at the foreign 
office, even while abolition in general was the theme of 
Aberdeen's instructions. These plans required that 
France and England unite to prevent that annexation. 
Doubtless the president's message to Congress inspired 
this new move. It may be that Aberdeen was stirred 
into action by it, but it is more likely that the message 
convinced him that annexation was really imminent, 
and that boldness was required in order to prevent it. 
On January 12 he instructed Cowley in Paris 4 to bring 
Tyler's message to the attention of the French govern- 
ment : — ■ 

It is true that no direct mention is there made either of 
Great Britain or of France ; and it is also true that, in 
noticing the possibility of interference on the part of other 
great and powerful Nations, in the affairs of the neighbour- 
ing Republics, the President appears to have alluded solely 
to Great Britain. At the same time, it is sufficiently evident 
that the future annexation of Texas to the United States is 
contemplated by the President and considering that France 
as well as Great Britain has recognized the Independence of 
Texas, and entered into a Treaty with that Republic, and 
that the Interests of the two countries in that part of America 
are, in all respects, the same, H. M's Govt presume that the 
Government of France would not any more than that of 
Great Britain, look with indifference upon any measure, by 
which Texas should cease to exist as a separate and inde- 
pendent State. 

I have to desire that Y. E. will ascertain from M. Guizot 
whether the views of H M's Govt on this subject are shared 
by the Government of France; and, if so, you will propose 
that the Representatives of the two Govts, at Washington 
and in Texas, should be instructed to hold the same lan- 

4 F. O. Texas, 20. Copies of all important despatches ex- 
changed by Aberdeen and Cowley on the Texan question 
were sent to the British agents in Mexico and Texas. Refer- 
ences to such despatches are therefore made to the volume 
where first found. 



CALHOUN-PAKENHAM CORRESPONDENCE. 1 59 

guage, deprecating all interference on the part of the United 
States in the affairs of Texas, or the adoption of any measure 
leading to the destruction of the separate existence of that 
State ; at the same time, warning the Texian Govt not to 
furnish the United States with any just cause of complaint, 
and encouraging them to look to the preservation of their 
independence, as the best security for their ultimate pros- 
perity, both political and commercial. 

This instruction can have no other meaning than that 
Aberdeen was ready to go to the length of a direct pro- 
hibition of annexation in case he found France acquies- 
cent. It is true that in itself the instruction does not 
state this in so many words, but there could have been 
no purpose in the measure as outlined if Great Britain 
and France were not prepared to defend their plan 
to any extent necessary. On the other hand, it is more 
than probable that Aberdeen believed that the com- 
bined efforts of two formidable European states would 
be effective in preventing annexation without resorting 
to more forcible methods. No' doubt, too, he underes- 
timated both the strength of annexation sentiments in 
America and the daring of the United States govern- 
ment. He probably never dreamed that the United 
States would venture to annex Texas in the face of 
vigorous objection from England and France. 

Cowley's reply to Aberdeen was written on January 
15. 5 He had found the king of France and his minis- 
ter, Guizot, in perfect sympathy with Aberdeen's ideas. 
He said : — 

It was apparent, the King observed, from the President's 
Message, that it was in serious contemplation to add Texas 
to the Union: That, in his opinion, this ought to be opposed, 
for it would be for the advantage of all Maritime States, 
for France and Great Britain in particular, that the Inde- 

B F. O. Texas, 20. 



i6o 



CALHOUN-PAKENHAM CORRESPONDENCE. 



pendence of Texas should be maintained, and that a barrier 
should thus be opposed to the encroachments of the United 
States, whose object was not only to take possession of 
Texas, but at some future period to make that Province a 
stepping stone to Mexico. His Majesty added that he had 
desired M. Guizot to instruct the French Ambassador in 
London to communicate with Your Lordship on this sub- 
ject, which he considered to be one of no slight importance. 
M. Guizot, upon my communicating to him Your Lord- 
ship's Despatch and its Enclosures, fully concurred in Your 
Lordship's opinion as to the course to be pursued with the 
Govt, of the United States, and said that he would forth- 
with send Instructions to M. de Ste. Auliare to confer with 
Your Lordship upon this subject : He would also, he said, 
direct the French Minister at Washington to act in strict 
concert with Mr. Pakenham in everything relating to this 
Matter. M. Guizot was of opinion that it was of importance 
that the designs of the Govt, of the United States with re- 
spect to Texas, should be prevented. 

The concluding words of this report by Cowley in- 
dicate a perfect understanding by France of Aber- 
deen's purposes. 6 Thus Aberdeen believed that he was 
building a really formidable barrier to the American 
annexation of Texas. His plan, naturally, presup- 
posed an immediate Mexican recognition of Texan 
independence, thus depriving Texas of an excuse for 
consenting to annexation. The working machinery of 
the plan was not yet set in motion, and meantime 

* This is the only despatch referring to the supposed pro- 
test to be found. The inference is that the matter ended 
where it began, or rather that the document went no farther 
than to the British and French ministers at Washington. 
There is no evidence that any such protest was ever made, 
or that instructions for its presentation were actually given. 
It will be seen later that both Pakenham and the French 
minister believed that the positions assumed by their re- 
spective governments were too aggressive, and after con- 
ference together, they decided to allow themselves a margin 
of discretion in carrying out the plans laid down for them. 



CALHOUN-PAKENHAM CORRESPONDENCE. l6l 

from Texas and from America came the welcome news 
that no such haste was required as had at first seemed 
necessary. Elliot wrote to Aberdeen on April 7 that 
he was back again in Galveston for a few days, and 
that he found Houston very much embarrassed by the 
pressure being put upon him from Washington, but 
still firm in his desire for independence. Houston 
had, in fact, told Elliot that Henderson, the new Texan 
agent sent to Washington, was instructed to demand 
such terms of the United States as it could not possibly 
grant These impossible terms were incorporated in 
Houston's demand that the United States place a force 
upon the border of Texas to defend that State against 
Mexico. Elliot wrote that if the projected treaty 
should fail, Houston was anxious that Great Britain 
and France should " find means of preventing all fur- 
ther risk of complication in that direction." 7 Yet, 
with all his confidence in Houston's intentions and 
sincerity, Elliot could not let matters rest without an 
attempt to get to the bottom of the public rumors of 
annexation. On his own authority, and contrary to 
Pakenham's advice, he asked for an official explanation, 
but failed to receive any satisfactory reply. Doubtless 
he felt himself justified by the general instructions 
Aberdeen had sent him in the previous year. 

In spite of all assurance by Elliot to the contrary, 
events at Washington, D. C., were moving with greater 
rapidity than had been expected by any of the British 
agents. After the death of Upshur, as a result of an 
explosion on board the " Princeton," Calhoun had 

7 F. O. Texas, 9. Elliot's correspondence shows that 
Houston did tell him the exact truth with regard to all that 
was taking place in Texas between himself and Murphy. 



l62 CALHOUN-PAKENHAM CORRESPONDENCE. 

been called to the department of state. He arrived 
in Washington in the latter part of March, and was 
soon in control of the situation, taking up with enthu- 
siasm the project for the annexation of Texas, and 
pushing it with more ability and shrewdness than had 
been shown by Upshur. The impossible terms which, 
by Houston's instructions, were a condition to a con- 
sideration by Texas of American advances had been 
refused by Tyler. When Calhoun succeeded Upshur, 
that refusal was withdrawn, Texas was conceded bor- 
der protection pending the negotiation, and a treaty 
was speedily drawn with representatives of that State. 
The treaty was signed on April 12, but it was not sent 
to the Senate until April 22, and with it was presented, 
among other correspondence, a portion of the so-called 
Calhoun-Pakenham letters. 8 These included Aber- 
deen's instruction of December 26, 1843, and a reply 
thereto by Calhoun. Aberdeen's letter had been 
written, as has been stated, to help clear up the 
misunderstanding regarding the abolition convention 
and to deny any " occult design " to bring about 
abolition in Texas with the purpose of influencing 
the institution of slavery in the United States. 
Aberdeen had admitted the general interest that 
Great Britain had in the subject of abolition 
" throughout the world," but added that British mo- 
tives were open, and that Great Britain would never 
act secretly in this connection. " She has no thought 
or intention of seeking to act directly or indirectly 
in a political sense on the United States through 
Texas." Unfortunately, some general and quite un- 
necessary reflections referring to the institution of 
8 See before, p. 156. 



CALHOUN-PAKENHAM CORRESPONDENCE. 163 

slavery in the United States were added to this broad 
outline of English policy. There is no proof that these 
were intended in a captious spirit, but they were quite 
superfluous, gave cause for irritation, and were there- 
fore unwise. 9 

Calhoun's reply, presented with Aberdeen's letter, is 
well known and need not be stated at length. For 
the sake of recalling his exact expressions it may not be 
amiss, however, to quote a few sentences. Referring 
to Aberdeen's acknowledged general interest in aboli- 
tion " throughout the world," Calhoun admitted Eng- 
land's right to concern herself with abolition among 
her own colonies, but " when she goes beyond, and 
avows it to be her settled policy, and the object of her 
constant exertions, to abolish it throughout the world, 
she makes it the duty of all other countries, whose 
safety or prosperity may be endangered by her policy, 
to adopt such measures as they may deem necessary 
for their protection." Calhoun then took up the de- 
fense of slavery as an institution, and surely no cham- 
pion of a cause was ever more sincere, more ardent, 
or more eloquent. Should Great Britain succeed in 

8 The Calhoun-Pakenham letters may be found in Sessional 
Papers, 1847, Commons, Vol. 64. This collection contains 
one letter from Pakenham to Aberdeen, dated April 28, 1844, 
which was not published in the United States. In it Paken- 
ham wrote : " Your Lordship will perceive with surprise and 
displeasure, . . . that the explanations furnished by Her 
Majesty's Government . . . have been received in a sense 
quite contrary to their obvious and literal meaning." As 
additions to these letters there should be noted also the 
unpublished letter previously cited from Aberdeen to Paken- 
ham, of January 9, 1844, and another to which attention will 
be directed later, bearing date of June 3, 1844. These have 
never been published. 



164 CALHOUN-PAKENHAM CORRESPONDENCE. 

her desires, he wrote that " she would involve in the 
greatest calamity, the whole country, and especially 
the race which it is the avowed object of her exertions 
to benefit." As a result of Aberdeen's pronouncement 
of British plans, the United States " can no longer 
refuse, consistently with their own peace and security," 
to meet the request for Texan annexation. Thus 
Aberdeen's letter, intended specifically to divert Amer- 
ican attention from the projected plan for Texan 
annexation, was made the excuse for immediate action 
in that very matter. It was, of course, the last thing 
Aberdeen expected. That his efforts to center atten- 
tion upon Great Britain's philanthropic interests should 
result in riveting the attention of the American gov- 
ernment upon Texas seemed the irony of fate. The 
result at the time would have been more disastrous to 
British interests if Calhoun's published letter had had 
the effect he hoped and expected. Unfortunately for 
him, however, he had overestimated his case, and his 
countrymen were not ready to subscribe to his broad 
statements of the need for slavery and for Texas. 
America was not yet ready to assume the issue here 
put forward by Calhoun. This public opinion was im- 
mediately reflected in the Senate, and it came to be 
noised abroad that the Senate would not ratify the 
treaty. Thus Calhoun, no less than Aberdeen, faced 
a totally unexpected situation when this correspon- 
dence was made public. Sympathizing with the anti- 
Calhoun element in the United States, Aberdeen was 
confirmed in the belief that there was still time to in- 
terfere in American plans in Texas, and he decided to 
proceed with his overture to France. Indeed, Aber- 
deen might well feel that in aiding to block Calhoun's 



CALHOUN-PAKENHAM CORRESPONDENCE. 165 

plan, he was in reality acting in harmony with the 
wishes of the greater part of the American public. 
This last, of course, was not the case. The American 
public was rapidly coming to desire Texas, but of 
this Aberdeen was not as yet convinced. Taken all in 
all, the very fire and force of Calhoun's letter defeated 
its own ends. He went too far for his countrymen, 
and he angered Aberdeen. If he believed that his 
threats would serve to intimidate the British minister, 
or to deter him from further effort to defeat American 
plans, he was wrong in his reckoning. Aberdeen, ir- 
ritated by such distortion of his statements and such 
wilful misinterpretation of his motives, resolved the 
more firmly to carry out his own plans and thereby foil 
Calhoun in his designs. From Texas, Elliot com- 
mented upon the general dismay among conservative 
men in America at the boldness of Calhoun's attack 
upon Aberdeen, adding that he was sure the Senate 
would refuse to ratify the treaty, and that thus Mexico 
would have one more chance to act wisely. " It may 
be depended upon," he said " that if Mexico can be in- 
duced to acknowledge the Independence of Texas, the 
Government and people would reject any renewed over- 
tures for annexation to the North American Union. 
Their recent consent has been less the result of a desire 
to form part of that Union, than of a belief that the 
agitation of such a project would dispose the Govern- 
ment of Mexico to acknowledge their Independence." 10 

The same impression was prevalent among American 
diplomats elsewhere. With a general belief that the 
treaty would be lost in the Senate, immediate public 
interest subsided. On May 18 Everett wrote to Cal- 

10 F. O. Texas, 9, Elliot to Aberdeen, May 10, 1844. 



1 66 CALHOUN-PAKENHAM CORRESPONDENCE. 

houn that news of the proposed treaty had aroused 
no great interest in England, and that there was much 
less excitement about the matter than he would have 
expected. Among the newspapers the Times alone 
was as vicious as usual. 11 The subject had indeed 
attracted some attention in Parliament, for on May 
17 Brougham had asked for information, and had 
desired to know what Great Britain was doing rela- 
tive to the reported American treaty of annexation. 
Aberdeen refused to give any information. On May 
20, in the Commons, Hume asked for papers, and in- 
dicated his belief that the British government was 
attempting an unjust interference in the internal af- 
fairs of other countries. Peel refused to give the 
papers. 12 Thus neither the public nor the press in 
England knew whether or not Aberdeen was really 
planning any action in regard to Texas. 

In Mexico the news that a treaty of annexation was 
being negotiated at Washington caused the greatest ex- 
citement and consternation. British residents and of- 
ficial representatives there were hardly less affected by 
such news than the Mexicans themselves, yet England's 
power and influence in Mexico were at a low ebb at 
this critical juncture. The affair of Doyle and the 
flag had so far undermined British authority that 
Doyle's successor, Bankhead, found his path a difficult 
one. His tact and energies for the first few months 
were exclusively devoted to restoring the old friendly 
and confidential relations between the two countries. 
Meantime, all questions that might cause embarrass- 
ment, or that could in any way mar the harmony that 

u H. R. Ex. Doc. No. 271, p. 100, 28th Cong., 1st sess. 
* Hansard, 3rd Ser., LXXIV, 1227, 1330. 



Aberdeen's plan. 167 

Bankheaci proposed to establish, were postponed or 
ignored. Certainly until British prestige was reestab- 
lished there was to ^e no pressure upon the Mexican 
government in any direction. This policy was carried 
so far that Bocanegra, the foreign minister, was told 
that England would never use " force " to compel 
Mexico to recognize Texas. 13 Doubtless Bankhead's 
bearing in Mexico was quite in line with the instruc- 
tions with which he had left England, but the necessity 
to attempt pressure came too soon. When conditions 
in regard to Texas obliged Aberdeen to say that Mex- 
ico must act in accordance with British plans, the 
change in attitude was most marked, and the feeling 
in Mexico was all the more irritated because of that 
change. The conciliatory attitude assumed by Bank- 
head upon his first arrival, therefore, later operated 
against Mexican acquiescence in British plans. 

By the end of May, Aberdeen had resolved to collect 
all his forces and to put into immediate operation his 
plan to prevent American annexation of Texas. On 
May 29 he had a long interview with Murphy, the 
Mexican minister in London, as a result of which 
Murphy drew up a note containing his understanding 
of the purport of that interview, and submitted it to the 
British foreign office. This was transmitted to Aber- 
deen on May 31. It was written in French, and, after 
having been amended by interlineary corrections in 
English, was returned to Murphy, while a copy was 
kept by Aberdeen. The note with the changes and 
additions indicated by italics is here given in full as 
best summarizing the plan that Aberdeen had now de- 
termined to put into effect : — 

13 F. O. Mexico, 173, Bankhead to Aberdeen, March 31, 1844. 



1 68 



ABERDEEN S PLAN. 



Apres avoir confere sur d'autres affaires, Lord Aberdeen 
fit allusion au traite d'annexation du Texas aux Etats Unis. 
Je fis observer a. Son Ex ce : que je me trouvais sans instruc- 
tions a ce sujet, mais qu'il n'etait poire douteux que le Gouv*. 
iMexicain ne tolererait pas l'outragv; qui avait ete fait a ses 
droits. Lord Aberdeen exprima le desir de voir le Mexique 
se preter a. la reconnaissance de l'independance du Texas. 
" Si le Mexique," dit-il, " veut ceder sur ce point, l'Angleterre 
s'opposera (et j'ai lieu de croire que la France se joindra 
a elle dans cette resolution) a l'annexation du Texas, et de 
plus he would endeavour that la France et l'Angleterre 
garantiront ensembles non seulement l'independance du 
Texas, mais aussi les limites du Mexique. Si au contraire 
le Mexique persistait dans son refus de reconnaitre l'inde- 
pendance du Texas, les intentions de l'Angleterre d'empecher 
l'annexation de ce pays aux Etats Unis pourraient ne pas 
etre mises a execution." Sur mon observation qu'il n'etait 
nullement probable que le Gouv*: Americain consentit 
desormais a abandonner la question de l'annexation, quand 
meme le Senat Americain repousserait le Traite quant a 
present; Lord Aberdeen repliqua que provided that England 
and France were perfectly agreed, " peu importerait a 
l'Angleterre que le Gouv*. Americain consentit ou non a 
abandonner cette question, et que, s'il etait necessaire, elle 
irait jusq'aux dernieres extremites pour soutenir sa resolution 
contre l'annexation ; mais qu'a cet effet il f allait que le 
Mexique fut pret a reconnaitre l'independance du Texas, car, 
dans l'etat actuel des choses, le Mexique et l'Angleterre 
marchaient sur des voies differentes, Tun s'opposant a l'an- 
nexation pour garder possession du territoire, et l'autre pour 
en assurer l'independance." Lord Aberdeen ajouta que e'etait 
pour l'Angleterre la seule voie qu'elle pourrait suivre aujour- 
d'hui attendu que l'independance du Texas avait ete reconnue 
par le Gouv*: Britannique; que lui (Lord Aberdeen) n'aurait 
point reconnu [substitution : " perhaps should not have been 
disposed to acknowledge"], cette independance, mais que 
cette reconnaissance ayant eu lieu, ce n'etait qu'en faveur 
de l'independance que l'Angleterre pourrait s'opposer a 
l'annexation. " Je ne suis pas pret," continua Son Excellence, 
" a f aire encore aucune proposition f ormelle au Mexique a ce 
sujet; j'attends la resolution du Senat Americain sur le traite 
dont il s'agit, et l'aspect que presenteront les affaires; mais je 
ferai cette proposition f ormelle aussitot que je serai eclaire 



Aberdeen's plan. 169 

sur ces points and as soon as an understanding can be com- 
pleted with the French Government. II doit etre bien 
entendu, cependant, que l'Angleterre ne fera pas de l'abolition 
de l'esclavage au Texas tine condition de la reconnaissance de 
l'independance de ce pays par le Mexique." 

Je rappelai a Lord Aberdeen que cette offre avait ete faite 
au Mexique. " Cela est vrai," repliqua Son Excellence, " mais 
le Mexique, lorsqu'elle fut faite, ne la prit point en con- 
sideration." 

It zvould undoubtedly have been highly satisfactory to the 
British Gov*, if the abolition of Slavery in Texas could have 
been effected in consequence of the recognition of its inde- 
pendence by Mexico ; but as Great Britain had herself acknowl- 
edged that independence without any such stipulation, it was 
quite impossible to recommend that it should be made an 
indispensable condition by the Mexican Government.™ 

The substance, then, of this proposal was that Mex- 
ico should immediately recognize Texan independence, 
and that, upon such recognition, England and France 
would definitely offer opposition to American annexa- 
tion and would endeavor to guarantee the indepen- 
dence of Texas and the territorial limits of Texas and 
Mexico. Aberdeen made plain that should Mexico 
refuse to recognize Texas, Great Britain could neither 
oppose annexation nor guarantee the territorial limits. 
He also here asserted that little importance was to be 
attached to the intentions of the United States if Great 
Britain and France were agreed in their action. All 
ideas of asking Mexico to urge Texas to abolish slav- 
ery were now abandoned. 

On June 2 Aberdeen had an interview with Ashbel 
Smith, going over this same ground with the purpose 
of securing from Smith a definite pledge that Texas 

11 F. O. Mexico, 180, Dom., Mr. Murphy. Murphy's note 
states that the interview was held upon the 28th, but Aber- 
deen's later references to it always specify the 29th as the 
correct date. 



1 70 ABERDEEN S PLAN. 

would not permit herself to be annexed in case Mexico 
should make peace. 15 Smith told Aberdeen that " in 
my individual opinion, if a solid permanent peace were 
established with Mexico and a treaty of commerce 
with Spain so as to enable us to trade with Cuba, 
Texas would prefer to remain independant; that if the 
British and French Govts, would say authoritatively 
to Mexico, you must forthwith make a solid and per- 
manent peace with Texas, that Mexico would do so, 
and that the annexation of Texas to the American 
Union would not take place." 

This interview is evidence of an underlying hesita- 
tion felt by Aberdeen in the future action of the Texan 
government. His plan was, to his mind, feasible if it 
were not wrecked by the desire of Texas to be annexed 
to the United States. While he totally underesti- 
mated this element in the situation, it was yet suffi- 
ciently present in his mind to make him hesitate, or at 
least to make him feel very anxious to secure pledges 
that Texas would take no such step. 

Before the interview with Smith, however, Aber- 
deen had already transmitted a direct proposal to 
France, based upon the plan drawn up in the inter- 

15 F. O. Texas, 11, Dom., Ashbel Smith. The substance of 
this interview is found in a letter from Smith to Rate, writ- 
ten from Paris, September 23, 1844. In that letter Rate was 
instructed to secure an interview with some one at the 
foreign office and present the substance of the statements 
made by Smith to Aberdeen in their interview of June 2. 
Smith summarized for Rate's benefit his own statements in 
that interview. The matter docs not appear anywhere else, 
but there is no question that Smith's summarization contains 
the substance of what actually took place. He did in fact 
give to Aberdeen a definite statement of what he believed 
would be the policy of Texas. 



Aberdeen's plan. 17 1 

view with Murphy. On May 31 he had instructed 
Cowley to present the matter to the French govern- 
ment. This appears in an instruction sent to Bank- 
head on June 3, in which Aberdeen stated at length 
the contents of his directions to Cowley. In substance 
these amounted to the adoption of a plan by which 
Great Britain and France would impose peace on Mex- 
ico, and would guarantee to Texas that her indepen- 
dence should be respected by other powers. Here 
also it will be noted that Aberdeen was troubled by 
the fear that Texas might willingly be annexed to the 
United States: — 

You will therein see that we have submitted a proposition 
to the French Govt for a joint operation on the part of 
Great Britain and France in order to induce Mexico to 
acknowledge the independence of Texas, on a guarantee 
being jointly given by us that that independence shall be 
respected by other Nations, and that the Mexico-Texian 
boundary shall be secured from further encroachment. 

Should France assent to this proposal, we propose to send 
out forthwith a fit person to Texas, in the unavoidable ab- 
sence of Captain Elliot, who will be instructed to ascertain 
as accurately as he may be able the state of publick opinion 
and feeling with respect to the projected annexation of Texas 
to the United States, under the security of the joint guarantee 
above described. If, as we are led to believe the publick 
feeling, under such a security for the future peace of the 
Country, should be in favour of independence, we shall then 
take measures forthwith -for operating directly and officially 
upon the Mexican Govt, which we shall hope to find amen- 
able to our views, as eminently advantageous to that Re- 
publick. Should they, however, refuse their assent, or still 
demur to the acknowledgment of Texas, it will be for 
England and France to take such further measures for 
attaining the desired object as they may deem expedient. 19 

The substance, then, of the plan is quite clear. It 
differed only slightly from the earlier suggestions to 

M F. O. Mexico, 172. 



17 2 Aberdeen's plan. 

this end, but in addition to the provisions of previously 
outlined plans it involved a guarantee of Texan inde- 
pendence against other powers. This necessarily 
meant that if such a plan were perfected and Mexico 
conceded recognition to the Texan Republic, Great 
Britain and France must be prepared to use force if 
necessary to prevent the absorption of Texas by the 
United States. No other conclusion is possible, and 
by making such a proposal to France, Aberdeen prac- 
tically announced his willingness to go to the point of 
war with the United States. Presumably he had no 
expectation whatever that the United States would 
carry the matter so far. His information led him to 
believe that the government of Texas desired inde- 
pendence, and although he had every reason to count 
upon opposition from the people he nevertheless hoped 
that they would be guided by their rulers. With the 
knowledge that the Texan government stood unani- 
mously for independence, and that Great Britain and 
France would support it and guarantee the territory, 
the American government, he felt sure, would take no 
further step toward annexation. Aberdeen, then, 
while outlining the plan that involved a remote possi- 
bility of war, never seriously thought that war would 
result. 

Upon the same day that this communication was sent 
to Bankhead with instructions that it be urged upon 
the Mexican government, a long letter was addressed 
to Pakenham, which took up the reflections of Cal- 
houn upon English policy and in conciliatory language 
attempted to allay the irritation of the American 
public : — 



Aberdeen's plan. 173 

I think it right, however, to state that Her Majesty's Gov- 
ernment have no intention to press at this time the abolition 
of domestic slavery on the Government of Texas. The 
Treaty by which Great Britain recognized the Independence 
of Texas having been concluded in 1840, without any stipula- 
tion for that object, Her Majesty's Government consider 
that they would not be justified in urging that point author- 
itatively upon the Government of Texas. Neither do they 
consider themselves authorized under the circumstances above 
stated, to press the Government of Mexico to make the 
abolition of domestic slavery a sine qua non with Texas for 
the recognition of its Independence by Mexico. But Her 
Majesty's Government, although abstaining from such inter- 
ference, do not the less deplore the existence of domestic 
slavery in a new Country which has scarcely struggled into 
existence; and they reserve to themselves the right which 
they possess, whenever they may think it expedient, to offer 
friendly counsel to Texas to take measures for the ultimate 
liberation of the Country from the stain and calamity of 
domestic slavery. 

In making this declaration, however, I again unequivocally 
state that counsel alone, and not dictation, would be employed 
for this object. 

It is but just and candid to add that the United States 
stand, with respect to domestic slavery, in a very different 
position from Texas. The evil, — for, notwithstanding Mr. 
Calhoun's arguments, I must still consider it an enormous 
evil, — was not of their seeking. Slavery was introduced into 
their Country, against the will of its Inhabitants, by the 
British Government in the earlier times of British dominion. 
Therefore, however deeply Her Majesty's Government may 
deplore the existence of such an evil in that great and free 
Country, they cannot but admit the difficulty of its extirpa- 
tion ; and they feel it also to be so much the more incumbent 
on them to refrain carefully from any steps which could 
affect the interests of the United States in this particular. 
The Governments of the slaveholding States of the Union 
may, therefore, repose with entire confidence on the good 
faith of Great Britain in this respect. 17 

That these two instructions, the one friendly and pa- 
cific, the other unyielding and determined, and both 
17 F. O. America, 403, June 3, 1844. 

12 






174 Aberdeen's plan. 

concerned with the same country, were posted upon 
the same day is surely interesting. While the letters 
form a notable contrast, in tone and differ distinctly 
when it comes to an expression of ultimate aims, they 
do not, after careful analysis, necessarily conflict. 
That Aberdeen expected, however, that his letter to 
Pakenham would be accepted at its face value, and 
thus be misleading as to his real purpose, seems cer- 
tain. His emphatic denials of any British designs re- 
garding abolition in Texas, even through Mexico, 
were intended to distract attention from the project 
of preventing annexation already under way. His 
instructions to Pakenham in no way conveyed a prom- 
ise that Great Britain would not oppose the annexa- 
tion of Texas. Yet by carefully laying all the empha- 
sis upon the matter of abolition, and by reiterating 
the British policy of non-interference with slavery, 
the impression was certainly created that opposition 
to annexation itself did not exist. Indeed, this instruc- 
tion, with its clever omissions and its cordial spirit, 
written so long after the publication of the Calhoun- 
Pakenham correspondence, seems very like an attempt 
to lull the suspicions of the American government. 

Aberdeen was, in fact, continuing preparations for 
a British-French combination against the annexation 
of Texas. On June 24 he had a further interview 
with Ashbel Smith, proposing a " diplomatick Act " 
by which England and France, acting with Texas and 
Mexico in any case, and with the United States if the 
last named could be secured, were to settle the boun- 
daries of Texas and guarantee its independence. 
Such an agreement would have involved a pledge upon 
the part of Texas not to permit herself to be annexed 



Aberdeen's plan. 175 

to the United States. 18 Smith, though not in favor 
of this particular plan, assured Aberdeen that Texas 
was extremely anxious to maintain its independence. 
Thus, by the middle of June, 1844, in the same month 
that the American Senate was rejecting the treaty of 
annexation, Aberdeen was rapidly maturing the proj- 
ect of a united opposition to that annexation. 

13 F. O. Texas, 11, and see Worley, 42. 



CHAPTER VIII. 

Aberdeen's Withdrawal from Joint Action with 
France, 

The first half of the year 1844 saw the rapid devel- 
opment of Aberdeen's carefully constructed plan for 
joint action with France. Before it could be put to the 
test, adverse conditions forbade resorting to it, and in 
the latter half of the year it was hastily though defi- 
nitely abandoned. While British agents in London and 
France were planning overtures in persuasion, or 
strategy, or whatever measures short of force might 
be needed to bring Mexico to accept the program laid 
out for her, Mexico herself was in the dark. The 
Mexican government had no information, and Bank- 
head had only such as reached him from Pakenham 
by way of Washington, or through public rumor. So 
when the news of the American proposal to annex 
Texas reached Mexico, it surprised Bankhead as well 
as the government. He was quite without instructions, 
and was therefore in great uncertainty as to his atti- 
tude in the matter. Though he had consistently pur- 
sued the ultra-conciliatory policy in all his dealings, 
when asked if England would aid Mexico to prevent 
annexation he would not commit his country to any 
definite assistance. He replied that England had al- 
ways been a great friend of Mexico, but he declined 
to be drawn into any explicit promise. 1 A month later 

1 F. O. Mexico, 174, Bankhead to Aberdeen, May 30, 1844. 
176 



ABERDEEN DECLINES JOINT ACTION WITH FRANCE. 177 

Bankhead was assured by Santa Anna that rapid prep- 
arations were being made to reconquer Texas as the 
most effective means of preventing American annexa- 
tion. Santa Anna asked what position Great Britain 
would take if this reconquest of Texas should lead to 
war with the United States, but again Bankhead re- 
fused to commit his government. 2 In this instance 
Bankhead failed to carry out Aberdeen's policy, since 
the mere refusal to answer Santa Anna's question gave 
encouragement to Mexico. Bankhead really needed 
no specific instructions to meet this emergency, as Eng- 
land had definitely refused under any circumstances to 
aid Mexico to reconquer Texas. 3 Thus the spirit in 
Mexico at the time when, to suit English purposes, it 
should have been most acquiescent was emphatically 
belligerent, and Bankhead was obliged to report that 
Mexico, instead of acknowledging Texan indepen- 
dence, was preparing to renew war upon that province. 
This would have meant inevitable war with the United 
States and her forcible annexation of Texas. 

On June 8 the Senate of the United States had re- 
jected the treaty with Texas. This did not mean the 
final disposal of the matter, for it was publicly ru- 
mored that President Tyler was determined to carry 
the measure through, and already by June n he had 
outlined in a message the plan of securing annexation 
by means of a joint resolution of both houses of Con- 
gress. Meantime, Pakenham was watching the prog- 
ress of affairs with the keenest interest. He had held 
long conferences with his French colleague, Pageot, 
upon Great Britain's projected measures, and his con- 

2 F. O. Mexico, 174, Bankhead to Aberdeen, June 29, 1844. 
8 See before, p. 102, Aberdeen to Pakenham, July 15, 1842. 



178 ABERDEEN DECLINES JOINT ACTION WITH FRANCE. 

fidence in their success was waning. On June 27 he 
despatched a letter containing a very open and frank 
analysis of the entire situation, warning Aberdeen of 
probable disaster to British policy if the United States 
should really determine to annex Texas. He urged 
that the moment was badly chosen for the disclosure 
of a plan for joint action with France. The political 
campaign in America was on, and an announcement of 
British plans would be a most effective help to the 
cause of the annexationists. British policy should bend 
itself in every way to aid in the election of Clay and to 
defeat Polk. In all this he had the entire concurrence 
of the French minister, and both diplomats wrote to 
their governments in practically the same terms : — 

It is scarcely necessary for us to remark that, by the rejec- 
tion of the late Treaty the question of the annexation of 
Texas must not be considered as disposed of. On the con- 
trary it must be looked upon as the question which at this 
moment most engages the attention of the American People, 
and which will form one of the most prominent Subjects of 
agitation and excitement during the approaching election to 
the Presidency. In fact it may be said that both questions 
will be tried at one and the same time : that is to say, if the 
feeling in favour of annexation should predominate, Mr. 
Polk, who stands upon that interest, and who has moreover 
the support of the democratic party, except where anti- 
annexation feelings may operate against him, will be elected. 

If happily the party opposed to annexation should prevail, 
Mr. Clay, who has taken a stand in opposition to that measure, 
will be the man; in which case, although the project must 
not even then be thought of as abandoned or defeated, there 
would at least be a prospect of its being discussed with the 
calmness and dignity required by its importance, and by the 
interest which other powers are justly entitled to take in it. 

According to this view of the question it seems to us, My 
Lord, that the Govts, of England and France have every- 
thing to gain by the success of Mr. Clay: and accordingly 
that whatever might in any way unfavourably affect his pros- 
pects ought by all means to be avoided. 



ABERDEEN DECLINES JOINT ACTION WITH FRANCE. 179 

Now I believe, My Lord, that one thing which greatly 
contributed to the rejection of the late Treaty, was the 
absence of all interference, at least open interference, in 
opposition to it on the part of England and France. Any 
demonstration of resistance on the part of those Govts would, 
I think, have had the very opposite effect to that intended, 
and would probably have led to the ratification of the Treaty 
instead of its rejection. 

Following this same view of the question, it would appear 
that, pending the Election to the Presidency, the line of non- 
interference on the Texian question would be that most con- 
ducive to our interests : for which reason, we humbly submit, 
My Lord, that it is desirable that the most important arrange- 
ment contemplated by Your Lordship's late Despatch should 
not be known in this Country until after the Election shall 
have taken place. 

Other considerations suggest themselves to 'us, My Lord, 
with reference to this important Subject, which although 
they will probably not have escaped Your Lordship's atten- 
tion, I beg leave most respectfully to submit. 

For instance, we are of opinion that in any Treaty or 
agreement which may be concluded with a view to the attain- 
ment of the object proposed, provision ought to be made 
from the beginning to allow the U. States to become a party 
to the engagement; and that the engagement ought, as far 
as possible, to have the appearance of a self-restricting en- 
gagement, rather than of an engagement involving opposition 
to the supposed designs of another Power. By this means 
some part of the odium which in this Country will most cer- 
tainly, under the most favourable circumstances, attach to the 
Measure, may be got rid of. 

Another consideration which we think ought not to be 
lost sight of, is, that any arrangement for a pacification be- 
tween Mexico and Texas which should not make provision 
for the absolute Independence of the latter Country, would 
at this moment be worse than useless, inasmuch as it would 
only facilitate the accomplishment of those designs which 
England and France are most anxious to frustrate: and, 
finally, My Lord, it is our opinion that if the arrangement 
contemplated by Your Lordship should be effected, that is 
to say, if England and France should unite in determining to 
secure the Independence of Texas, without the consent and 
concurrence of this Country previously obtained, that deter- 



ISO ABERDEEN DECLINES JOINT ACTION WITH FRANCE. 

ruination would probably not be met, in the first instance, 
by measures of open and declared hostility, but that Texas 
would be immediately annexed and occupied, leaving it to the 
Guaranteeing Powers to carry out the objects of the agree- 
ment as best they might. 

On the other hand it is my firm belief that if either Eng- 
land or France were to undertake alone to accomplish 
what it is proposed that those Powers should undertake 
united, the announcement of such an intention would be met 
here by measures of the most extreme resistance. And, in 
whatever way the project may be announced here, I need 
scarcely add that it will form a crisis of the utmost delicacy 
in our relations with this Country. 

Practically all of Pakenham's despatch is here pre- 
sented for the reason that it furnished fundamental 
causes for a change in Aberdeen's policy. 4 

The effect of Pakenham's communication was im- 
mediate. His portrayal of the strength and depth of 
American feeling was a revelation to Aberdeen, and 
was extremely disconcerting. In his plan for joint 
action with France he had made but meagre allowance 
for United States opposition, and he had believed that 

*F. O. Texas, 20. Copy transmitted to Elliot. At the 
same time several letters were received from Kennedy, consul 
at Galveston, stating in very emphatic language that the 
United States would not stop at war in its policy of annexa- 
tion. Kennedy had no authority to write upon matters of 
British policy. Indeed, he had been directed to concern him- 
self solely with commerce. He was, however, bitterly in- 
censed at Elliot, and during Elliot's absence from Texas 
could not keep out of the game. He escaped direct dis- 
obedience, therefore, by sending private letters, together with 
official reports, to Aberdeen. He thus tried to secure a 
hearing, even though he had been instructed to the contrary. 
Aberdeen was annoyed by this evasion of an order, and 
Kennedy was later reproved for his letters. Nevertheless, 
the fact that he emphasized American readiness for war was 
just so much additional support of Pakenham's contention. 
F. O. Texas, 10. 



ABERDEEN DECLINES JOINT ACTION WITH FRANCE. l8l 

if accepted by Mexico and Texas it would effectually 
and peacefully prevent American annexation. He had 
so far committed himself with France as to propose a 
guarantee of the Texan State, and in view of French 
compliance and cordiality when joint action was first 
proposed, he had no reason to think that France would 
not act heartily with England. But even the co- 
operation of France would not insure a successful 
termination of the negotiation under such circum- 
stances as Pakenham stated, and Aberdeen acted im- 
mediately. His plan was doomed to fail, and he saw 
it, although historians generally have not credited him 
with that foreknowledge. It has been a* commonly 
accepted statement that Aberdeen's proposal to France 
failed because France herself withdrew and left Eng- 
land to undertake alone a hopeless task. Instead of 
this, Aberdeen paved the way for French withdrawal, 
stating a strong case to give France her opportunity. 
On July 1 8 he wrote to Cowley, enclosing Pakenham's 
despatch, and showing how greatly it had affected Brit- 
ish policy : — 

Mr. Pakenham's Despatches furnish much ground for 
serious reflection. It appears from them that both he and 
his French Colleague are decidedly of opinion that any 
ostensible interference at this moment, on the part of Foreign 
Govts, and especially the English Govt, in the Texian annexa- 
tion Question, so far from advancing the object which we 
have in view, namely the prevention of the incorporation of 
Texas with the United States, would directly tend to defeat 
that object by throwing additional weight into the scale of 
Mr. Tyler or Mr. Polk, the Annexation Candidates for the 
Presidency, and proportionally diminishing Mr. Clay's chances 
of Election to the Presidential Chair. 

H. M. Govt feel that this is at the present moment a very 
important consideration ; and they are consequently disposed 
to defer, at all events until a more fitting season, the execu- 



I 82 ABERDEEN DECLINES JOINT ACTION WITH FRANCE. 

tion of their projected measure of combined interposition 
with Mexico and Texas on the basis of the joint guarantee 
of the Independence of Texas and the frontiers of Mexico by 
Great Britain and France. 6 

This placed the emphasis upon the service which 
would be rendered to Clay in his campaign for the 
presidency by refraining from action. While the let- 
ter suggested postponement, it did not necessarily im- 
ply that the plan should be abandoned. This, how- 
ever, is unquestionably what Aberdeen had in mind. 
Pakenham's despatch, with its reference to " extreme 
resistance," could mean only one thing, and by trans- 
mitting it Aberdeen gave to France a reason for her 
rejection of the plan. Having originally conceived the 
project and suggested it to France, it was impossible 
for England to withdraw without loss of dignity, 
hence Aberdeen's message to Cowley and the enclosing 
of Pakenham's letter. Should France decline to carry 
out her share in the original program, as would un- 
doubtedly happen after the receipt of the instruction 
to Cowley, it could easily be said that the desertion of 
France had caused the failure. On July 22 Cowley 
reported that Guizot was quite willing to postpone a 
decision upon the matter. Both Great Britain and 
France were thus ready in July to postpone and, as 
will be seen later, definitely to set aside the project 
matured in May and June. This was before the in- 
structions of Calhoun in August to King, the American 
minister to France, which were directed toward pre- 
venting a British-French combination in regard to 

e F. O. Texas, 20. Copy transmitted to Elliot. 
6 F. O. Texas, 20. 



ABERDEEN DECLINES JOINT ACTION WITH FRANCE. 1 83 

Texas. 7 In a labored analysis of the Texan situation 
Calhoun went over the whole ground of American 
interests in the West and Southwest, dwelt upon the 
customary friendship of France and the United States, 
and emphasized, on both commercial and political 
grounds, the idea that the interests of Great Britain 
and France were quite dissimilar in the new world. 
He repeated former arguments intended to prove the 
benefits of slavery to the subject race, and went so 
far as to assert that the mainspring of Great Britain's 
interest in abolition was a recognition of the bad 
economic results of her own emancipation in the 
West Indies and a jealousy of the superior conditions 
existing in the United States. These arguments were 
intended to prevent France from acting with Great 
Britain, and it has usually been supposed that they 
were a distinct influence in that direction. But if 
Pakenham's despatch of June 27 caused the change 
in British and French policy, then Calhoun's repeated 
efforts counted for nothing in determining French 
action. On the contrary, Guizot's line of action was 
virtually mapped out and France was committed to 
withdrawal before Calhoun's instructions to King 
were received. 

While messages between Washington and London 
could be transmitted Avithin a reasonable time, such 
was not the case where Texas or Mexico and England 
were concerned. Consequently the foreign office and 
its agents in the United States were in reasonably close 
touch when a bare three weeks would be required for 

* There are two of these instructions, one dated August 1, 
1844 (see Moore's Digest, I, 453), and another dated August 
12 (see Calhoun's Works, V, 379). 



I 84 ABERDEEN DECLINES JOINT ACTION WITH FRANCE. 

the delivery of despatches, while the long interval 
(sometimes two months or more) consumed in the 
journeyings of messages between Mexico and London 
gave opportunity for great changes in the interim. It 
thus happened that by the time the Murphy memoran- 
dum of May 29 reached Mexico, late in August, the 
plan therein outlined, insuring peace and harmony 
through the allied action of England and France, had 
already practically been discarded. Necessarily there 
was entire ignorance in Mexico of this shift in policy, 
and the memorandum was the cause of great excite- 
ment. When Bankhead received his copy of this im- 
portant document, he immediately presented himself 
before the Mexican government for the purpose of 
discussing it. A series of conferences followed. 8 
Upon Santa Anna and the government the memoran- 
dum produced an effect the very reverse of that in- 
tended. It strengthened the war spirit, and drew 
from Santa Anna the statement that he would use all 
his energy to raise troops for the reconquest of Texas. 
Bankhead was skeptical of the President's sincerity, 
and expressed the belief that if money were raised 
for war, the greater part of it might find its way into 
Santa Anna's pockets. But Bankhead was distinctly 
annoyed by this Mexican bluster. Indeed, there were 
many difficulties to beset him if he hoped to further 
the ambition of Aberdeen at this time. Whatever his 
government required of him was to be read from the 
memorandum only. There were no definite instruc- 
tions; pro-British sentiment, though carefully nursed, 
could not yet be depended upon, and annexation re- 
ports from the United States had called forth only hos- 
8 F. O. Mexico, 17s, Bankhead to Aberdeen, August 29, 1844. 



ABERDEEN DECLINES JOINT ACTION WITH FRANCE. 1 85 

tile expressions. The situation was not promising, 
and when he discovered that Santa Anna proposed to 
submit the Murphy memorandum to a secret session of 
Congress, he was much alarmed. Protest was made 
just in time to prevent this. The president had told 
one of the deputies, " I shall send this communication 
to the Congress, — shew them that England will stand 
by us, — and they must now give the money." And he 
had also added, " The English Government say we 
must either conquer Texas or grant its independence, 
— what will Congress say to that?" This was cer- 
tainly a very remarkable perversion of the intent of 
the memorandum. Santa Anna's declared intention 
of using it before Congress and his absurd distortion 
of Aberdeen's meaning both show what unique stum- 
bling-blocks the Mexican government found to ob- 
struct Bankhead's path. At first all of Bankhead's 
energy was required to prevent public knowledge of 
the British proposals, and his first reports after the 
receipt of the memorandum showed that he was wholly 
ignorant of what action the Mexican government 
would ultimately take, though expectant that a more 
reasonable view would soon prevail. 

Long before any news could reach England from 
Mexico, Aberdeen had received the Pakenham de- 
spatch, and had acted upon it by communicating its 
contents to France. When, therefore, in September 
there reached him a despatch from Bankhead, written 
on June 29, stating that Santa Anna proposed to at- 
tack Texas in order to prevent American annexation, 10 
it found Aberdeen in no uncertain mind. Bankhead's 

8 F. O. Mexico, 175. 
10 F. O. Mexico, 174. 



1 86 ABERDEEN DECLINES JOINT ACTION WITH FRANCE. 

despatch had been written before it was possible for 
the Murphy memorandum to reach Mexico. Aber- 
deen of course knew this. He might reasonably have 
expected that document to check Santa Anna's warlike 
plans ; nevertheless he at once replied to Bankhead, 
expressing his great astonishment at Mexican folly, 
and stating explicitly that if Mexico pursued such a 
policy, Great Britain would not help her. He 
wrote : — X1 

You will make known these sentiments to the Govt of 
Mexico, and, at the same time that you again urge that 
Government to suffer itself to be guided by the counsels of 
a Nation which, in offering its advice, seeks and can seek 
but the substantial good of Mexico, you will clearly point out 
to M. Bocanegra that if the President, contrary to our hopes 
and belief, were to take the rash step of invading Texas with 
a view to it's forcible reconquest, and if, by so doing, he 
should find himself involved in difficulties with other Coun- 
tries, he must not look for the support of Great Britain in 
aiding him to extricate himself from those difficulties. 

Mexico received direct warning, and at the same time 
England disclaimed all responsibility in case Mexico 
should ask aid. Some three weeks later, October 23, 
1844, after hearing from Bankhead of the reception 
of the Murphy memorandum, Aberdeen wrote again 
and still more emphatically. 12 He said that Santa 
Anna's plan to make war on Texas was wholly op- 
posed to the idea of English-French action, and the 
very existence of any such project defeated the pur- 
pose of the English-French-Mexican concert in ad- 
vance; hence this international combination now 
ceased to exist. Here is definite proof of English 

11 F. O. Texas, 20, Aberdeen to Bankhead, September 30, 
1844. Copy sent to Elliot. Original to Bankhead is missing. 
12 F. O. Mexico, 172. 



ABERDEEN DECLINES JOINT ACTION WITH FRANCE. 1 87 

withdrawal from the project of joint action before 
the English government had any direct refusal from 
France to go on with that action. Aberdeen's instruc- 
tion of October 23 is based wholly upon Bankhead's 
first report of the reception given to the Murphy mem- 
orandum. In that first report, Bankhead, although 
frankly describing the difficulties presented by Santa 
Anna's opposition, had expressed the belief that by a 
little manipulation he could bring the Mexican govern- 
ment to consent to the plan. Aberdeen, however, was 
not now willing to take any risks. It was a part of 
his line of defense against parliamentary criticism to 
inform Mexico at once that the plan of joint action 
was at an end. Having done so, even though France 
should not formally withdraw her support, he could 
assert that the failure of the plan was wholly due to 
Mexican folly. 

The fact was that at the very time that Aber- 
deen was thus placing upon Mexico the responsi- 
bility for the failure of his project, Bankhead had 
secured from the Mexican government practical 
acquiescence in that plan. 13 The English minister, in 
spite of all obstacles and of the inconsistencies of the 
Mexican government, was not daunted, and had con- 
tinued to urge the general arrangement outlined by 
Aberdeen and Murphy. Bankhead then drew up 
with the Mexican foreign minister a scheme looking 
toward the operation of a joint guarantee of boun- 
daries by England and France, after Mexican recog- 
nition of Texan independence. He did not sign any 
such document, nor did he pledge a British guarantee, 

13 F. O. Mexico, 176, Bankhead to Aberdeen, October 30, 
1844. 



1 88 ABERDEEN DECLINES JOINT ACTION WITH FRANCE. 

but he gave his advice as to the answer which Mexico 
should transmit to Great Britain. He was also in 
such close touch with the Mexican government that all 
of the voluminous correspondence then passing be- 
tween the United States and Mexico on the question 
of Texas was submitted to him and received his cen- 
sorship. Thus acting as the intimate adviser of Mex- 
ico, he transmitted on November 29 what appeared 
to him an acceptance in substance of Aberdeen's plan. 
He thought that the changes introduced were im- 
material, or could easily be altered later. 14 The docu- 
ment read as follows: — 

Points on the settlement of which the Mexican Govern- 
ment might agree to grant the Independence of Texas, in 
compliance with the wish indicated by Her Majesty's Gov- 
ernment. 

1st. Mexico will yield the Territory which is now oc- 
cupied by the so called Republick of Texas, that is from the 
Rio Colorado to the Sabine and would at the same time mark 
out the Boundaries of the Interior Part of the Country. 

2nd. Mexico by way of compensation demands an in- 
demnity for the Territory so yielded — The guarantee of 
England and Franco united, that under no pretext whatever 
shall the Texans ever pass the Boundaries marked out. The 
same nations shall also guarantee to Mexico the Californias, 
New Mexico and the other points of the Northern frontier 
bordering on the United States, according to a Treaty to be 
drawn up for that purpose. — If the United States carry into 
effect the annexation of Texas, to the North American Union, 
England and France will assist Mexico in the contest which 
may be thereby brought on always under the supposition 
that Mexico shall have carried into effect the Recognition 
mentioned in Article I. 

3rd. Until an answer shall have been received from Eng- 
land, which is requested to be sent with the least possible 
delay, Mexico will suspend all hostilities against Texas. 

4th. The English Cabinet can either give her Minister here 

14 F. O. Mexico, 177. 



ABERDEEN DECLINES JOINT ACTION WITH FRANCE. I 89 

[power], or send a Commissioner charged with full powers, 
to treat upon the above Points and conclude the Negotiation. 

While these terms differed materially in form from 
the terms that Aberdeen would have elaborated, Bank- 
head did not think the altered outline wholly un- 
suited to the situation, and he believed that in certain 
particulars it would be easy to amend it. Thus he 
wrote that the " compensation " required by Mexico 
could be provided by a return to the earlier scheme of 
Hamilton in which Texas was to assume a portion of 
the Mexican debt ; that the restricted boundary line as- 
signed to Texas was inserted merely to give Mexico 
something to offer in return for " compensation," and 
that Mexico could easily be induced to withdraw other 
articles if the guarantee of her northern boundary and 
of aid in case the United States annexed Texas were 
retained. These last two items were the essential ones 
in the Murphy memorandum, and if Bankhead was 
correct in stating that Mexico would not in the end 
insist on other points, he had good cause to feel that his 
diplomacy had been successful and that he was fol- 
lowing closely Aberdeen's plan. Even the Mexican 
revolution in December of 1844, which drove Santa 
Anna from the presidency and placed Cuevas in con- 
trol of foreign affairs, did not unsettle Bankhead's 
belief in Mexico's ultimate consent. Aberdeen had 
written on October 23 that the concert was at an end, 
but of this Bankhead was ignorant, and until the end 
of the year he persevered in his efforts to hold Mexico 
to the British point of view. He was unaware as late 
as December 31, 1844, that any change in British 
policy had taken place and that all of the negotiations 
which he had been conducting with the Mexican gov- 

*3 



I90 ABERDEEN DECLINES JOINT ACTION WITH FRANCE. 

eminent were futile. They serve to show, however, 
that Bankhead, at least, did not believe that a change 
in British policy was necessitated by the action of the 
Mexican government. 15 

Bankhead's optimistic reports, however, would have 
wrought no change in Aberdeen's determination to 
avoid any serious trouble with the United States. In 
reply to his transmission of Pakenham's despatch of 
warning, France, on July 22, had definitely consented 
to defer action, but had left in uncertainty her exact 
position. Nominally, both England and France awaited 
the result of the presidential election in the United 
States. In reality, neither power desired to go on 
with the proposed joint action, and certainly Aber- 
deen but waited such an answer from Guizot as would 
free his hands. On December 2 Cowley was at last 
able to report a definite decision by Guizot. The 
French foreign minister, in the course of an interview 
relating to American affairs, had informed Cowley 
that France would join with Great Britain to prevent 
a Mexican invasion of Texas, but that further than 
that she would not go. This, then, was the end of the 
plan for a joint guarantee of Texan independence, 
and the news was welcome in London. Aberdeen was 
unquestionably relieved when he received Cowley's 
report of the interview : — 

Generally speaking (M. Guizot continued) England having 
large possessions in America, has a greater interest than 
France in the question of Texian Independence. 

I said that, this question being one of interest to both 
Govts, since both had recognized the Independence of Texas, 
he would no doubt act in concert with us in any negotiation 

18 F. O. Mexico, 177, Bankhead to Aberdeen, December 31, 
1844. 



ABERDEEN DECLINES JOINT ACTION WITH FRANCE. I9I 

with the Mexican Govt, for the purpose of obtaining from 
them the acknowledgement of that Independence. — " Undoubt- 
edly," he answered, " we will both use our best efforts for 
that purpose, and will even refuse to recognize the annexation 
of Texas to the United States ; but, as a Question of Peace 
or War, I am not prepared to say that it's junction with the 
American States is of sufficient importance to us to justify 
our having recourse to arms in order to prevent it." 18 

The language here used was such as to make it per- 
fectly possible for Aberdeen to emphasize French 
hesitation and to defend his own policy before the 
British Parliament, if necessary. The closing weeks 
of December saw him released from all outside obli- 
gations, and he was left free to pursue whatever of- 
fered England the greatest advantage. The demand 
for a new policy was imperative from the moment 
that Pakenham's despatch revealed the depth and in- 
tensity of American feeling regarding annexation. 
Fortunately for the ministry, this change of purpose 
had not to be immediately formulated. French con- 
currence in deferred action permitted time for ob- 
servation and consideration, and when in December 
the Guizot decision left England free to announce a 
new policy, Aberdeen was ready. The cardinal prin- 
ciple of the program was more negative than positive, 
and committed the government to avoid war with the 
United States at all costs. At the same time England 
was to use her influence to secure Texan independence 
and to persuade Mexico to recognize that indepen- 
dence. In the first instruction to Bankhead after the 
receipt of Cowley's despatch by the foreign office 
Mexico was severely arraigned for her sins of gov- 
ernmental conduct, and little consideration or sym- 

16 F. O. Texas, 20, transmitted to Elliot. 



I9 2 ABERDEEN DECLINES JOINT ACTION WITH FRANCE. 

pathy was shown for the plight in which she found 
herself. Indeed, Aberdeen went so far as to charge 
her with the entire responsibility for her unhappy 
position. Nevertheless, he still urged a prompt recog- 
nition of the Texan Republic. He said: — 

You will also again clearly explain to the Mexican Govt 
that they must not count upon the assistance of Gt. Britain, 
whose friendly advice they have constantly neglected in en- 
abling them to resist any attack which may at any time, now 
or hereafter, be made upon Mexico by the U. States, since 
they will have wilfully exposed themselves to such attacks 
by omitting to make a friend and dependent of Texas while 
it was yet time. 

You will further state that the conduct pursued by the 
Mexican Govt must effectually paralyse the exertions by 
which Gt. Britain and France were prepared to uphold the 
Independence of Texas against the encroachments of the U. 
States, even at the risk of a collision with that Power, with 
which it is the desire and Interest of both to remain on terms 
of friendship. 17 

In this last paragraph Aberdeen possibly made clever 
use of verb tenses to state matters with exactness and 
yet convey a wrong impression. To write that the 
acts of Mexico "must effectually paralyse" British- 
French exertions implied that a change of Mexican 
policy might still insure the support of the two powers, 
while the use of the past tense in the words "were 
prepared " did not indicate with complete frankness 
that all plans of further exertions in the matter were 
definitely set aside. The instruction as written con- 
veyed no promise to Mexico, yet might be so inter- 
preted as still to furnish a reason for Mexican recog- 
nition of Texas. 

"F. O. Texas, 20, Aberdeen to Bankhead, December 31, 
1844. 



ABERDEEN DECLINES JOINT ACTION WITH FRANCE. 193 

On the same date on which Aberdeen wrote to 
Bankhead, December 31, 1844, he wrote also to El- 
liot in Texas, to Pakenham at Washington, and to 
British agents in California and on the Pacific Coast. 18 
The instruction to Elliot was most comprehensive, and 
with it Aberdeen sent copies of all the correspondence 
with Cowley, Pakenham's despatch of June 27, and 
the instructions to Bankhead. He thus gave Elliot 
a complete knowledge of the situation. He wrote: — 

These Papers will put you in possession of the line of 
conduct which Her Majesty s Government have pursued and 
intend to pursue both with regard to Mexico and to the 
United States, with reference to Texas. That line of conduct 
may be summed up in a few words. It is to urge Mexico 
by every available argument, and in every practicable man- 
ner, to recognize without delay the Independence of Texas, 
as the only rational course to be taken for securing the real 
Interest of Mexico, to which Country the Annexation of 
Texas to the United States would be ruinous ; while, on the 
other hand, we have carefully abstained from any ostensible 
Act which could inflame the wild and dangerous spirit which, 
partly for national, but more for party purposes, has been 
roused and sustained by demagogues in the United States, in 
favour of the Annexation of Texas, and which wanted but 
the evidence of active interference on the part of Great 
Britain to be kindled at once into a flame. 

This policy we propose still to pursue, because, under pres- 
ent circumstances, and until we can see our way more clearly 
with reference to the intentions of Mexico, as well as to 
those of the United States, under the altered circumstances 
which the Election of a new President may exhibit, we think 
a passive course, or rather a course of observation, the most 

18 For the importance of the California correspondence, see 
Chapter XI. Briefly, these California instructions were to 
the effect that British agents must do nothing to stir up 
revolution in California against Mexico, but at the same time, 
if such revolution actually occurred, British interests must be 
protected, and the annexation of California to the United 
States prevented, if possible. 



194 ABERDEEN DECLINES JOINT ACTION WITH FRANCE. 

prudent, and the least likely to involve us in difficulties with 
Mexico or with the United States. 19 

In addition, Aberdeen stated that the attitude of his 
government toward the independence of Texas was in 
no way changed, but that it was essential that the 
agents of Great Britain use the greatest caution in deal- 
ing with this affair, to prevent the appearance of any- 
open opposition between British and American in- 
terests. Aberdeen believed that Great Britain could 
still depend upon the sincerity of the Texan govern- 
ment, and that that government might still be able to 
control the Texan public. Apparently, then, in the 
face of many discouragements Aberdeen still hoped 
for a successful issue in the case of Texas. To sus- 
tain that hope were the personnel of the Texan gov- 
ernment, in which he still had confidence, and the 
potentiality of Great Britain to coerce Mexico when 
coercion seemed necessary. If the Mexican govern- 
ment could be induced to make peace with Texas on 
the basis of independence, and if the Texan govern- 
ment could convert popular demand for annexation 
into popular acceptance of that independence, then 
British pressure on the United States would happily 
be unnecessary. Peace and harmony with the United 
States came first, and all other advantages were to be 
sacrificed to that. There was no fear of war with the 
United States, nor doubt of its results, but rather a 
distinct national antipathy to the suggestion of such a 
war. Aberdeen could have made no more unpopular 
move than to ask his country's support of it. Eng- 
lishmen in the forties were not only disinclined to 

19 F. O. Texas, 9. 



ABERDEEN DECLINES JOINT ACTION WITH FRANCE. 195 

fight their trans-Atlantic brothers, but ;:hey would 
have dismissed the government that asked it of them. 
While at the close of 1844 Aberdeen's determina- 
tion to abandon opposition to American annexation 
of Texas had become the keystone of a fixed policy, 
the Texan government had not been apprised of the 
fact. The treaty of annexation had been rejected by 
the United States Senate on June 8, and Houston 
soon after recalled his agents from Washington. Ap- 
parently he did not look upon the matter of British 
intervention as finally settled, for Anson Jones states 
that Houston issued orders in September to secure 
at once the ratification of the agreement proposed by 
Aberdeen to Ashbel Smith on June 24. 20 This was 
the so-called " Diplomatick Act" by which England 
and France, together with Texas, Mexico, and the 
United States (if the last named could be secured), 
were to settle the boundaries of Texas and guarantee 
its independence. There is conflicting testimony as to 
Jones's action in this connection, for Reeves's narra- 
tive differs materially here from the documents in 
London. According to his account, Jones later de- 
clared that he refused to carry out Houston's orders, 
basing his refusal upon the fact that he was the 
president-elect of the Texan Republic and that 
Houston's term of service would soon end. 21 This is 
not in harmony with the evidence at the Record 
Office, for Elliot reported in December that Jones was 
most urgent in his effort to secure prompt action by 
Great Britain in the matter of the British-French com- 

20 Reeves, 175. 

21 Ibid. 



I96 ABERDEEN DECLINES JOINT ACTION WITH FRANCE. 

bination with regard to Texas. 22 Jones's efforts to 
arouse the British government to activity were wholly 
unfruitful. 23 Elliot, so recently in the United States 
and under the influence of Pakenham, felt very 
strongly the force of United States sentiment and of 
Pakenham's objections to such a project. As yet 
without any instructions other than those transmitted 
by Pakenham, he refused to be drawn into any hasty 
action. It was not, therefore, until the following 
year, when he received definite instructions to that 
effect, that he made a last effort to prevent American 
annexation. 

22 F. O. Texas, 9, Elliot to Aberdeen, December 10, 21 and 
28, 1844. 

M Anson Jones was born in Massachusetts in 1798, and died 
in Texas, in 1858, by his own hand, having become insane in 
his later years. He was a physician, practising in Phila- 
delphia, New Orleans, South America, and going to Texas 
in 1833, when he became a leader in the revolutionary move- 
ment. From 1837 to 1839 he was Texan minister to the 
United States ; from 1841 to 1844 he was Houston's secre- 
tary of state; and, in 1845 he was chosen president. Jones 
was popularly supposed to desire an independent state and to 
be against annexation, losing political influence because of 
this suspicion. He wrote a defense, published after his death, 
to disprove the allegation, and Reeves accepts this, at least 
to the extent of believing that Jones desired annexation, 
while keeping open the road to independence. 



CHAPTER IX. 

1845. Elliot's Mission to Mexico. 

The defeat of Clay and the choice of Polk in the 
November elections of 1844 practically settled the 
matter of American annexation so far as the govern- 
ment of the United States was concerned. Donelson 
was sent to Texas with instructions so broad that he 
could practically pledge his government to a deter- 
mined effort to conclude the matter. In the minds of 
Tyler and his intimate advisers the only uncertainty 
was in regard to the date for a new and, it was 
hoped, final proposal to Texas. For some time it was 
undecided whether this should occur during the Tyler 
administration or after the inauguration of the new 
president. It soon appeared, however, that Tyler in- 
tended to arrange the matter during his own incum- 
bency, in order that the acquisition of Texas might 
date from his presidency and be his final claim to 
fame. There was not sufficient time before the close 
of his term of office for the conclusion of all for- 
malities, but the president desired that at least it 
should be his fortune to make such an offer to Texas 
as would be certain of acceptance. 

While the pronounced intention to forward the an- 
nexation program was known to those in the confi- 
dence of the administration and to many American 
politicians, it was neither discussed nor suspected out- 
side this close circle, and British officials, both in the 

197 



198 Elliot's mission to Mexico. 

United States and at home, were wholly in the dark. 
Pakenham had clearly stated probabilities when, in 
his letter to Aberdeen, he had predicted that Polk's 
election and a Democratic victory would mean greatly 
increased support for annexation, but immediate ac- 
tion in that direction he had not foreseen. Prepared 
for a reopening of the question, and perhaps for sub- 
sequent discussion and organized opposition, he hardly 
expected so prompt a termination. 

To Aberdeen the defeat of Clay and the unfavorable 
conditions attending upon it brought genuine dis- 
couragement, and his instructions of December 31 
betray his hopelessness at that time. There was 
sudden reaction from this frame of mind, however, 
when in January he received from Bankhead Santa 
Anna's acceptance of the Murphy memorandum. 
From Elliot also came the reassuring news that Jones, 
the new president of the Texan Republic, was still 
anxious to prevent annexation. Distinctly encouraged, 
therefore, Aberdeen late in January wrote to Elliot 
in reference to the Mexican acceptance of the British 
overture, urging upon Texas the advantages of the 
decision to which the Mexican government had now 
consented. No actual guarantee, he admitted, could 
be offered by Great Britain, and he barely hinted at 
possible modifications of Santa Anna's plan. He 
avoided any discussion of these, however, although 
frankly ridiculing Santa Anna's ideas as to limiting 
Texan territory. Aberdeen further stated that Cal- 
houn's assertion that a rift existed between Great 
Britain and France and that the two states were not 
pursuing a similar policy, was false. In proof of this, 
he enclosed instructions sent by Guizot to Savigny 



Elliot's mission to Mexico. 199 

in Texas, drawn in practically the same terms as those 
he now sent to Elliot. Aberdeen hoped that the gov- 
ernment of Texas would meet that of Mexico half-way 
and would "avail themselves of the good offices of 
Great Britain and France with a view to the modifica- 
tion of the terms now offered by General Santa Anna 
and to rendering them such as Texas can honourably 
and advantageously accept." He made a vague refer- 
ence to the extent to which England and France would 
commit themselves to assure peaceful relations be- 
tween Mexico and Texas. This might mean much 
or little. Of course the implication was that Texas 
should have adequate support from her European 
friends, but, phrased as this was, it was unsatisfying 
rather than encouraging. " You may also add that, 
although Her Majesty's Government would not be dis- 
posed to undertake their share of the responsibility, 
which, for the security of the possessions of Mexico, 
General Santa Anna would impose on England and 
France, yet, that, under certain circumstances, those 
Powers would not refuse to take part in an arrange- 
ment by which Texas and Mexico should be bound 
each to respect the Territory of the other." 1 

1 F. O. Texas, 21, Aberdeen to Elliot, January 23, 1845. 
The enclosed copy of Guizot's note to Savigny closely paral- 
leled Aberdeen's own instructions: — 

(1) "Nous pensons toujours que l'lndependance du Texas 
importe a la balance politique de l'Amerique, et que la France 
et L'Angleterre, en particulier, ont interet a ne pas voir dis- 
paraitre un etat dont elles viennent de reconnaitre l'existence." 

(2) As to guarantee, Savigny is instructed : " Que dans 
certains cas, et sous certaines conditions, elles ne se re- 
fuseraient pas a intervenir dans un arrangement, par lequel 
le Mexique et le Texas s'obligeraient a respecter leur Ter- 
ritoire et leur Independance reciproques." 



200 ELLIOTS MISSION TO MEXICO. 

The comprehensiveness of Elliot's instructions, the 
detail, and the very apparent effort to induce Texan 
acceptance indicate a reversal in the positions of 
Texas and Mexico. Two years earlier the acqui- 
escence of Texas was counted on, when Mexican 
stubbornness refused to yield. With the contrary 
situation — Mexico's readiness to accept a docile part — 
it was upon Texas that British effort and eloquence 
were to be expended. 

With Bankhead it was unnecessary to go into great 
detail. The minister at Mexico had been so far effec- 
tive that Aberdeen practically left to his discretion 
such further activities as the situation might demand. 
Then, too, there was the uncertainty as to the con- 
tinuance of the Mexican government, it being more 
than likely that Santa Anna had been superseded in 
power. 2 Whatever the situation in Mexico, Aber- 
deen's previous instruction to Bankhead was surely 
unlikely to secure a ready acquiescence. Indeed, 
it is surprising that Aberdeen could have hoped for a 
satisfactory answer from Mexico after sending his 
letter of December 31, which was so filled with accusa- 
tion and criticism of the government. Nevertheless, 
English dictation to Mexico had been frequent ; it was 
almost a tradition, and apparently Aberdeen expected 
it to be accepted in this instance. In the end he was 
fortunate in the actual fate of his instruction of De- 
cember 31, 1844, f° r it was never presented. It ar- 
rived in Mexico not long after the revolution which 
displaced Santa Anna, and Bankhead, in view of this 
political change, had not communicated it. The 

S F. O. Mexico, 183, Aberdeen to Bankhead, February 3, 
1845. 



ELLIOTS MISSION TO MEXICO. 201 

Mexican government was, therefore, never cognizant 
of the severity of Aberdeen's language or of his pro- 
posed policy of leaving Mexico to shift for herself. 
In the new government Bankhead found the minister 
of foreign affairs, Cuevas, ready to present to Con- 
gress the project of Texan recognition if he could at 
the same time be assured of British and French ap- 
proval and " support." 3 

Unquestionably there was still ground to hope for 
Texan independence, in spite of the movement to an- 
nex in the United States. Neither Houston nor Jones 
publicly favored annexation, and Houston went so far 
as to advise the immediate conclusion of an agreement 
with Mexico. Jones in his inaugural address failed 
to express himself as favoring annexation. 4 The gen- 

'F. O. Mexico, 184, Bankhead to Aberdeen, January 29, 
1845. Cuevas had also proposed to bring up the abolition 
question again in the treaty with Texas, but on this point 
Bankhead evaded any reply, and in doing so, reported that he 
was following the verbal instructions of Aberdeen given to 
him before setting out for Mexico. 

4 The substance of Jones's "defense" in his autobiography 
is that while favoring annexation, he adopted a policy tending 
to keep open the chance of securing support from England 
and France and of establishing a strong independent state 
in case the annexation project again came to nothing. Jones, 
in justifying himself, attacks Houston, asserting that he 
(Jones) refused, while still secretary of state, to carry out 
Houston's orders looking toward English-French interven- 
tion. As already stated, this contention is not borne out 
by the documents in the Record Office. On the other hand, 
the autobiography states that Jones was always perfectly 
frank with Elliot in explaining the exact situation to him 
and in expressing the conviction that Texas was so set upon 
annexation that it was very improbable any other result 
could be secured. Elliot's reports to Aberdeen show this to 
be the truth, Jones always emphasizing the fact that he was 
but the agent of the people and must execute their will. 



202 Elliot's mission to Mexico. 

cral inference was that the strong men of the Texan 
government were opposed to annexation, and Elliot 
so reported to Aberdeen, believing that the indepen- 
dent element was really gaining control of the situ- 
ation. 5 Yet by this time Tyler's plans were very 
generally known. He had conceived a project to take 
up the subject in Congress by joint resolutions and 
thus to carry the matter to a successful issue without 
submitting a treaty to the Senate. This was still the 
subject of bitter discussion in Congress. Friends of 
annexation were positive that the Tyler program 
would go through, while on the other side an equally 
strong belief existed that Congress would never con- 
sent to these proposals. With the arrival of the news 
that the annexation resolutions had passed the House 
of Representatives, Mexico at last became thoroughly 
aroused and keenly apprehensive. Bankhead, writing 
to Aberdeen on March I, 1845, reported that through- 
out the country there was the greatest excitement, 
and that there had never before been such apparent 
readiness to concede Texan independence. Cuevas 
announced that he was prepared to give his consent, 
and that he Was confident that the Mexican Congress 
would also support the cause if he could but assure 
them of the backing of Great Britain. Much as Bank- 
head hoped to see such action taken, he could not 
give the desired assurance. He was extremely cau- 
tious in his reply to Cuevas, emphasizing the fact that 
" any assistance from England must be a moral one, 
for that whatever disposition may have at one time 

6 F. O. Texas, 13, Elliot to Aberdeen, February 8, 1845. 



Elliot's mission to Mexico. 203 

existed to go beyond that line, had now been with- 
drawn." 6 

The progress of Tyler's annexation program had 
been fairly rapid. In his message of December 3, 
1844, the president had advocated the passage of a 
joint resolution by Congress authorizing the executive 
to carry out the compact with Texas. A resolution to 
this effect passed the House of Representatives on 
January 25, 1845, but met objection in the Senate, and 
was finally amended in such a way as to permit the 
president either to renew a negotiation looking toward 
a formal treaty or to proceed on the more direct plan 
outlined in the resolution of the House. Thus 
amended, the matter passed the Senate on February 
28, and received the president's signature on March 1. 
Unquestionably it was the expectation of the majority 
in Congress that it would fall to the incoming presi- 
dent, Polk, to deal with the affair, and that he would 
prefer a negotiation conducted on ordinary diplo- 
matic lines. But Tyler was greedy of fame, and on 
March 3, a few hours before the close of his admin- 
istration, he approved instructions to Donelson which 
offered annexation to the Texan Republic. This was 
soon known to Pakenham, but in spite of it, writing 
as late as March 29, he reported to Aberdeen that the 
latest news from Texas was of a revulsion there 
against annexation, and that a refusal of Tyler's 
overture was not impossible. He believed, at any 
rate, that there would be no immediate acceptance by 
the Texan government. From various sources, then, 
Aberdeen received such information as encouraged 

6 F. O. Texas, 21, Bankhead to Aberdeen. Copy sent to 
Elliot. 



204 Elliot's mission to Mexico. 

him to believe that annexation was not a foregone 
conclusion. He hoped yet that some action might be 
taken to persuade Texas to remain independent, and 
immediately upon receiving Pakenham's despatch he 
wrote to Cowley, stating that reports from Washing- 
ton, from Texas, and from Mexico indicated that 
there was still an opportunity to bring about an agree- 
ment between Mexico and Texas. At the same time, 
Cowley was instructed to inform Guizot that this was 
the last chance, and that both powers should act with 
promptness and energy. In addition Aberdeen made 
it perfectly clear that Great Britain would undertake 
nothing that could involve her in war with the United 
States, writing, " Her Majesty's Government ... do 
not conceive that they would be justified in exposing 
Great Britain to the serious risks of a war in seeking 
to establish that [Texan] independence." 7 He pro- 
posed that France unite with England in a joint in- 
struction to their agents in Mexico and Texas urging 
the one state to grant and the other to accept inde- 
pendence. France and Great Britain were to offer 
their joint mediation for this purpose, but with no 
responsibility or guarantee whatever. He wrote : — 

They [Great Britain] would not wish to require any formal 
declaration on the part of either of those States beyond an 
assurance that they accepted such joint mediation and good 
offices, and engagement on the part of Texas to use every 
effort to maintain its own independence. Moreover H. M's 
Govt, would not propose to enter into any guarantee what- 
ever with respect to either of the States, whether to secure 
to Mexico the inviolability of Her frontier against Texas, 
or to secure to Texas its frontier against the United States 
or Mexico. In fact H. M's Govt, would not be disposed to 
place themselves in any respect in a position which might 

7 F. O. Texas, 21, Aberdeen to Cowley, April 15, 1845. 



Elliot's mission to Mexico. 205 

give to Mexico or to Texas the power of hereafter calling 
upon Great Britain, as a matter of right, for her protection 
and succour against encroachment on the part of any other 
Powers, nor even of leading the Mexican Govt, to hope that 
such succour might be afforded. . . . They would merely wish 
to exert all the weight of their moral influence, added to 
that of France, in order to secure the present pacification and 
future stability both of Mexico and Texas. 

Guizot at once agreed to the proposal. 8 His affirma- 
tive reply gave Aberdeen the chance to send to Bank- 
head one more message looking toward Texan inde- 
pendence. He immediately set about preparing this 
final and comprehensive instruction, which urged haste 
upon Mexico and regarded the measure as the only 
possible means of preserving the nationality of Texas. 
In this letter Aberdeen reviewed British efforts in 
Mexico from the close of Palmerston's ministry, and 
dwelt upon the various advances and suggestions of 
Great Britain and Mexico's subsequent postponements 
or refusals. He presented once more the arguments 
for a Mexican concession of independence and the 
benefits to be derived by both Mexico and Texas. 
There was also the specific statement that no British 
guarantee need be counted upon, and Bankhead was 
especially warned to refrain from any discussion of the 
acts or policy of the United States. 9 While this in- 
struction was based upon a slender thread of hope, 
it was immediately despatched to Bankhead. Two 
days later Aberdeen transmitted to Elliot a copy of a 
" declaration " agreed on by France and England 
which Elliot was to present to the government of 
Texas if affairs were still favorable to its reception. 

8 F. O. Texas, 21, Cowley to Aberdeen, April 28, 1845. 
9 F. O. Texas, 21, Aberdeen to Bankhead, May 1, 1845. 

14 



206 Elliot's mission to Mexico. 

This declaration, if presented, was to be signed by 
Elliot, Savigny, and the president of Texas. It stated 
that " their said Majesties engage to use their best 
exertions with a view to the restoration of Peace at the 
earliest possible period, and to the recognition of the 
Independence of the Republick of Texas by the Mexi- 
can Republick. And the president of the Republick 
of Texas has, on his part, authorized the Under- 
signed to declare on the other hand 

that the Govt, of Texas will use every effort to main- 
tain the independence of the Republick under its own 
separate and national Jurisdiction." 10 

At the same time Aberdeen transmitted to Elliot 
copies of all the correspondence bearing upon the de- 
termination of England and France with regard to 
Texas. This instruction was based upon the assump- 
tion that there was a revulsion of feeling in Texas 
against annexation. That this assumption was far 
from being conviction is clear from Aberdeen's warn- 
ing Elliot of the delicacy of his position if public senti- 
ment should be unfavorable. In that case Elliot was 
to act with the greatest care, always remembering that 
friendly relations with the United States were to be 
maintained at any cost. This was Aberdeen's final 
instruction to Elliot concerning Texan independence. 
Even so, it was freighted with misgivings as to a suc- 
cessful result of the effort. Perhaps it was already 
too late, yet English endeavor to preserve the new 
republic was not to be stayed while any slight chance 
remained. In the event of ultimate failure it should 
not be said that Aberdeen had left any stone un- 

10 F. O. Texas, 21, May 3, 1845. 



elliot's mission to Mexico. 207 

turned or that he had been deterred from any legiti- 
mate attempt by the probability of disappointment. 
In the end, however, the declaration of England and 
France was never presented to the Texan government, 
as it arrived too late to be of service. Elliot's activities 
in Texas had been undirected by the foreign office dur- 
ing the winter of 1844-1845, and were dictated solely 
by reports from the United States and knowledge of 
political conditions there. Such information concern- 
ing the question of annexation as reached him led him 
to assume a generally passive attitude for which, as 
yet, he had no definite instruction, Aberdeen's message 
of December 31 not reaching Texas until February. 
With the arrival of this instruction, advising just such 
a course of inactivity as had been pursued, Elliot had 
the distinct satisfaction of having intuitively grasped 
Aberdeen's policy. Early in March, however, Ashbel 
Smith withdrew from his European post to become 
secretary of state under Jones, and he immediately 
sought Elliot for conference, bringing forward again 
the cause of independence. In his interview with El- 
liot he affirmed the growing sentiment against annexa- 
tion among his countrymen, and described conditions 
as he wished them presented to Aberdeen. Among 
Smith's suggestions was one that Texas voluntarily 
pledge herself never to annex to any other country, 
provided Mexico promptly recognized her indepen- 
dence and England consented to act as arbiter in any 
boundary dispute between Texas and Mexico. In re- 
gard to such projected measures it was quite impossible 
to get an expression from Elliot, although Smith made 
every effort. Elliot reported all these conferences to 
the foreign office, but limited himself to careful state- 



208 elliot's mission to Mexico. 

ments. As to the boundary question, he was strongly 
opposed to a British guaranty in any case. 11 Evidently 
there was some contagion of hope in Smith's earnest- 
ness, for on March 22 Elliot wrote to Aberdeen that the 
supreme necessity for Texas was an immediate offer 
from Mexico of independence. He did not, how- 
ever, permit his reviving hope to lead him into any 
active effort for the cause of independence, but still 
mindful of the instructions of December 31, refrained 
from meddling in Texan politics. 12 

In April Elliot received news from Bankhead that 
Mexico was intensely interested in the return of Smith 
to Texas and in the possible result of his efforts there. 13 
Bankhead and the French minister had conferred with 
Cuevas, and Bankhead was convinced that if the Texan 
government was sincere, Mexico would readily do her 
part. Two days after Elliot wrote his letter of March 
22 to Aberdeen he received the joint instructions of 
Great Britain and France, sent out in January of 1845. 
The receipt of these at once changed the entire situa- 
tion for both Elliot and Savigny, and they determined 
to act with energy and vigor. They knew of the pre- 
vious activities of Donelson, Tyler's representative, in 
preparing for annexation, and had just learned of 
the vote in the American Senate authorizing a direct 
offer to Texas. Before this news reached Texas, 
Donelson had left the State and was on his way to 
New Orleans. Elliot and Savigny believed that Don- 
elson would soon return commissioned to conclude an- 
nexation formalities with such speed as he could. 

u F. O. Texas, 13, Elliot to Aberdeen, March 6, 1845. 

12 F. O. Texas, 13. 

13 F. O. Texas, 23, Bankhead to Elliot, April 8, 1845. 1 



elliot's mission to Mexico. 209 

Hence both men at once started for Washington on the 
Brazos, the capital of the Texan State, in order to 
prevent if possible any immediate acceptance of 
United States proposals. 14 

Arrived at the seat of government, Elliot and Sav- 
igny had a series of interviews with President Jones, 
Ashbel Smith, and various members of the cabinet. 
These men told Elliot very frankly that while they de- 
sired independence, their first duty was to execute the 
will of the country, which clamored for annexation. 
The best they could do now, they said, was to delay 
decision, thus giving opportunity for the ultimate ac- 
ceptance of some other measure than annexation. 
The opinion was openly expressed, however, as re- 
ported by Elliot, that the people of Texas were so de- 
termined upon annexation that all steps to avert that 
measure would be quite useless. But Elliot, invigor- 
ated by active measures, and possibly carried away by 
his own enthusiasm, found much encouragement in the 
Texan government's promise of delay, and thought that 
the delay itself might very well end in a defeat of 
American policy. Elliot reported at length to Aber- 
deen the steps taken and the arguments advanced by 
himself and his colleague sending also a copy of a doc- 
ument signed by Ashbel Smith, Savigny, and himself. 
The securing of the document was referred to as an 
achievement in which Elliot took much satisfaction. 

14 Washington on the Brazos was declared the seat of gov- 
ernment by Houston in 1842, at a time when it was feared 
that Santa Anna was about to attack the town of Austin. 
Jones was inaugurated at Washington in 1845. The place 
was very small, with but few inhabitants, and the government 
was installed in a room over Hatfield's grocery store or 
saloon. After annexation Austin again became the capital. 



2IO ELLIOTS MISSION TO MEXICO. 

It had been readily accepted by President Jones, and 
with his consent had been signed by Smith, after a 
personal pledge on the part of Elliot and Savigny 
that it should be known only to the courts of London 
and Paris, to their ministers at Washington, D. C, 
and, necessarily, to the Mexican government. In 
order to carry out the plan outlined in this document, 
Elliot urged upon Jones that Ashbel Smith should be 
sent at once to Europe and Allen appointed secretary 
of state in his place. This was agreed to, and the 
nominations were made. Elliot himself offered to 
take the document to Mexico secretly and at the same 
time to use his personal influence with the government 
there. 15 This document consisted of two articles which 
made the following requirements: — 

1st The signature and seal of the Secretary of State or 
any other Minister of the Republic of Texas duly authorized 
by the Government thereof, to be procured to the preliminary 
conditions now submitted to the Representatives of the two 
Powers, and the Government of Texas pledges itself forth- 
with after the same shall be placed in the hands of the 
President to issue a Proclamation announcing the conclusion 
of the preliminaries of peace with the Republic of Mexico. 

2nd Texas for a period of ninety days from the date of 
this Memorandum agrees not to accept any proposals, nor 
to enter into any negotiations to annex Herself to any other 
Country. 

In addition to this, a brief proposal of peace stat- 
ing the points necessary to such a treaty accompanied 
this document: — 

Conditions preliminary to a treaty of peace between 
Mexico and Texas. 
I. Mexico consents to acknowledge the Independence of 
Texas. 

16 F. O. Texas, 13, Elliot to Aberdeen, April 2, 1845. 



elliot's mission to mexico. 211 

II. Texas engages that she will stipulate in the Treaty not 
to annex herself or become subject to any Country 
whatever. 

III. Limits and other conditions to be matters of arrange- 

ment in the final treaty. 

IV. Texas will be willing to remit disputed points respect- 

ing territory and other matters to the arbitration of 
umpires. 
Done at Washington on the Brasos on the 29 of March, 
1845. 

Elliot then made arrangements for immediate de- 
parture for Mexico, and just before setting out re- 
ceived from Bankhead a most encouraging letter. 
Bankhead, with the sanction of Cuevas, assured him 
that Mexico was ready to welcome a proposal of peace 
from Texas. This assurance seemed to Elliot most 
auspicious. His journey and the business which oc- 
casioned it were to be kept profoundly secret. It was 
absolutely essential to the success of the undertaking 
— at least so Elliot believed — that no suspicion be 
aroused in the public mind as to what was on foot, 
and especially that the government of the United States 
remain ignorant of British interference in Texas. 
Thus Elliot, under pretext of a journey to Charles- 
ton, South Carolina, left Texas on H. M. S. " Eiec- 
tra." When out of sight of land he was transferred 
to another British ship, the " Eurydice," under the 
command of Captain George Elliot. The " Eurydice " 
was bound for Vera Cruz, from which point her cap- 
tain, George Elliot, proceeded overland to the City of 
Mexico ostensibly to carry British despatches to Bank- 
head, and Charles Elliot, with his precious documents, 
accompanied the captain incognito. 16 Thus the jour- 

18 F. O. Mexico, 192, Dom. Var., Captain George Elliot to 
Sir Charles Adam, April 4, 1845, explaining the plan. 



212 Elliot's mission to Mexico. 

ney to Mexico was managed with extreme caution, and 
was carried through apparently without arousing cur- 
iosity or comment. Bankhead had been notified that 
Elliot was to come, and he was ready to unite his en- 
deavors with those of Elliot and the French minister 
toward an acceptance of the Texan proposal. While 
at this time Bankhead was more than ready to second 
Elliot's enterprise, in the earlier stages of the nego- 
tiation he had been plainly lukewarm. Doubting 
Great Britain's intention to give adequate support to 
Mexico, he had felt the hopelessness of active measures 
and had confined his earlier energies to encouraging 
pacific relations between the irritated Mexican officials 
and the United States. Gradually, however, he had 
become more sanguine, and finally convinced himself, 
apparently without any ground for it, that Aberdeen 
would not push the peace negotiation unless he defi- 
nitely proposed to strengthen moral suasion with force 
if it became necessary. 17 

The Mexican cabinet listened to the proposal and 
to the arguments of the French and British agents 
that it be accepted immediately and without alteration. 
After much difficulty their combined efforts were suc- 
cessful, and Cuevas finally promised his signature and 
acceptance. Bankhead was elated at this turn of 
affairs. He reported to Aberdeen that Elliot was then 
in Mexico, that his mission was already a success, and 
that the consent of Mexico had been promised and the 
formal answer would be ready "tomorrow." The 
unexpected British victory he attributed largely to 
his own energy and persistence in the matter. Like 
Elliot, he believed implicitly in the sincerity of Jones 

17 F. O. Mexico, 184, Bankhead to Aberdeen, March 31, 1845. 



Elliot's mission to Mexico. 213 

and Ashbel Smith in this offer, and took it for granted 
that with the signature of Mexico, American annexa- 
tion would be an impossibility. 18 The "tomorrow" 
of Cuevas proved, however, to be the proverbial 
Spanish " manana." Nearly three weeks elapsed be- 
fore the Mexican government finally attached its sig- 
nature to the document, and not then until such 
changes were made as Were considered " essential to 
the maintenance of Mexican honor." Cuevas asserted 
that the delay in final action was caused by the opposi- 
tion of a small faction in the cabinet. This obstrep- 
erous element contended that Great Britain's inter- 
est in Texas was purely selfish, and that -her ultimate 
intention was to acquire the State as a colony. The 
final signature for which all waited was secured only 
after Cuevas had won over this difficult faction. 
Bankhead's earlier elation had wholly subsided in the 
intervening three weeks, and had been succeeded by 
bitter irritation, directed particularly at the unreason- 
able delay and at the stupidity of Mexican officials. 
The type of intellect manifested by the chairman of 
the committee in Congress, to whom the matter was 
first referred, was quite beyond his comprehension; 
this person wasted several days " in order to draw up 
a labored report which began by a dissertation on the 
conduct of the Duke of Alva in the Low Countries 
and thence down to the question of Texas." 19 When 
the document was once signed, however, Bankhead felt 
not only relief but that a great result had been ob- 
tained. Both he and Elliot were, however, gravely 
anxious because of the lapse of time occasioned by 
Mexican delay. 

18 F. O. Mexico, 185, Bankhead to Aberdeen, April 29, 1845. 

19 F. O. Mexico, 185, Bankhead to Aberdeen, May 20, 1845. 



214 elliot's mission to Mexico. 

On May 19 the signature of Mexico was affixed 
to the document so long under discussion ; on May 20 
Bankhead prepared a letter to Elliot transmitting the 
Mexican acceptance of the agreement, and on May 23 
Elliot set out upon his return journey to Texas. Again 
it was intended that the mission should be kept secret, 
and provision was made to conceal Elliot's identity, 
while the errand which required a messenger to go to 
Texas pretended to be the transmission of the Mex- 
ican acceptance. So Elliot carried the letter addressed 
to himself to be presented by himself to the Texan 
president. As the return journey progressed, there 
appears to have been less caution maintained as to 
secrecy, for by the time of Elliot's arrival in Texas 
rumors in regard to his mission were afloat. The 
knowledge that the undertaking had been crowned by 
success may have explained relaxed efforts in the di- 
rection of secrecy; at any rate, all attempts to guard 
the secret were abandoned soon after Elliot was again 
on Texas soil. 

When the report of the Mexican mission appeared 
in the public press of the United States it aroused the 
greatest indignation, as might have been expected. 
Here was a capital opportunity to charge Great 
Britain with " secret " designs, it being known that 
Elliot had had a " secret " part in it. Of Texas there 
was no serious condemnation, the transaction being 
interpreted as an intrigue on the part of Texas to push 
the United States to prompt action. Intrigue was not 
creditable to Texas, to be sure, but inasmuch as it was 
based on loyalty to American interests and not on dis- 
affection it could be condoned. Jones and his ad- 
visers were credited with inveigling Elliot and Savigny 



elliot's mission to Mexico. 215 

into their scheme and persuading Elliot to accept the 
mission to Mexico, — all to bring pressure upon the 
United States. To read into such a negotiation the 
steady adherence to future incorporation with the 
United States was thoroughly gratifying to that gov- 
ernment and its people. To attribute loyalty to the 
Texans necessarily implied in this instance unjusti- 
fiable interference on the part of Great Britain, and 
unquestionably, from the point of view of the United 
States, this charge was well founded. 

Unfortunately, as is commonly the case when nego- 
tiations of importance first obtain publicity, the judg- 
ment of the United States was founded on- half knowl- 
edge, and in this instance that incomplete knowledge 
has held until the present. There are, however, many 
facts that clear Great Britain of the charges of duplic- 
ity which circulated so freely at the time and also seem 
to attest the sincerity of the Texan government. In 
the first place, Texas, at the moment that the Mexican 
mission was undertaken, was perfectly free to make 
any national arrangement she chose. The Tyler offer 
had not been presented, and no formal notification of 
its approach had been given her. Indeed, Donelson, 
having previously left Texas, did not learn of Tyler's 
offer until he had reached New Orleans. Returning 
with all speed, he met and passed Elliot and Savigny 
just ten miles outside the Texan capital, as they were 
starting to Galveston and Mexico. 

As to the claim that Texas originated the manoeuver 
and used Elliot as a tool, the correspondence shows 
that Elliot's activities were directed solely by instruc- 
tions from his chief. His quiescence in the early part 
of 1845, his later reluctance to enter into any plan 



216 elliot's mission to Mexico. 

with Ashbel Smith, followed by his sudden and ener- 
getic efforts in behalf of independence when Aber- 
deen's January letter was received, show that not 
Texas but England inspired his action. With the 
receipt on March 24, 1845, °f the January instructions, 
both Elliot and Savigny took the initiative, did the 
urging, and secured the consent of the Texan govern- 
ment to the project. Elliot also took great pride in 
the part he had taken, and comforted himself with the 
thought that, whatever the outcome, he at least had 
played a creditable role. That he believed absolutely 
in the sincerity of the Texan government is unques- 
tionable. As to the sincerity of Jones and Smith, that 
can neither be affirmed nor denied upon the basis of 
their belief in the plan. Even though wholly skeptical 
of results, they may have been perfectly sincere in 
encouraging and forwarding a project which might 
offer an advantage to their country. It was surely 
justifiable policy to permit Elliot to prepare an alterna- 
tive plan which might be available in case anything 
should happen to break off the negotiations with the 
United States. The good faith of the Texan govern- 
ment is still further emphasized by the fact that Donel- 
son knew nothing of British intervention until late in 
May, when the envoys were returning from Mexico. 
Previous to that date, he had heard rumors of British 
intrigue, but had pretty generally discredited them. 
Indeed, his errand in Texas accomplished, he started 
upon his return journey to Washington after having 
repeatedly assured the United States government that 
there was nothing in the reports of English interfer- 
ence. He had proceeded as far as Iberville, in Louisi- 
ana, when, on May 22, further disquieting news 



elliot's mission to Mexico. 217 

reached him, which so aroused his suspicion that he 
again returned to Texas. In Galveston he met Elliot 
on the latter's return from Mexico, and heard for the 
first time and from Elliot himself the exact terms of 
the proposals carried to the Mexican government. 20 

Elliot, en route from Mexico to the Texan capital, 
reached Galveston on May 31, and was angered at the 
unanimity and strength of the cry for annexation. 
Rumor had already been occupied with his travels, 
and so much of his enterprise was guessed at that 
further efforts to maintain its secrecy were abandoned. 
Though fearing that he was already too late, he 
hastened to get in touch with President Jones and to 
complete his mission by delivering to the Texan gov- 
ernment the documents he had brought from Mexico. 
Jones immediately declared peace with Mexico in 
accordance with the terms of these documents, and 
soon after summoned a convention in order to lay 
before that body both the proposals of Mexico and the 
offer of the United States. To Elliot the calling of 
this convention offered but slight encouragement. The 
recent revelation of public sentiment showed but too 
plainly that a decision in favor of annexation was a 
foregone conclusion. His own presence in the Texan 
capital aroused suspicion and doubtless strengthened 
the cause of the annexationists. He realized this, and 
determined to save the situation as far as it lay in his 
power by leaving the country. 21 Before leaving his 
post, for which he was later reprimanded by Aberdeen, 
Elliot had received Aberdeen's instructions of May 3, 

20 H. R. Ex. Doc. No. 2, 29th Cong., 1st sess., Donelson to 
Buchanan, June 2, 1845. 

21 F. O. Texas, 13, Elliot to Aberdeen, June 12, 1845. 



21 S elliot's mission to Mexico. 

with the plan of a document to be signed by himself, 
Savigny, and the authorities in Texas. He did not 
disclose this document, feeling that many of Aber- 
deen's points had been anticipated in the recent ne- 
gotiation with Mexico and that nothing could be 
gained by present action. His letters at the time, both 
to Aberdeen and to Bankhead in Mexico, indicate 
his uncertain frame of mind. In the main, he was de- 
spondent, and believed that a victory for British policy 
was impossible. Jones and others had assured him, 
however, that the strong men of the Texan govern- 
ment still looked toward independence, and Elliot did 
not quite give up hope that they might ultimately find 
means to defeat the public demands. Nevertheless, 
in the confidence that his presence could only embar- 
rass the party opposed to annexation, and apprehend- 
ing only defeat for it under any circumstances, he 
despatched his letters and left for New York. With 
his departure from Texas all intimate relations be- 
tween himself and the Texan leaders ceased, as did 
also any active participation in Texan affairs. 



CHAPTER X. 
1846. Texas Annexed. Conclusion. 

There was genuine rejoicing in London when El- 
liot's communication of April 2 with its documentary- 
enclosure was received. Aberdeen was distinctly 
elated over the success of Elliot and Savigny in out- 
lining this document and getting Texan acquiescence, 
as well as over the proposed mission to Mexico which 
should make it effective. On May 31 he wrote to 
Bankhead in terms of enthusiastic appreciation, stating 
that Great Britain and France had " by the dexterity 
and activity of their Agents in Texas, undoubtedly 
gained an advantage in checking the successful prog- 
ress of the Annexation Project." x Knowing only of 
the projected mission, and sympathizing with its pur- 
pose, his letter to Bankhead was intended chiefly to 
express British official support of Elliot's enterprise. 
He wrote that if Mexico still stubbornly refused to 
accept British advice, Great Britain and France would 
wash their hands of the matter, and would " consider 
themselves entirely absolved from all further inter- 
ference in the affairs of Mexico with reference to the 
United States." 

The friendly relations of England and the United 
States at the moment had been seriously threatened 
by certain statements in the president's inaugural ad- 
dress. Polk's bold announcement that the United 

*F. O. Mexico, 183. 

219 






220 TEXAS ANNEXED. 

States would concede none of the British contentions 
with regard to Oregon had inspired hostile sentiments 
in England, and for a short time war between England 
and the United States seemed quite possible. Coinci- 
dentally with the prevailing sense of tension in Eng- 
land and the consequent vexation at Polk's arrogance 
came the announcement of Elliot's proposed mission 
to Mexico. Under any circumstances Aberdeen would 
probably have sanctioned the plan, but his support of 
it in this instance may easily have been the more 
enthusiastic because England had been given a rebuff 
by the United States. 

Elliot's further report of his errand, with an ac- 
count of the wearisome Mexican delays, reached Lon- 
don shortly after the arrival of the welcome news that 
it was under way. Although the message was sent in 
advance of the literal completion of the mission, Aber- 
deen read failure in the weeks of postponement. He 
now wrote that he was without " any sanguine hope 
that the President of Texas will have been enabled to 
resist the popular clamour for annexation." Indeed, 
he felt the utter hopelessness of any means of defeat- 
ing the plan of the United States, and resented the 
secrecy and mystery that clothed the expedition from 
start to finish. For this he reproved Elliot, though 
generously commending the fertility and invention 
that inspired the enterprise as well as the energy with 
which it was conducted. The secrecy, however, laid 
Great Britain open to the charge of intriguing in 
Texas, a manner of interference not in harmony with 
British policy and one which England strongly de- 
plored. Indeed, it had been the pride of British 
diplomacy that its methods had been always frank 



#3 

>• TEXAS ANNEXED. 221 

and open. 2 Besides his comment on this specific un- 
dertaking, Aberdeen included in his letter a general 
exposition of British policy in America. The con- 
stant object of that diplomacy was to maintain peace 
on the North American continent. He believed that 
British interests were secured only by such means, and 
that, while Great Britain need fear no United States 
aggression upon Canada, the steady expansion of the 
United States portended no good; and he again pre- 
dicted, as a result of expansion, civil war in the United 
States which might or would involve British interests 
also. This is not Aberdeen's first prophecy of civil war 
in America, but it is, perhaps, the first time that he 
made it an excuse for British policy. His elaboration 
of British policy was thus clearly stated, in order, he 
wrote Elliot, " to demonstrate to you that the mystery 
which you unfortunately threw around your recent 
proceedings was not only unnecessary, but liable to be 
misconstrued in such a manner as to make our policy 
appear in a light the very reverse of that which it 
ought to bear." 

When, late in June, the news reached Mexico of the 
Jones proclamation in Texas and of the calling of the 
convention, the period of complacent elation over the 
results of Elliot's mission was followed by deep de- 
pression. Bankhead's earlier rejoicing at his own 
efficiency in Mexico was dampened by his recognition 
of the absolute futility of the enterprise to forestall 
American action. Still, he pressed Cuevas to issue a 
proclamation similar to that of Jones, calling for a 
cessation of hostilities. The news from Texas, how- 
ever, inspired in Cuevas sentiments neither magnani- 

2 F. O. Texas, 21, Aberdeen to Elliot, July 3, 1845. 
*5 



.222 .TEXAS ANNEXED. 

mous nor docile, and instead of consenting to a cessa- 
tion of hostilities, he resorted to vehement and ex- 
citable bluster and threat. Bankhead's demands for 
peace he met with threats of war. 3 

The Texas convention in response to the call of 
President Jones met early in July, rejected peace with 
Mexico upon the basis of independence, and on July 
4, 1845, committed Texas to annexation. The final 
formal agreement was deferred until February, 1846, 
but the vote of July 4, 1845, determined the future of 
Texas conclusively. News of this action reached 
Bankhead at about the same time as Aberdeen's in- 
struction of May 3 which outlined the policy of joint 
British and French action. This instruction from 
Aberdeen was withheld owing to the altered condi- 
tions in Texas. Bankhead later excused the suppres- 
sion of the instruction by the statement that England 
might be compromised by its presentation. Aberdeen 
had written that should Mexico refuse to acknowledge 
Texan independence, she " would thereby forfeit the 
assistance and good-will of England." Bankhead held 
that Mexico might insist that the converse of the 
proposition made England liable for assistance inas- 
much as Mexico had twice yielded to Great Britain. 
Having formally consented to a peace with Texas upon 
the basis of independence, " Senor Cuevas might lay 
hold of such an acquiescence by insisting upon our now 
aiding Mexico in her quarrel." 4 This seems a forced 
and most unlikely interpretation of British responsi- 
bilities. Almost every message from the foreign office 
of the previous two years had carefully and explicitly 
stated that England would not aid Mexico by force 

3 F. O. Mexico, 185, Bankhead to Aberdeen, June 29, 1845. 
4 F. O. Mexico, 186, Bankhead to Aberdeen, July 30, 1845. 



TEXAS ANNEXED. 223 

of arms. The instructions to Bankhead had repeat- 
edly expressed these intentions with ever increasing 
emphasis, and Aberdeen was in no way committed to 
more than the moral support which his letters had 
promised. 

After the vote of the Texan convention in July of 
1845 was known in England, the whole matter was re- 
garded as finally and irrevocably settled. When, as 
before mentioned, it was learned that Elliot had aban- 
doned his post in Texas, he was ordered to return to it 
at once. He was reproved and explicitly directed to 
stay in Texas and maintain his position as a representa- 
tive of the dignity of the British nation until the 
country should become a corporate part of the United 
States. When the formalities of annexation were 
concluded, he was to close his office and return to 
England. 5 In the last month or so of his stay, how- 
ever, Elliot was more occupied in meeting the Amer- 
ican attacks occasioned by his secret mission and with 
his own defense before Aberdeen than he was with the 
dignity of England or the affairs of Texas. Letters 
from Buchanan to Donelson, reflecting upon Elliot 
and talking much of his secrecy, had appeared in the 
New York Herald in December of 1845. Much of 
Elliot's time and energy were given to defending him- 
self to Aberdeen against the charges in these news- 
paper attacks. 6 

5 Elliot was instructed to bring with him all the records of 
his office. Thus the manuscripts in the Public Record Office 
contain all of this correspondence, in addition to the corre- 
spondence ordinarily found between the foreign office in 
London and the ministers abroad. 

6 F. O. Texas, 16, Elliot to Aberdeen, January 8, 1840. 
Newspaper comment at the time of Elliot's mission had 



224 TEXAS ANNEXED. 

The Texan matter was ended. Texas for a short 
time longer stood on her own feet, but she was com- 
mitted to her future, and direct British interest and 
interference were things of the past. Both Aberdeen's 
and Elliot's letters show that no further step was con- 
templated, and that they accepted the inevitable. They 
were none the less confident of the honesty and sincer- 
ity of Houston, Jones, and Smith. At no time did 
they doubt them, and they regarded the probable 
election of Houston and Jones to the United States 
Senate as in a measure a proof that Great Britain 
had attempted no unwarranted interference in Texas. 
At the same time, neither Elliot nor his chief was 
hopeful of the future of Texas; they predicted that 
annexation boded ill for the people, and Aberdeen's 
prophetic vision saw disintegration of the Union as 
well. 

While Texas was waiting, things were happening in 
Mexico, and England was not permitted to wash her 
hands entirely of Mexican affairs. As war with the 
United States became more and more probable, the 
Mexican government turned again to Great Britain 
for aid. Aberdeen never varied from the position he 
had assumed in the last months of 1844, and uniformly 
refused any aid to Mexico. On June 1, 1846, he 
wrote to Bankhead, positively declining any support 
to Mexico, and stating that it had been British policy 
for the last three years to refuse such support and that 
each year had seen better reasons for adhering to such 
a policy. He summed up the situation in very terse 
language : — 

been excited by references to the presence in Mexico of the 
" man in the white hat," and Elliot, much to his disgust, was 
now identified with this person. 



TEXAS ANNEXED. 22 5 

It is moreover obvious that, were Great Britain to inter- 
fere in that quarrel, she would involve herself in a war with 
the United States ; and not only that, but she must neces- 
sarily play the part, not merely of an auxiliary, but of a 
principal, in such a war ; that is, she would find herself en- 
gaged in a war with a Nation with which she would have no 
personal cause of quarrel, in behalf of a Nation and Govern- 
ment which she had repeatedly warned in the most friendly 
and urgent manner of their danger, and which, solely in 
consequence of their wilfull contempt of that warning, have 
at last plunged headlong down the precipice from which the 
British Government spared no efforts to save them. 7 

This note was not to be communicated to the Mexican 
government, but Bankhead was instructed to make it 
the basis of his answer to that government. The 
reasons for British policy and the argument which 
Aberdeen was now prepared at all times to advance in 
support of that policy were forcibly and simply stated. 
At this time Aberdeen knew that the Oregon question 
was approaching a peaceable solution, and he was 
also aware of the probable fall of his government. 
The soothing influence of a happy solution of the 
Oregon question, which had threatened pacific condi- 
tions for a short time, was perhaps reflected in Eng- 
land's attitude in this matter. British support to Mex- 
ico in a war with the United States could not be 
accorded immediately upon American concessions to 
England in the northwest boundary dispute. Pros- 
pective retirement from office may also have caused 
Aberdeen to leave behind him this final statement, out- 
lining a concise defense of his entire policy with regard 
to Mexico. In July of 1846 Lord John Russell became 
prime minister of England, and Palmerston once more 
returned to the foreign office. 

1 F. O. Mexico, 194. 



226 



CONCLUSION. 



While there is nothing to add to the facts already 
stated in this study of British-Texan diplomacy, it may 
not be amiss to call to mind briefly some of the points 
narrated, and perhaps thereby get a clearer general 
view of the sequence of events with their causes and 
effects. While this study begins properly in 1839, 
Texas had separated itself from Mexico in 1836, and 
beginning even earlier than that the strength of Mexico 
as a concrete nation had steadily waned. Whether or 
not there was general recognition of the fact in Eng- 
land, it is true that British support of the government 
of Mexico, which had become almost a tradition in 
the foreign office, was losing popularity. The mani- 
fest weakness of Mexico may account for this in 
part; then, too, the realization that England's future 
was not dependent upon Mexican adherence in the 
question of balance of power in the New World had 
its weight as well. The time had gone by when British 
prestige or power were augmented by either the trade 
or the friendship of Mexico. 

To recapitulate, England at first took little interest in 
the revolt of Texas, but when British agents in 
America called Palmerston's attention to the new re- 
public, and assured him that it could never be recon- 
quered by Mexico, he looked into the situation. This 
new country, peopled by men of Anglo-Saxon ancestry, 
made its own appeal; once independent and strong, it 
would be an ally and its friendship would be worth 
cultivating, and the opportunity to assist in its de- 
velopment attracted Palmerston. The existing rela- 
tions between Great Britain and the United States, 
while friendly, were hardly upon a perfectly reliable 
basis while such matters as the northeastern boundary, 



CONCLUSION. 227 

right of search or visit, and others were unsettled. 
If, in the inevitable adjustment of these matters, fric- 
tion should result, as would be more than likely, what 
more advantageous for England than a friend to the 
south of the United States border? Texas, in her 
ambition for independence and power, might act as a 
check upon the United States. Doubtless such senti- 
ments and reasoning led up to the signing of the 
Hamilton treaty, which was the first important step 
taken by England involving the recognition of Texan 
independence and an admission of her value to 
England. 

Following the impression that Texas first made upon 
the British horizon, internal political changes in Eng- 
land and Mexico and a little later in the United States 
altered the direction of affairs. The change of govern- 
ment in Mexico was of little importance, so far as 
Mexico was concerned, in Mexican relations with the 
outside world; but in England the fall of the Mel- 
bourne ministry brought with it a different foreign 
policy. When Aberdeen succeeded Palmerston, con- 
servative tendencies led to a renewal of the earlier 
relations with Mexico, and he directed British diplo- 
macy in support of the Mexican Republic. With the 
election of Harrison and Tyler, friendship for the 
United States, which was to come first under Aber- 
deen, seemed more possible, and future British security 
demanded the cementing of such ties, so that in the 
new Peel administration Texas was a less important 
item. Indeed, Texas had been discredited in a meas- 
ure by Hamilton's duplicity in the matter of the de- 
layed treaty ratification, and the State could the more 
justifiably be forced into the background. It is hardly 



228 CONCLUSION. 

necessary to say, however, that any real British appre- 
hensions of annexation would have dictated a different 
policy. Neither Palmerston nor Aberdeen appreciated 
any danger in that direction, nor, indeed, did they 
consider its possibility. 

The incidents in connection with the " Guadeloupe " 
and the " Montezuma," in which Aberdeen's action 
betrayed the uncertainty of his policy, which it must 
be admitted, had a distinct leaning toward Mexico, 
were succeeded by Ashburton's errand to America and 
the conclusion of the treaty. This treaty, after all, 
failed to satisfy England. Much had been hoped from 
Ashburton's mission, and something had been accom- 
plished. Nevertheless, the feeling prevailed that a 
satisfactory adjustment of difficulties had not resulted, 
and that the United States herself presented the first 
hindrance to those desirable, permanent, friendly rela- 
tions which England sincerely hoped to see established. 
With the disappointing conclusion of the Ashburton 
treaty and the consequent check upon the friendly 
advances of Great Britain, Aberdeen's attention was 
once more directed to Texas. Kennedy's reports and 
Ashbel Smith's arrival in London served to strengthen 
Texan interests at this time, and the policy which 
earlier ignored the importance of Texas was gradually 
directed toward maintaining the friendship of both 
that State and Mexico. England discharged the ob- 
ligation involved in the treaty with Texas by urging 
Mexico to make peace with the revolted province, but 
the British ministry declined a part in the tripartite 
intervention, sent Elliot to Texas without instructions 
indicating British policy, and was not at all concerned 
with the possibilities of annexation by the United 



CONCLUSION. 229 

States. As the year 1843 proceeded, however, the in- 
effectiveness of the Ashburton Treaty became more 
apparent. A dispute arose as to the interpretation to 
be placed upon the eighth article of that treaty in 
regard to a joint cruising squadron therein provided 
for the suppression of the slave-trade on the African 
coast. President Tyler attempted to interpret that 
article to include a renunciation by Great Britain of 
the offensive British claim to a right of search or visit. 
Aberdeen was forced to deny officially and in Parlia- 
ment that Great Britain had given up any asserted 
right in this connection. Such incidents were naturally 
provocative of irritation in England, and their occur- 
rence was a severe test to a peace policy; however 
positive and determined. 

In the summer of 1843 occurred the abolition con- 
vention in England and Aberdeen's conference with 
the committee which urged upon him the necessity 
for effort on the part of Great Britain to bring about 
abolition in Texas. Up to this time, in spite of El- 
liot's persistent pleadings, Aberdeen had taken no 
official notice of the institution in Texas, but with the 
revival of the antislavery agitation in England he was 
induced to press for abolition through Mexico, hence 
the armistice plan, which Aberdeen seconded while 
wholly ignorant of annexation plans maturing under 
Tyler and Upshur in the United States. It was Aber- 
deen's misfortune, as it was Tyler's good luck, that 
these measures were undertaken at about the same 
time. The opportunity to publish British intentions in 
regard to Texas and to interpret these to mean inter- 
ference with a national institution was precisely what 
was needed in America to solidify American support 



230 CONCLUSION. 

of annexation. British interest in and for Texas 
could be interpreted to mean British interference and 
intrigue, and most bitter anti-British sentiments were 
aroused. The sensational newspaper reports were a 
revelation to Aberdeen, but astonishment soon gave 
place to anger at the injustice of the charge, and later 
still to anxiety, as the inevitable conclusion forced itself 
upon him that back of the attack made upon him by 
the United States was the definite plan to annex Texas. 
Aberdeen's official denial of any intention to inter- 
fere with slavery in the United States was formally 
presented through Pakenham. His emphatic dis- 
claimer in regard to abolition, when viewed in the 
light of his future plans for Texas, is more interesting 
for what it left unsaid than for its announcement of 
policy. Probably Tyler's plans for annexation were 
no more clearly formed and definitely determined 
upon than was Aberdeen's carefully worked out 
scheme to defeat annexation at the very time he was 
focusing public attention on his denials in regard to 
abolition. His proposal of joint action to France in 
January, 1844, outlined a well-balanced, well-developed 
plan to which he trusted for success. In its application 
the use of force, if necessary, was implied, but British 
confidence in British powers of prohibition was such 
that it was never for a moment contemplated. When 
Pakenham's illuminating letter came which showed 
how far wrong Aberdeen was in his reckoning, and 
that war would certainly follow if the plan were un- 
dertaken, England could not too soon find a way of 
escape. Aberdeen's transference of Pakenham's de- 
spatch to Guizot, with an accompanying suggestion of 
delay until after the American presidential election, 



CONCLUSION. 23 1 

prepared the way for French withdrawal, and Bank- 
head's report of Santa Anna's warlike intentions, re- 
ceived at about the same time, opened another avenue 
of escape to Aberdeen. Santa Anna's blustering, 
stupid threats in this connection gave excuse for 
Aberdeen's arraignment of Mexico and for his as- 
sumption, before the fact, that she would not grant 
Texan independence. British-French action, being de- 
pendent upon Mexican compliance, was assumed to be 
a failure since Mexico proposed to reconquer Texas 
rather than sign a treaty of peace. Without waiting 
for an acknowledgment from Mexico of the joint 
intervention project itself, Aberdeen presupposed 
Mexico's refusal, and felt himself and" England ab- 
solved from all further responsibilities toward Santa 
Anna's government. Later came Guizot's statement 
that French cooperation in intervention would not go 
to the point of war, and England's anxiety was over. 
In the six months intervening between the receipt of 
Pakenham's message in June and the final announce- 
ment of French withdrawal in December Aberdeen's 
belief in the helplessness of Great Britain to avert the 
annexation of Texas had become a settled conviction. 
The events of the year 1845 m regard to Texas 
are almost in the nature of anticlimax. The year 
1844 saw the culmination of arrangements of preceding 
years ; in the United States preparation and education 
for annexation were carried through to completion and 
the presidential election resulted favorably to the 
cause, while in England the government resigned itself 
to the inevitable. Elliot's enterprise of 1845, futile in 
results as it was, was permitted, not instigated or di- 
rected, and success was not anticipated. Aberdeen's 



232 CONCLUSION. 

instructions at this time were concerned with limiting 
British energies rather than encouraging them, and 
indeed these activities were permitted only on the 
slight chance that Texas herself might refuse annexa- 
tion at the last. The difficulties of Aberdeen's pro- 
gram had their origin in his effort to put nearly equal 
emphasis upon two naturally conflicting points of 
policy. The first point was the maintenance of 
peaceful and friendly relations with the United 
States; the second, which, in the development of his 
policy, had ultimately to be sacrificed to the first, was 
the restriction of the United States to its then boun- 
daries. That he believed he could maintain unruf- 
fled peaceful relations with America while British 
efforts were constantly directed to checking American 
expansion to the south and west seems something of 
an anomaly. Yet it was in pursuance of this policy 
that Aberdeen's negotiations regarding Texas were 
undertaken. Texas was an independent country, 
though adjacent to the United States; that country 
had been the first to recognize its independence; and 
England's privileges in Texas were just such as she 
had in Mexico or in any other independent republic. 
In so far as Texas stood upon her own feet uncom- 
promised by pledge or agreement with any other na- 
tion, England's efforts to secure influence beneficial to 
British trade were perfectly legitimate. Neither was 
there any violation of international ethics in a straight- 
forward attempt to bring about abolition in this young 
republic. Criticism of Aberdeen's action was rather 
centered upon his lack of frankness and his unac- 
customed use of devious ways. 

What might have been the final result in Texas had 



CONCLUSION. 233 

Palmerston not given place to Aberdeen it is difficult 
to conjecture. With less stress upon the friendship 
of the United States, and with the less conservative, 
more adventurous temperament of the earlier minister, 
British policy might have been so directed as to 
threaten peace. But British policy with Texas was es- 
sentially Aberdeen's pacific policy, and England's 
peaceful acceptance of the fact of annexation was also 
dictated by Aberdeen. In order to circumvent the 
United States in her project for annexation, Aberdeen 
expended his best energies, but nothing was undertaken 
which involved any break in existing harmonious rela- 
tions. His resourcefulness was taxed to devise a 
measure promising success which should not involve 
England in war. The checking of United States ex- 
pansion was a thing most desirable in itself; an in- 
dependent Texas might greatly benefit England; but 
the independence of Texas, in Aberdeen's eyes, was 
practically a negligible consideration when weighed 
against war with the United States. The spirit of the 
nation, his own preference, and the integrity of British 
diplomacy demanded the continuance of peaceful rela- 
tions with America. 



CHAPTER XI. 

Addendum. English Interest in the Annexation 
of California. 

In the opinion of contemporary British diplomats 
the situation in California was intimately connected 
with events in Mexico and Texas, and British 
agents, prophesying the destruction of the Mexican 
state, frequently advocated the acquisition of Cali- 
fornia as some compensation for American expansion 
in other directions. It is not apparent that this had 
any influence whatever in directing British policy in 
Texas. On the other hand, the changing situation in 
that State had a direct bearing on the activities and de- 
sires of British agents in California and, in much less 
degree, on the inclinations of the foreign secretary in 
London. For this reason permission has been ob- 
tained to append the following chapter on " English 
Interest in the Annexation of California " as it ap- 
peared in the American Historical Review. 1 

All histories treating of the Pacific Coast devote 
much attention to the question of English interests in, 
or designs on, California during the period from 1838 
to 1846. In any brief treatment of this subject only 
the more important points can be considered, and this 

1 The substance of this paper was presented before the 
meeting of the Pacific Coast Branch of the American Histor- 
ical Association, at Berkeley, California, November 21, 1908, 
and was printed in the American Historical Review, Vol. 
XIV, July, 1909. 

234 



ANNEXATION OF CALIFORNIA. 235 

article is therefore confined to the larger aspects of 
the case customarily stated by historians. When the 
various suspicions directed against Great Britain are 
summarized, they are found to deal with three points : 
first, a mooted transfer of California to the English 
bondholders of the Mexican debt, with the ultimate 
object of making California a colony of Great Britain; 
second, a project for the immediate and direct transfer 
of California to England by sale or gift from Mexico ; 
and third, specific instructions to British admirals upon 
the Pacific Coast looking toward the accomplishment 
of these designs. Until very recently it has been possi- 
ble to meet general assertions of such designs with 
merely negative evidence. Now, however, by the 
recent opening to research of the records of the British 
Foreign Office to 1850 it is possible to determine 
whether or not English foreign secretaries knew or 
cared anything about California. It is the purpose 
therefore of this article to state the results of an exami- 
nation made into the documents preserved in the 
Record Office in London with special reference to the 
question of British designs upon California, 2 for it is 

2 The records thus examined covered the period from 1838 
to 1846 inclusive, and were found in the series of despatches 
to and from the diplomatic agents, both ministers and consuls, 
in America, Mexico, and after 1841 in Texas. In addition, 
search was made in the Admiralty Records for the same 
period, although these are by no means complete, owing to 
the destruction by an official at the Admiralty Office of the 
greater portion of the despatches of the Admiralty of this 
period — a destruction covering not merely the Admiralty 
Letters to and from the Pacific Coast, but Admiralty Letters 
from stations all over the world. It was, however, possible, 
in the lack of the letters themselves, to use for these years 
the " Digest and Precis " of Admiralty Correspondence, which 
gives in condensed form the substance of each letter sent 
out or received. 



236 ENGLISH INTEREST IN THE 

certain that if any definite plans ever existed upon 
the part of the English government, or were even 
favorably received by English ministers, they would 
find some place in British contemporary correspon- 
dence. 

Dismissing as incompetent the various rumors of 
the time and confining attention to the evidence from 
the Record Office, it appears that the very first mani- 
festation of British interest in California resulted 
from the arrest of English and American citizens in 
Monterey. This occurred in April, 1840, for an 
alleged conspiracy intended to overthrow the authority 
of Governor Alvarado. 3 These foreigners, some two 
score in number, were transported to Tepic, under the 
charge of Josef Castro, and there claimed the protec- 
tion of Barron, the British vice-consul. In his report 
upon the incident to Pakenham at Mexico, Barron, 
while taking the necessary steps to secure indemnity 
for the " injustice " done to British subjects, was 
nevertheless primarily concerned that no British ship 
of war was at hand to be despatched to Monterey. 
He was in fact compelled to appeal to the commander 
of the United States corvette " San Luis " and to en- 
trust to him the investigation of the causes of the 
trouble in California. In the subsequent correspon- 
dence on the adjustment of the difficulty much praise 
is given the American commander for his prompt and 
generous services, 4 but the necessity for such aid irri- 
tated both Barron and Pakenham, and both men urged 
an increase of naval strength in the Pacific. 5 

3 F. O. Mexico, 136, Barron to Pakenham, May 12, 1840. 

4 Ibid., 137, no. 78, Pakenham to Palmerston, August 22, 1840. 

5 Ibid., 136, no. 65, Pakenham to Palmerston, July 5, 1840. 



ANNEXATION OF CALIFORNIA. 237 

In the beginning, then, Pakenham was interested 
solely in the question of British naval prestige, and 
there is no evidence that he had any real knowledge 
of the situation in California. Soon after this, how- 
ever, he received several communications- from Bar- 
ron stating the great value of Upper California, and 
about the same time he had an extended conversation 
with one Forbes, who had been a resident of Mon- 
terey. 6 Also, Pakenham learned of the journey 
through California of a Frenchman, Duplot du Mor- 
fras, and apparently became somewhat suspicious of 
French designs upon the Pacific Coast. The result 
was that on August 30, 1841, he addressed a despatch 
to Palmerston, advocating a plan which should ulti- 
mately secure California to Great Britain. 7 He 
wrote : — 

It is much to be regretted that advantage should not be 
taken of the arrangement some time since concluded by the 
Mexican Government with their creditors in Europe, to estab- 
lish an English population in the magnificent Territory of 
Upper California. 

He then stated the terms of an agreement concluded 
in 1837 between the Mexican government and the 
British bondholders of the Mexican debt, by which it 
had been arranged that in place of a repayment in cash 
to the bondholders they were to be permitted to locate 
lands within the boundaries of the Mexican state, to 
colonize them, and to receive revenues from them. 
Some few attempts had been made and plans put for- 
ward to realize this scheme, and the Mexican govern- 
ment had offered to allot a large quantity of such 

9 Ibid., 145, no. 43, Pakenham to Palmerston, June 10, 1841. 
7 Ibid., 146, no. 91, Pakenham to Palmerston. 
16 



238 ENGLISH INTEREST IN THE 

lands in the province of Texas. Meanwhile, however, 
Texas had risen in revolt and had thrown off 
Mexican authority, so that the proposal seemed ab- 
surd to the bondholders, and it was now desired to 
find lands elsewhere that might be thus organized. 
Pakenham continued : — 

... as relates to Texas, the arrangement must of course, be 
considered a dead letter; and in the present circumstances 
of the Country, Chihuahua, and New Mexico are not eligible 
districts for colonization : but I believe there is no part of the 
World offering greater natural advantages for the establish- 
ment of an English colony than the Provinces of Upper Cali- 
fornia; while its commanding position on the Pacific, its fine 
harbours, its forests of excellent timber for ship-building as 
well as for every other purpose, appear to me to render it by 
all means desirable, in a political point of view, that Cali- 
fornia, once ceasing to belong to Mexico, should not fall into 
the hands of any Power but England ; and the present de- 
bilitated condition of Mexico, and the gradual increase of 
foreign population in California render it probable that its 
separation from Mexico will be effected at no distant period ; 
in fact, there is some reason to believe that daring and ad- 
venturous speculators in the United States have already turned 
their thoughts in that direction. 

He then gave details to show that it would be easy to 
form a company in England " for the establishment 
of an English colony in California," and to prove its 
certain success as a business venture : — 

If it were to be known that an enterprise of this kind 
would receive the sanction and support of Her Majesty's 
Government, properly qualified persons would readily be 
found to carry out the plan ; and I am sanguine enough to 
believe that the result would be the establishment of a pros- 
perous colony united in feeling and interest with England, 
and at the same time the attainment of an object, in my 
humble opinion, of the highest political importance. I need 
scarcely observe that any foreign Settlement in California 
would for some time to come be nominally dependent on the 



ANNEXATION OF CALIFORNIA. 239 

Mexican Republic; but this state of things would not last 
forever, nor, while it did last, would it, I imagine, be attended 
with serious inconvenience. 

If it were to be understood that Pakenham here 
reflected English governmental opinion, it would be 
certain that England was looking forward to the 
breaking-up of Mexico, and that she was not averse 
to profiting by the disturbance. In reality, Paken- 
ham merely stated his own opinion — an opinion evi- 
dently moulded by Barron and Forbes. Certainly, it 
must have appeared to the British cabinet that its 
agent in Mexico was pursuing a curious policy in thus 
coolly planning for the ultimate seizure of a part of 
that state at a time when his instructions ordered him 
to aid Mexico in every possible way in the establish- 
ment of a strong, united government. Pakenham him- 
self did not believe that Mexico would ever be able 
to unite under a republican form of government and 
become a strong power, but his idea of the inevitable 
disintegration of the Mexican state was not as yet 
shared by his superiors at home. His recommenda- 
tion in regard to California had been addressed to 
Palmerston, but before his despatch could reach Eng- 
land a change of government had brought Aberdeen 
to the foreign office. 

Aberdeen's reply promptly put an end to Paken- 
ham's dream of a British colony in California. The 
latter's despatch had been referred to the colonial 
office, and the reply of Stanley from that office to 
Aberdeen was now transmitted to Pakenham without 
comment from the foreign office : — 8 

8 F. O. Mexico, 143, no. 13, Aberdeen to Pakenham, De- 
cember 15, 1841, and ibid., 151, Dom. Van, G. W. Hope to 
Viscount Canning, November 23, 1841. 



24O ENGLISH INTEREST IN THE 

His Lordship directs me in answer, to acquaint you for the 
information of the Earl of Aberdeen, that he is not anxious 
for the formation of new and distant Colonies, all of which 
involve heavy direct and still heavier indirect expenditure, 
besides multiplying the liabilities of misunderstanding and 
collisions with Foreign Powers. Still less is Lord Stanley 
prepared to recommend the adoption of a plan whereby the 
Soil shall, in the first instance, be vested in a Company of 
Adventurers, with more or less of the powers of Sovereignty 
and of Legislation, and the Settlement so formed be after- 
wards placed under the protection of the British Crown ; 
which as it seems to his Lordship is the position contended 
for by Mr. Pakenham. 

This reply is, in truth, a concise statement of the entire 
British attitude at the moment and represents the al- 
most unanimous opinion of English statesmen that the 
day for colonial enterprise had passed. Such opinion 
is illuminative of British policy as regards both home 
and colonial politics, and to neglect it would be totally 
to misunderstand those conditions in English govern- 
ment at the moment which practically negative any 
suspicion of British designs for expansion in any new 
territory, wherever that territory might be located. 
Pakenham perfectly understood the indifference of 
Great Britain to his plan and he himself at once lost 
interest in it. In fact, he even neglected to appoint 
a vice-consul at Monterey at the time, permission to 
do this having been previously granted to him, 9 and it 
was not until after Commander Jones of the American 
navy performed his spectacular feat of seizing and 
releasing the Port of Monterey, in the fall of 1842, 
that Pakenham bestirred himself to appoint a British 
agent there. The man appointed was James Forbes, 
who was to act as vice-consul, and who was to be sub- 

9 F. O. Mexico, 143, no. 6, Palmerston to Pakenham, Feb- 
ruary 26, 1841. 



ANNEXATION OF CALIFORNIA. 24 1 

ordinate to Barron, located at Tepic, on the Gulf of 
Lower California. 10 Upon these two men Great Brit- 
ain depended for intelligence and advice regarding 
California, although other sources of information were 
available for it was in this same year that Sir George 
Simpson wrote his impressions of California and trans- 
mitted them in letters to officials of the British govern- 
ment. 11 Like Simpson, Barron and Forbes were con- 
fident that it would require but little activity on the 
part of the British Government to secure California. 
Throughout 1843 their reports were numerous, 12 con- 

10 F. O. Mexico, 155, no. 120, Pakenham to Aberdeen, De- 
cember 25, 1842. The appointment of Forhes was made 
immediately after Pakenham heard of Jones's act at 
Monterey. This act was reported by Pakenham in his no. 119, 
of the same date as the preceding. 

11 The most important of Simpson's letters were published 
in the number of the American Historical Review for Oc- 
tober, 1908, and need not be expanded here. It is interesting 
to note that about the time of Simpson's letter, Ashburton, 
who was negotiating the Treaty of Washington, was writing 
of a hint made to him by Webster that the United States 
would yield somewhat in the Oregon matter if Great Britain 
would acquiesce in the American occupation of California. 
Ashburton also expressed his disbelief in the value of Cali- 
fornia, for a long time to come, to the United States or any 
other power. Ashburton's letter is also of interest in view 
of Webster's later denial that he had ever made such a pro- 
posal, F. O. America, 379, Ashburton to Aberdeen, April 25, 
1842. 

12 F. O. Mexico, 156, Admiral Thomas to Barron, Valparaiso, 
August 12, 1842; Barron to Aberdeen, December 7, 1842, and 
again December 20, 1842 ; ibid., 161, Barron to Pakenham, 
December 20, 1842 ; ibid., 165, Doyle to Aberdeen, December 
30, 1843 ; ibid., 167, Barron to Admiral Thomas, January 18, 
1843; Barron to Aberdeen, April 15, and September 9, 1843; 
Forbes to Barron, October 19, 1843; ibid., 179, Barron to 
Aberdeen, January 20, 1844. 



242 ENGLISH INTEREST IN THE 

taining frequent and suggestive allusions to American 
designs upon California, and so somewhat adroitly pav- 
ing the way for a definite proposal. This, in 1844, 
Forbes was prepared to submit, although even here the 
proposal was thinly veiled in the form of a request 
for advice. This plan, originating with Forbes in 
September, was transmitted by Barron to Aberdeen on 
October 12, 1844, and it was received in London on 
December 13, a date which it will be important to re- 
member later in estimating the reply made by Aber- 
deen. 13 

On September 5 Forbes had reported to Barron the 
circumstances of an interview with a body of influen- 
tial native Californians. These men asserted that 
the Mexican government had reached such a state of 
inefficiency that they were planning to revolt in order 
to establish an independent government. After de- 
scribing all the evils which California had suffered 
under the misrule of Mexico, Forbes was asked 
" whether this country [California] can be received 
under the protection of Great Britain, in a similar 
manner to that of the Ionian Isles, but to remain for 
the present under the direct Govt, of one of its natives 
though under the same form as the Govt, of that Re- 
public." The reply of Forbes was that he was " en- 
tirely unauthorized " to enter into any such affair. 
The deputation assured him that their only desire at 
present was that he act as " an organ of communi- 
cation with the English Government. If he would do 
this, his correspondents would quietly await until he 
should learn the pleasure of H. Majesty's Govern- 
ment." Forbes reported to Barron that he had been 

13 F. O. Mexico, 179. 



ANNEXATION OF CALIFORNIA. 243 

most careful not to compromise the English govern- 
ment in any way, and that he certainly would not med- 
dle without authority, but he added : — 

I feel myself in duty bound to use all my influence to pre- 
vent this fine country from falling into the hands of any 
other foreign power than that of England. I repeat that it 
is impossible for Mexico to hold California for a much longer 
period, and if the Govt, of Great Britain can with honor to 
itself, and without giving umbrage to Mexico, extend its pro- 
tection to California, reaping those benefits which by proper 
management, would infallibly attend that protection, I should 
presume that it would be impolitic to allow any other nation 
to avail itself of the present critical situation of California 
for obtaining a footing in this country. 

In this connection Forbes stated that there were sev- 
eral standing offers of French protection, giving as his 
authority the word of native citizens of California. 
He mentioned Du Morfras as being the agent in one 
of these offers of French protection, but added that at 
the time the offer was made the people were not so 
ready to act or so united in sentiment as they now 
were. Forbes also stated that if Great Britain was at 
all interested in the project of a colony upon the Pa- 
cific Coast no reasonable comparison could be made 
between Oregon and California, thus indicating that 
he, like Barron, thought that possibly an arrangement 
might be made by which British interests in Oregon 
could be exchanged for a position in California. Bar- 
ron made no detailed comment upon this report, but in 
transmitting it stated: — 

I shall of course caution him most earnestly not to inter- 
fere in any manner of way in the promotion or conduct of 
any revolutionary proceedings, and I am sure such will be 
his conduct. It is not for me to express any opinion on the 
subject of Mr. Forbes' despatch, otherwise than to say, that 
this fine country has been totally neglected by Mexico, and 



244 ENGLISH INTEREST IN THE 

she must ere long see some other nation its protector, or in 
absolute possession of it. 

In the light of later events the plan proposed to 
Forbes and reported by him to the British government 
may seem of no moment when compared with the 
energy displayed by the United States, but the inci- 
dent is of the greatest importance in this account be- 
cause the report of Forbes brought out the most 
direct and positive instruction given by the British 
government in regard to California throughout the 
eight years from 1838 to 1846. Before stating Aber- 
deen's reply, however, it is necessary to explain the 
conditions existing with regard to other Mexican in- 
terests at the exact moment when the report of Forbes 
reached the British foreign office. These conditions 
are peculiar, for the month of December, 1844, records 
a strange lapse in the otherwise consistent attitude 
regarding Mexican relations — a lapse which was 
strictly temporary (lasting less than a month) and 
wholly explainable. The situation was this : in the 
spring of 1844, after it became evident that the 
United States was actually planning for the annexa- 
tion of Texas, Aberdeen became greatly exercised 
over the possibility of such an expansion of the Amer- 
ican State. He sought in various ways to bring about 
an international situation which should prohibit such 
an annexation. He instructed Elliot, the British 
charge d'affaires in Texas, to use all his influence 
against a Texan acquiescence in the projects of the 
United States. 14 He urged upon Mexico the neces- 
sity of immediately recognizing the independence of 
Texas in order that by some sort of joint diplomatic 

11 F. O. Texas, 20. 



ANNEXATION OF CALIFORNIA. 245 

action, France, Mexico, and Great Britain might guar- 
antee the independence of the Texan State. 15 The 
British ambassador at Paris, Lord Cowley, was ac- 
tively seeking the consent of France to this plan and 
supposed that he had secured it. 16 Pakenham, who 
was now the British minister at Washington, was in- 
structed to act cautiously yet with decision in the 
matter. The complete details of the negotiations look- 
ing toward this end are too minute to be given here, 
but in substance it may be said that one element in 
the failure of the plan was the stupidity and obstinacy 
of Mexico, which could not bring itself to yield to 
British advice and to recognize the independence of 
Texas. Time after time, acting under instructions 
from Aberdeen, Bankhead, the new British minister 
at Mexico, pressed upon Santa Anna the necessity for 
a prompt and speedy recognition of Texas. The an- 
swer returned to him in every instance was that an 
army was now being gathered in Mexico for the im- 
mediate reconquest of that province. 17 Neither Bank- 
head nor Aberdeen believed that Santa Anna really 
thougnt the reconquest of Texas a possibility, and 
Aberdeen was angered at the refusal to follow his 
advice and play Great Britain's game. In the sum- 
mer of 1844 Pakenham reported his conviction that 

15 F. O. Mexico, 172, no. 16, Aberdeen to Bankhead, June 
3, 1844; F. O. America, 403, no. 25, Aberdeen to Pakenham, 
June 3, 1844; F. O. Mexico, 180, Dom., report drawn up of 
interview between Aberdeen and Murphy, Mexican minister 
in London, May 29, 1844. 

16 F. O. Texas, 20, copy of despatch, Cowley to Aberdeen, 
Paris, June 15, 1844. 

17 F. O. Mexico, 174, no. 44, Bankhead to Aberdeen, June 
29, 1844; ibid., 175, nos. 65 and 62, Bankhead to Aberdeen, 
August 29, 1844. 



246 ENGLISH INTEREST IN THE 

the United States, should it determine upon the an- 
nexation of Texas, would not be deterred therefrom 
even by a threat of war by England and France. 18 
This report was decisive in its effect on Aberdeen's 
policy, for he had no desire to carry opposition to 
annexation to the point of war with the United States. 
Nevertheless, he had already gone so far in overtures 
to France and Mexico that a formal withdrawal of 
the plan was not at once possible. On December 2 
Cowley reported from Paris that France was becom- 
ing lukewarm in any project looking toward the guar- 
antee of Texan independence. 10 In the same week 
there came from Mexico a final report by Bankhead 
stating the utter impossibility of bringing the Mexican 
government to recognize the independence of Texas. 
The effect of all these altered conditions upon Aber- 
deen was an immediate change of attitude. 20 Instead 
of making such effort to prevent impending annexa- 
tion as would be consistent with his earlier position, 
he completely ignored the American question, turned 
against Mexico, and for some four weeks all his in- 

18 F. O. Texas, 20, copy of despatch, Pakenham to Aberdeen, 
Washington, June 27, 1844. 

19 Ibid., 20, copy of Cowley's no. 568, to Aberdeen, Paris. 

20 For the purpose of showing the causes of Aberdeen's 
action in relation to California it is sufficiently exact to 
specify December as the turning-point in Aberdeen's policy 
toward Mexico and Texas, but a more detailed explanation 
of all this correspondence will show that it was Pakenham's 
despatch of June 27 that caused the change. After receiving 
it, Aberdeen was fearful that his diplomatic manoeuvering 
might actually result in a war with the United States. The 
final refusal of France, in December, to act with England 
was a distinct relief to him, while the obstinacy of Mexico 
gave him the chance to throw all the blame on that state. 
For a more complete account of this episode, see Chapter VIII. 



ANNEXATION OF CALIFORNIA. 247 

structions to Bankhead indicate a determination to 
have nothing further to do with the defense of Mexi- 
can interests. This was the situation, then, when 
Forbes's report reached London on December 13. 
Up to this moment the honor of the British govern- 
ment had apparently been bound to a general support 
of Mexican authority and unity. 

Now, however, Aberdeen could argue that Mexico's 
obstinacy offered a sufficient excuse for taking advan- 
tage of Mexico's weakness, in case that weakness 
should bring profit to England without specific Brit- 
ish attack upon Mexican territory. Aberdeen's reply 
to Barron bears date of December 31, 1844, and de- 
serves quotation at length, since, as before stated, it is 
the most definite instruction upon California emanat- 
ing from the British foreign office throughout the 
entire period : — 21 

The present position of California is evidently very critical; 
and it appears to be pretty clear that unless the Mexican 
Government bestir themselves, an outbreak will in no long 
time take place in that Province, which may end in it's separa- 
tion from Mexico. Her Majesty's Government can have 
nothing to do with any insurrectionary movement which 
may occur in California; nor do they desire that their agents 
in that part of the world should encourage such movement. 
They desire, on the contrary, that their agents should remain 
entirely passive. 

While California continues subject to Mexico it would be 
obviously contrary to good faith on the part of England to 
encourage a spirit of resistance or disobedience in the 
inhabitants of the Province against their Mexican rulers. 
It is therefore entirely out of the question that Her Majesty's 
Government should give any countenance to the notion which 
seems to have been agitated of Great Britain being invited 
to take California under her protection. 

21 F. O. Mexico, 179. 



248 ENGLISH INTEREST IN THE 

Her Majesty's Government do not pretend to determine as 
to the propriety of any step which may be taken by the 
inhabitants of California towards establishing their inde- 
pendence. In such matters no foreign nation has any right 
to interfere, except it be bound to such interference by Treaty 
with the Mother country; which is not the case with Great 
Britain. It is, however, of importance to Great Britain, 
while declining to interfere herself, that California, if it 
should throw off the Mexican yoke, should not assume any 
other which might prove inimical to British interests. It 
will therefore be highly desirable that at the same time that 
it is intimated to the persons of authority in California that 
the relations which exist between Great Britain and Mexico 
prevent us from taking part in any proceedings of the Cali- 
fornians which may have for their object the separation of 
that province from Mexico, those persons should be clearly 
made to understand that Great Britain would view with much 
dissatisfaction the establishment of a protectoral power over 
California by any other foreign state. 

I do not think it necessary to enter into any speculative dis- 
cussion or opinions as to the possible future course of events 
with respect to California, but confine my observations and 
instructions to the aspect of affairs, and occurrences of the 
present moment. 

Upon the same day Aberdeen wrote to Elliot in 
Texas notifying him of the failure of his plan for a 
diplomatic intervention, 22 to Bankhead to the same 
effect and upbraiding Mexico for her acts, 23 to Ad- 
miral Seymour on the Pacific Coast, 24 instructing him 
to become more active in counteracting French de- 
signs upon the Pacific Islands; and again, a second 
letter to Bankhead in comment upon the letter just 
addressed to Barron, of which he enclosed a copy. 
This second letter to Bankhead stated even more 

22 F. O. Texas, 9, no. 13. 

23 F. O. Mexico, 172, no. 53. 

24 Admiralty Secretary, In-Letters, no. 5544, Addington to 
Barron, December 31, 1844. 



ANNEXATION OF CALIFORNIA. 249 

clearly than the note to Barron the attitude now as- 
sumed toward Mexico and in regard to the situation 
in California. In it Aberdeen summarized the weak- 
ness of the Mexican government, and acknowledged 
that the separation of California from Mexico was 
probably inevitable. 25 He then proceeded : — 

It is however for the Mexican Government alone to take 
measures for providing against such a contingency; nor have 
we any ground for interposing to preserve California to 
Mexico, or to prevent that Province from asserting its Inde- 
pendence. We have, undoubtedly, no right to excite or 
encourage the Inhabitants of California to separate them- 
selves from Mexico; but if the Mexican Government chooses 
to be wilfully blind we should in vain attempt to enlighten 
them. 

But it may be a matter of serious importance to Great 
Britain that California, if it shake off the rule of Mexico, 
should not place itself under the protection of any other 
Power whose supremacy might prove injurious to British 
Interests. 

Although, therefore, national integrity forbids us to give 
encouragement to the spirit of insurrection against Mexico 
which has evidently struck such deep root in the minds of 
the Californians, and still less to countenance the suggestion 
submitted by some of the principal Residents to Mr. Forbes 
with respect to the contingent Protection of their Province 
by Great Britain, it is not any part of our duty to supply 
the want of energy exhibited by their Natural Rulers, or to 
dissuade their subjects from taking any course, which, under 
a sense of misgovernment, they may think proper. 

You will therefore abstain from touching on this subject 
with the Mexican Govt, and if any observations respecting it 
should originate with the Heads of the Govt, or the Secretary 
of State, you will use great caution and treat the matter with 
as much reserve as courtesy will permit. 

But on the other hand you will keep your attention vigilantly 
alive to every credible report which may reach you of occur- 
rences in California, especially with respect to the proceedings 
of the United States Citizens settled in that Province, whose 

25 F. O. Mexico, 172, no. 53. 



25O ENGLISH INTEREST IN THE 

numbers are daily increasing, and who are likely to play a 
prominent part in any proceeding which may take place there, 
having for its object to free the Province from the yoke of 
Mexico. 

These numerous letters, all bearing the same date, 
indicate' the importance of the shift in British policy, 
and that this was, so far as Mexico, California, and 
Texas are concerned, a new policy from this moment. 
That it did not prove in the end to be a permanent 
policy was due to a rapid submission upon the part 
of Mexico and a resumption of former friendly rela- 
tions with that state. Aberdeen as a man of honor, 
and as guardian of the honor of the British govern- 
ment, was opposed to authorizing any British agent 
to perform an act that might tend to stir up a revolu- 
tionary movement in California. He was not, how- 
ever, unwilling to accept the fruits of that revolution 
if they should fortunately fall into British hands, and 
he was even willing to refrain from notifying the 
Mexican government that revolution in California was 
imminent. Such a passive policy was wholly inade- 
quate to the situation. This was understood perfectly 
by British agents and by those close to affairs on the 
Pacific. While awaiting the reply from Aberdeen, 
neither Forbes nor Barron ventured to take any de- 
cided step to secure British interests, though both be- 
came more and more fearful of the speedy acquisition 
of California by the United States. In spite of the 
expulsion of Micheltoreno by Castro and of the in- 
coming of numerous American immigrants, both men 
still thought a British protectorate could easily be se- 
cured if Great Britain would but express her will- 



ANNEXATION OF CALIFORNIA. 25 I 

ingness to assume such a protectorate. 26 But with 
the receipt of Aberdeen's instruction, May 26, their 
hopes of a British protectorate in the near future had 
to be abandoned. They were genuinely discouraged, 
but, hoping still to thwart American designs, they 
transferred their support to the Mexican government, 
believing that Mexican control would be more favor- 
able to British interests than an independent govern- 
ment in California. 27 

The British agents in California therefore remained 
inactive, even largely ceasing to report conditions 
there, and it was not until Fremont arrived in the win- 
ter of 1845-1846, nearly a year later, that Forbes 
was stirred to further action. The presence of Fre- 
mont was to him sufficient evidence that something was 
about to be undertaken by the United States to secure 
California. On January 28, 1846, therefore, he ad- 
dressed to Oliveria a protest against Fremont's pres- 
ence " with Soldiers " in California, stating that 28 

in obedience to the commands of Her Majesty's Govern- 
ment, it is the duty of the Undersigned to state clearly and 
distinctly to this Departmental Government that while Great 
Britain does not pretend to interfere in the political affairs 
of California, she would view with much dissatisfaction, the 
establishment of a protectorate power over this country, by 
any other foreign nation. 

29 F. O. Mexico, 185, Barron to Bankhead, April 8, 1845; 
ibid., 189, no. 3, Barron to Aberdeen, February 18, 1845, en- 
closing a letter he had written to Admiral Seymour, January 
28, 1845 ; and no. 5, Barron to Aberdeen, April 19, 1845, en- 
closing two letters received from Forbes, dated January 27 
and March 10, 1845. 

27 Ibid., 189, Forbes to Barron, October 24, 1845. 

23 Ibid., 196, Forbes to Barron, January 30, 1846 (in Bank- 
head's no. 42). 



252 ENGLISH INTEREST IN THE 

In assuming this authority to protest, Forbes clearly- 
exceeded any authority given him from London, but 
he seems to have had no doubt as to the wisdom of 
his act or as to the approval of the home government. 
In the meantime events were moving rapidly upon the 
Pacific Coast, and before the reply of the foreign office 
could reach Forbes, Sloat had seized Monterey. Of 
this the foreign office was, of course, ignorant. A 
copy of this protest reached London in May, and 
Forbes was immediately disavowed by Aberdeen. On 
June 1 Aberdeen instructed Bankhead that while Her 
Majesty's government would no doubt view with dis- 
satisfaction the presence of Fremont in California, 23 

. . . they do not in any way approve of a British Vice Consul 
taking upon himself, without instructions from his Superiors, 
to address the Authorities of the Province in which he is 
residing a formal diplomatick note like that under considera- 
tion. I have accordingly to desire that you will signify to 
Mr. Forbes that Her Majesty's Government do not approve 
of his late proceeding, and wish that he should in future be 
more cautious in his conduct. 

The reproof thus administered to Forbes came too 
late to have any effect upon his acts in California 
during the summer of 1846. It is, however, clearly 
evident that Great Britain had no specific design or 
plan with regard to California when her foreign 
minister could promptly disavow so trifling an evidence 
of British activity as was Forbes's protest. 

While British official agents in Upper and Lower 
California were thus definitely prohibited from direct 
interference in the movements in the province, other 
and less authoritative suggestions were being made 
to the government of Great Britain looking toward 

28 F. O. Mexico, 194, no. 16. 



ANNEXATION OF CALIFORNIA. 253 

its acquisition. Late in 1844 McNamara, an Irish 
priest, appeared at the city of Mexico and laid before 
Bankhead a scheme for the colonization of California 
by Irish emigrants. 30 Bankhead expressed a mild in- 
terest in the plan and reported it to Aberdeen. No 
comment whatever, nor even an acknowledgment of 
its receipt, was made by that official. A more definite 
proposal, drawn up in specific detail and following 
in its main outlines the plan earlier proposed by Pak- 
enham, was submitted to Bankhead in July, 1845, by 
Mackintosh, a British consul in Mexico. 31 Business 
partners of Mackintosh in London were also involved 
in this plan, but here again no attention was given at 
the foreign office, and no reply was made either to 
Bankhead or to the promoters. Besides the proposals 
of Mackintosh and McNamara there were many other 
suggestions from would-be statesmen or patriotic 
dreamers. Nevertheless, it is true that the proposal 
of Pakenham and the report of Forbes are the only 
two communications that were carefully considered 
or were officially met by the British government. 

In spite, however, of the prohibition placed on 
British agents in California and of the lack of inter- 
est in private schemes of colonization, it is still con- 
ceivable that secret instructions were sent to British 
admirals of the purport of which British agents of 
merely consular rank would have no knowledge. In- 

80 F. O. Mexico, 185, no. 52, Bankhead to Aberdeen, May 30, 
1845. Bankhead did not report McNamara's scheme until 
some six months after it was broached. 

31 F. O. Mexico, 186, no. 74, Bankhead to Aberdeen, July 30, 
1845. This plan is worked out in more careful detail than 
any other project submitted to the British government looking 
toward the acquisition of California. 

17 



2 54 ENGLISH INTEREST IN THE 

structions to admirals of the Pacific fleet have there- 
fore been a subject of curiosity and suspicion to Amer- 
icans. From the bare movements of the British ships 
on the coast they have tried to argue British govern- 
mental intention to acquire California. An exami- 
nation of the letters to and from British admirals 
stationed on or near the Pacific Coast wholly negatives 
this suspicion and serves merely to emphasize the Brit- 
ish government's lack of interest in California. Dur- 
ing 1841-1842 Admiral Thomas, with headquarters at 
Valparaiso, wrote almost exclusively of the activities 
of the French in Tahiti, 32 and the entire absence of 
any mention of California in his correspondence proves 
conclusively how absurd was Commander Jones's con- 
tention that one reason for the seizure of Monterey 
was a fear of British naval action. In 1843 this in- 
terest in the policy of France was greatly augmented. 
The French had seized the Friendly Islands, and Cap- 
tain Paulet, of the British navy, took possession of the 
Sandwich Islands, where, however, native authority 
was very quickly restored under instructions from the 
British government. 33 In 1844 Admiral Seymour, now 
in command of the Pacific squadron, was still pri- 
marily interested in the question of the control of the 
Pacific Islands. Gradually, however, as a result of 
somewhat urgent letters from Barron at Tepic, he 
began to manifest an interest in California. Still, 
Seymour had to obey orders, and his orders were to 

82 Admiralty Secretary, In-Letters, no. 5512, Thomas to 
Admiralty Secretary, December 28, 1841. Also in same 
volume, Thomas to Herbert, April 23, 1842. No. 5538, Cap- 
tain Nicholas to Thomas, November 10, 1843. 

33 Ibid., Out-Letters, no. 1696, Secret, Addington to Barron, 
July ii, 1843. 



ANNEXATION OF CALIFORNIA. 255 

watch the French. This, in fact, was the substance 
of the instruction received by him from Aberdeen, 
bearing date of December 31, 1844, an instruction of 
the same date as the many instructions sent to other 
officials in Mexico and on the Pacific Coast. 34 Per- 
sonally, Seymour never received any instruction direct- 
ing him as to the policy he should pursue in regard 
to California, and for nearly a year he did not even 
know the contents of Aberdeen's instruction to Barron 
of December 31, 1844. When finally he did receive a 
copy of that instruction, late in 1845, ne perceived, as 
had Barron and Forbes, the merely passive policy 
enjoined upon British agents. Earlier in 1845 ne had 
been directed to proceed to the Friendly Islands, 35 and 
after some hesitation, because of his own feeling that 
the greater interest was in Oregon and California, he 
had gone to those islands by way of Honolulu. 36 It 
was not until December, 1845, tnat he again reached 
Valparaiso. Once arrived, he eagerly awaited new in- 

34 Admiralty Secretary, In-Letters, no. 5544, Addington to 
Barron (enclosing instructions to Seymour). 

35 Ibid., no. 5554, Addington to Corry, March 5, 1845 ; Ad- 
miralty to Addington, March 6, 1845 ; Addington to Hamilton, 
March 8, 1845. Also, Out-Letters, no. 1646, Hamilton to Sey- 
mour, June 1, 1845, urging immediate departure for Tahiti 
to watch the French. 

36 Admiralty "Digest and Precis," 1845, no. 153 Y, letter 
from Seymour, July 3, stating that he cannot leave for Tahiti 
because of Oregon troubles, and letter of July 15, changing 
his decision and announcing his departure; Admiralty Secre- 
tary, In-Letters, no. 5561, Seymour to Corry, October 4, 1845. 
The " Digest and Precis " contains for each year abstracts of 
all Admiralty Correspondence with British naval officers. 
Because of the destruction of the greater portion of the 
letters themselves for this period the " Digest and Precis " 
furnishes almost the only available material for study. 



256 ENGLISH INTEREST IN THE 

structions as to Oregon and California, and at last, on 
March 6, 1846, addressed a letter to the Admiralty 
urging an increase of his forces in the Pacific. 37 This 
request was based on the belief that war with the 
United States was probable, and he specified the in- 
terests to be guarded in this order: first, to defend 
Oregon ; second, " to observe the proceedings of the 
United States relative to California;" third, to protect 
British commerce on the coast of South America; 
fourth, to attack the commerce of the United States. 
The greatest stress was laid on the defense of Ore- 
gon, and detailed plans were given of probable opera- 
tions on that coast. Seymour's request was couched 
in very vigorous language, and made evident his con- 
stantly increasing anxiety with regard to a recent in- 
crease of the United States naval force in the Pacific 
and the uncertainty as to what that might indicate. 
This anxiety was further shown by a letter from Sey- 
mour to the Admiralty, on April 7, written from San 
Bias, in which Seymour confessed that he had no 
knowledge of the whereabouts or intentions of Com- 
modore Sloat, but suspected him of some movement 
toward Oregon. 38 No reply was received by Seymour 
to any of these letters or requests previous to the 
actual seizure of Monterey by Sloat. 

Shortly after this, early in May, Seymour sent 
Captain Blake with the " Juno " to California. Blake's 
action upon the Calif ornian coast is well known and 
needs no comment here. He took Forbes on board his 

"Admiralty Secretary, Out-Letters, no. 1696, Corry to G. 
Smythe, June 10, 1846, transmitting to foreign office Sey- 
mour's letter of March 6. 

88 Admiralty Secretary, In-Letters, no. 5561. 



ANNEXATION OF CALIFORNIA. 257 

ship and sailed to southern California, where inter- 
views were held with Pico, but both Blake and Forbes 
reported that in accordance with the instructions of 
Aberdeen they had limited themselves strictly to ad- 
vising Pico that he should not permit California to 
accept a protectorate from any foreign state. 39 Mean- 
while, Seymour, who was becoming daily more anxious 
for instructions, wrote on June 13 to Bankhead, the 
British minister at Mexico, that he had received in- 
formation that the people of California were about to 
hold a convention at Santa Barbara to separate from 
Mexico and to seek protection from some other 
power. 40 This movement, Seymour was informed, had 
originated in northern California, where partizans of 
the United States were strong. He stated: — 

I have little doubt that I shall find the object of that power 
will be obtained, either by voluntary subjection on the part 
of the Inhabitants, or by the United States having taken 
possession of the Principal Port, in consequence of the recent 
hostilities with Mexico. Having however detached the 
" Juno " last month with instructions to Capt. Blake, if the 
Inhabitants of California declared their independence of 
Mexico, to endeavor to induce their leaders not to place 
themselves under the control or subjection of any Foreign 
Power, I think it my duty to call at Monterey to ascertain 
if the Inhabitants should have come to any resolution, which 
will facilitate the maintenance of their independence. My 
expectation is entirely to the contrary; but if the connection 
with Mexico, which appears to have been one of the principal 

39 Ibid., no. 5562, Blake to Admiralty, August 3, 1846, enclos- 
ing two letters written by him to Seymour on July 5 and July 
17; F. O. Mexico, 198, Bankhead's no. 112, enclosing two 
letters from James Forbes to Alexander Forbes, July 9 and 
14, 1846. The first letter was written just after the trip of 
Forbes and Blake to see Pico ; the second, when Forbes heard 
of Sloat's action. Alexander Forbes was acting as consul at 
Tepic during Barron's absence. 

40 F. O. Mexico, 197, in Bankhead's no. 91. 



258 ENGLISH INTEREST IN THE 

causes of the non-interference of Her Majesty's Govern- 
ment shall have been removed, it seems desirable to ascer- 
tain the state of affairs, before it is acknowledged to be 
irremediable. 

On the same day Seymour wrote to the Admiralty in 
much the same terms : — 41 

I have not, after the reports made by Captain Gordon and 
others to me, of the state of affairs on that coast, judged it 
advisable to proceed there, under the views expressed by the 
Earl of Aberdeen to Her Majesty's Minister in Mexico, 
deprecating interference, while California formed a part of 
the Mexican Republic; I however (as I have already reported) 
sent the Juno to Monterey and San Francisco on the nth of 
May, with instructions to ascertain the Security of British 
Subjects, and observe what was passing. 

I also directed Captain Blake, in the event of California 
declaring or having declared its Independence of Mexico, 
to use any influence he could obtain to counteract any inclina- 
tion on the part of those in Authority to place themselves 
under the Exclusive Control or Protection of any Foreign 
Powers, without the participation of Great Britain ; and gave 
him copies of Lord Aberdeen's Letters, (which I had procured 
since my arrival on this Coast) of the 31st of December, 
1844, to Mr. Bankhead and the Consul at Tepic, of the same 
date, for his information. 

This contingency having occurred while I remain on the 
Coast, I deem it right, although I can form no very favorable 
anticipations of a satisfactory result, to proceed to Monterey, 
and ascertain the actual state of affairs ; and it is my intention 
to sail from San Bias, for that purpose, this evening. 

It is noteworthy that Seymour's indicated reason for 
the trip to Monterey is quite different from the one 
given after his arrival and the discovery of Commo- 
dore Sloat in possession. By the wording of Sey- 
mour's letter to the admiralty it is, however, positively 
certain that no instruction whatever had been received 

41 Admiralty Secretary, In-Letters, no. 5561, Seymour to 
Corry. 



ANNEXATION OF CALIFORNIA. 259 

by him or by the consular office at Tepic subsequent to 
Aberdeen's instruction of December 31, 1844, and it 
is therefore clear that Seymour was greatly hampered 
by the lack of more positive and recent instructions 
from London. Following the tenor of Aberdeen's de- 
spatch of December 31, 1844, he was certainly limited 
to urging upon the people of California the mainte- 
nance of their independence, and there can be no doubt 
that he confined himself to this in the instructions 
which he gave to Blake. Blake's actions did not go 
beyond this in any respect. Seymour left on June 14 
for Monterey, where, upon finding Sloat in authority, 
he gave out a statement to the effect that he had merely 
called at the Port of Monterey on his way to the Sand- 
wich Islands. His report to Bankhead on July 22 is 
very brief and contains no comment or reflection on the 
United States. 42 In the light of Seymour's expres- 
sions earlier in the spring of 1846 and of his request 
for an addition to his force on the Pacific there can be 
no doubt that he personally hoped to see some step 
taken toward the acquisition of California. In this 
he was of much the same mind as other British agents. 
His letters reveal that he was more anxious for such 
an opportunity than he was afterwards willing to 
confess. Nevertheless, neither he nor any other Brit- 
ish agent felt free to undertake active operations to 
secure California to Great Britain, and all that can be 
said is that they were hoping for some fortunate chance 
that might permit them to forestall American plans 
while yet they maintained the purely passive attitude 
directed by Aberdeen. 

42 F. O. Mexico, 198. 



26o ENGLISH INTEREST IN THE 

The fact that the government of Great Britain had 
very slight interest in California at this moment is seen 
in the answer given to Seymour's request for an in- 
crease of his force upon the Pacific. The official reply 
was prepared and forwarded at a time nearly identical 
with the seizure by the United States, but in complete 
ignorance of that fact. The admiralty transmitted 
the request to the foreign office, accompanying it with 
a statement that in case Aberdeen really wished to have 
a larger force in the Pacific the ships necessary for 
such increase would have to be taken from the home 
force, and in that event the naval force at home would 
be reduced below the power of the French. 43 On this 
ground the admiralty objected to the granting of 
Seymour's request, unless the government was willing 
to find the money for an increase of the home force. 
In this connection the admiralty brought out the ne- 
cessity of occupying at least two points on the Pacific, 
"one selected with reference to the French at Tahiti; 
the other with reference to the position the Americans 
are taking up on the N. W. Coast of No. America." 
This letter clearly proves that so far no instructions 
had been sent out by the admiralty for the occupation 
of Pacific ports, and if not sent by this time it is also 
evident that they would not be sent at all. The foreign 
office reply to the admiralty shows that Aberdeen had 
no fear of war, and hence was not in sympathy with 
the demand for an increase of force upon the Pacific. 44 
On June 19 Addington wrote : — 

48 Admiralty Secretary, Out-Letters, no. 1696, Corry to G. 
Smyth e, June 10, 1846. 

44 Ibid., In-Letters, no. 5568, Addington to Corry, June 19, 
1846. 



ANNEXATION OF CALIFORNIA. 



26l 



The proposition of Sir George Seymour for an increase 
of force appears to Lord Aberdeen to be entirely founded 
upon the supposed probability of War with the United States, 
or with France, or with both Countries. Lord Aberdeen 
does not pretend to judge what amount of force may be 
requisite in the Pacifick for the general interests of the ser- 
vice: but if any material change should now be adopted, it 
ought, in his Lordship's opinion, to be the result of views 
of the policy which may be at present entertained by Her 
Majesty's Government upon this subject. Lord Aberdeen 
considers that whatever reasons may exist for rendering an 
addition of force necessary, the chance of war ought not 
to be taken as one, for of that he sees no probability. 

This brief quotation from the foreign office reply to 
the admiralty contains the substance of the entire let- 
ter. Its tone indeed indicates surprise that the ad- 
miralty should ask for any large increase of force in 
the Pacific. 

But one further incident concerned with English 
action in California requires mention. Although after 
1842 there were repeated rumors that Mexico had di- 
rectly offered to sell or transfer California to Great 
Britain, the evidence already presented in this article 
furnishes sufficient proof of the falsity of those ru- 
mors up to 1846. More direct testimony is, however, 
furnished when at last the offer was actually made. In 
the first months of 1846 little attention was paid at 
Mexico to what was taking place in California, 45 but 
when war with the United States apparently became 

45 Bankhead's interest was at this time greatly aroused by 
proposals, or suggestions, unofficially made by Mexicans of 
prominence that a solution of Mexican difficulties might be 
found in an overthrow of the republic and the establishment 
of a monarchy under a European prince. Bankhead was 
much attracted to the idea, and Aberdeen expressed friendly 
interest. The suggestion was not new, for similar plans had 
been in the air even as early as 1837, and had even specified 
an Austrian prince. 



262 ENGLISH INTEREST IN THE 

unavoidable anxiety rapidly developed as to the fate of 
California, and a plan was brought forward to place 
that province in the hands of Great Britain. After 
some preliminary interviews, Paredes, the Mexican 
president, officially proposed to transfer California to 
England as security for a loan. 46 This offer was made 
in May, 1846, and in reporting it to Aberdeen, Bank- 
head stated, " It is an indirect offer of sale, and it is 
the first time that any such offer has ever been hinted at 
from a responsible authority."' 4T This testimony is 
important in view of the persistent rumors of earlier 
offers. Bankhead was careful not to express any 
opinion to Paredes of the probable action of the British 
government, and in transmitting the question to Aber- 
deen indicated doubt as to its importance. He did 
transmit it, however, and at the same time Paredes in- 
structed the Mexican minister in London to press the 
affair officially. It is perhaps conceivable that such 
an offer, if made two years earlier, might have re- 
ceived some consideration by Aberdeen, but the time 
had gone when any such scheme was feasible, even if 
Great Britain had been favorable to it. Bankhead's 
despatch of May 30 containing the offer reached Lon- 
don shortly after a governmental political change, and 
it fell to Palmerston, who was again at the foreign 
office, to answer it. This letter, dated August 15, 
shows the new ministry adopting without material 
change the policy of the preceding government toward 
Mexico and the Californian question. 48 Palmerston 
wrote : — 

46 F. O. Mexico, 197, no. 73, Bankhead to Aberdeen, May 30, 
1846. 

47 Ibid. 

48 F. O. Mexico, 194, no. 4. 



ANNEXATION OF CALIFORNIA. 263 

If the Mexican President should revert to the above propo- 
sition you will state to His Excellency that Her M's. Govt, 
would not at present feel disposed to enter into any Treaty 
for the acquisition of California: and the more so, because 
it seems, according to recent accounts, that the Mexican Govt, 
may by this time have lost its authority and command over 
that Province, and would therefore be unable to carry into 
effect its share of any arrangement which might be come to 
regarding it. 

The incident had in truth no direct bearing upon the 
question of British plans in regard to California, for 
the offer did not come until long after British policy 
was definitely determined. The importance of the 
facts just cited lies rather in the proof furnished that 
but one offer of sale was ever made by. Mexico, and 
that not until May, 1846. 

The preceding account drawn from the available 
English documents in the Record Office is intended as 
a presentation of the most essential part of the evi- 
dence bearing upon the interests and intentions of 
Great Britain toward California. In estimating the ex- 
tent of that interest and intention, it must always be 
borne in mind that at this time Great Britain had ex- 
actly as much right to acquire the province of Cali- 
fornia as had the United States or any other power. 
The possessor of the territory was Mexico, and Mex- 
ico alone had legal right to the country. When Amer- 
icans made up their minds to occupy this province and 
took steps to secure it, they had no more claim to it 
than had British citizens. This fact is sometimes lost 
sight of, or is misunderstood by American writers. 
With them, the existence of any plan in the mind of a 
British agent upon the coast was in itself an offense 
against so-called rightful American claims. The idea 



I 



264 ENGLISH INTEREST IN THE 

is, of course, absurd. The plan of Forbes to acquire 
California is in itself no more blameworthy than the 
plan of the American consul, Larkin. In other words, 
precisely the same justification could be found for an 
English plan as for an American. It was equally 
right or equally wrong for either nation. In fact 
no such plan on the part of the British government 
ever existed. Restating again, briefly, the general 
results of this investigation, it is shown first, that 
there was a genuine and lively interest among British 
agents in securing California for England, if possible; 
second, that these agents acted wholly without instruc- 
tions to this purport from their government, and were 
ultimately either checked or reproved for such slight 
openings as they effected. 

Great Britain's lack of interest in California was 
probably due to a variety of reasons, among which 
may be specified a general indifference to colonial ex- 
pansion under any circumstances ; lack of positive in- 
formation about California; the trying relations with 
Mexico; and lastly and most important of all, the pe- 
culiarities of the Texas question, for here, in reality, 
lay the key to the whole situation. The only variation 
in her attitude of consistent passivity toward Cali- 
fornia appears in Aberdeen's instruction of December 
31, 1844. That instruction was the result of a mo- 
mentary irritation with Mexico, had no lasting influ- 
ence, and after all was of a nature to discourage British 
agents. The theory of an active British governmental 
design upon California is then wholly without foun- 
dation. 



INDEX. 



Aberdeen, Fourth Earl of, and 
British interests in Texas, 67, 
69, 71-78, 79-80, 84-96, 100- 
104, 118-120, 130-131, 137- 
147, 156-160, 162-175, 180- 
182, 185-187, 190-195, 198- 
200, 203-207, 219-221, 224- 
225 ; and British interests in 
California, 239, 244-251. 

Andrews, S. P., 137- 

Annexation of Texas to U. S., 
see Texas. 

Ashburton, Baron, 94-96, 241 
(note). 

Bankhead (British minister to 
Mexico), 154, 166-167, 176- 
177, 184-185, 187-190, 202, 
212-213, 221, 222 > 261 (note), 
262. 

Barron (British vice-consul), 236, 
241-242, 250-251. 

Blockade of Mexican coast by 
Texas, 81-83. 

Bocanegra, J. M. de, 104-105. 

Boundary between Texas and 
Mexico, 27, 28, 33, 37, 42, 
47-48, 168, 169, 171, 188, 207, 
208. 

Buckingham, James 3., 120-122. 

Burnet, David G., 42-43. 

Calhoun, John C, 161-167, 182- 
183. 

Calhoun-Pakenham correspond- 

ence, 156-167. 

California, English interest in the 
annexation of, 234-264. 

Canedo, J. de D., 32, 44, 48, 49. 

Cass, Lewis, 25. 

Cuevas (Mexican minister of for- 
eign affairs), 201, 202, 221- 
222. 



Donelson, A. J., 197, 215, 216-217. 

Doyle, Percy, British charge in 
Mexico, 123-124, 134-135, 148, 
153-154- 

" Eliza Russell," case of the, 34. 

Elliot, Captain Charles, British 
charge in Texas, 75 (and 
note), 106-116, 119, 124, 127- 
129, 131-136, 139 (note), 148- 
152, 155, 161, 165, 195-196, 
207-218, 223. 

Everett, Edward, 143-144. 

Forbes, James, 237, 240-243, 250- 
252. 

France, interests of, in Mexico, 
20-22; recognizes Texas, 20; 
share in iripartite interven- 
tion, 1 1 7-1 19; share in at- 
tempt to prevent American 
annexation of Texas, 158-160, 
168-172, 174-175; withdrawal 
from plan, 181-183, 190-191; 
agrees to offer joint media- 
tion, 204. 

Gorostiza, M. E. de, 28, 44. 

Goulburn, Henry, 71-72. 

Great Britain, refuses recognition 
of Texas, 15-20, 23-25, 33-35. 
63-72; relations with Mexico, 
15-17, 20-22, 25-33, 61-63, 
98-106; attempt to make peace 
between Mexico and Texas, 
26-33, 63-66, 117-119, 138- 
139, 148-150; interest in sup- 
pression of slave-trade, 54-56, 
59-60, 67-68; refusal to guar- 
antee Texan-Mexican boun- 
dary, 42-43; treaties of peace 
between Texas and, 50, 52- 
56, 58-60, 63-65, 67-76, 85-86, 
87-88, 97-117; Kennedy's mis- 



265 



266 



INDEX. 



sion, 72-78; Aberdeen's policy 
toward Mexico and Texas, 79- 
96; share in tripartite inter- 
vention, 1 1 7-1 22; the Robin- 
son armistice, 128-137; desire 
that Mexico abolish slavery 
in Texas, 138-139; aboli- 
tion plans for Texas, 139- 
150; Calhoun-Pakenham cor- 
respondence, 156-167; Aber- 
deen's plan to prevent Amer- 
ican annexation of Texas, 
167-175; withdrawal from 
plan, 180-183, 185-187, 190- 
191; desire that Mexico offer 
and Texas accept recognition, 
191-194, 198-199; proposal of 
joint mediation with France, 
204-207, 208-218; acceptance 
of American annexation of 
Texas, 223, 224; refusal of 
aid to Mexico, 224-225; in- 
terest in annexation of Cali- 
fornia, 236-264. 

Green, Duff, 140, 142. 

" Guadeloupe," the, 83-93. 

Gurley, R. R., 56 (and note). 

Hamilton, James, and American 
annexation of Texas, 31, 36- 
38, 39-40, 50, 52-S4. 67-70, 
76-77, 80, 89. 

Henderson, J. Pinckney, 19, 20, 

25- 

Houston, Samuel, president of 

Texas, 81-83, 108, 110-114, 

124-126, 131-133, 135, JSi. 

195- 
Hoy, Barlow, 16-17. 
Jones, Anson, 118, 195-196, 201 

(and note). 
Kennedy, William, 72-78, 85, 117, 

180 (note). 
" Little Penn," case of the, 34-35- 
Lizardi and Company, 26, 34, 51, 

83-91. 
Martin, Capt. H., 99-100. 
Mexico, British relations with, 

15-17, 20-22, 25-33, 61-63; 

French interest in, 20-22; 



urged by England to recog- 
nize Texas, 26-33, 63-66, 117- 
119, 138-139. 148-150, 167- 
175, 187-190, 192-194, 198, 
202, 205, 210-218; Hamilton's 
peace negotiations, 36-41, 50- 
60; Treat's peace negotiations, 
41-50; Aberdeen's policy to- 
ward, 79-81, 83-87, 88-93; 
British support of, 98-106; 
the Robinson armistice, 128- 
137; Bankhead in Mexico, 
166-167; plan to reconquer 
Texas, 184-185; Bankhead's 
diplomacy, 187-190; refused 
aid by England, 224-225; 
relations with California, 237- 
239, 242-243, 247-251, 261- 
263. 

" Montezuma," the, 83-92. 

Murphy (representative of Mexico 
in England), 50 (and note), 
83-90, 150-151, 167-168. 

Pakenham, Sir Richard, minister 
to Mexico, 23 (and note), 24- 
25, 26, 27-29, 32-33, 38-50, 
61-66, 80-93, 97-99, 104-106, 
123, 129-130, 177-180, 237- 
240. 

Palmerston, Lord, 16, 17, 19, 25, 
29-31. 35, 39, 42. 52-56, 58- 
60, 67. 

Pareu.es y Arrillaga, M., 262. 

Reeves, J. S., 14, 113, 133 (and 
note), 195-196. 

Robinson, J. W., 128 (and note). 

Robinson armistice, 128-137. 

Santa Anna, Antonio Lopez de, 
65 (and note), 80, 105, 128- 
129, 184-185. 

Santa Fe expedition, 81. 

Seymour, Sir George, 254-259. 

Simpson, Sir George, 241 (and 
note). 

Slavery in Texas, 16, 17, 29, 31, 
56-57, 70, 74. 111-114, 121- 
122, 132, 137-150, 157, 162- 
164, 173- 

Slave-trade, British interest in 



HAY 19 1950 



INDEX. 



267 



suppression of, 54-56, 59-60, 
67-68. 
Smith, Ashbel, and Texas, 85-92, 

118, 119, 140-142, 170, 207. 
" Tappan " committee, 138-139. 
Texas, refused recognition by 

Great Britain, 15-20, 23-25, 
33-35, 63-72; recognized by 
U. S., 18; by France, 20; 
slavery in, 16, 17, 29, 31, 56- 
57. 7°, 74, m-114, 121-122, 
132, 137-150, 157, 162-164, 
173; Great Britain's attempt 
to make peace between Mex- 
ico and, 26-33, 63-66, 117- 

119, 138-139, 148-150; Ham- 
ilton's peace negotiations, 36- 
41, 50-60; Treat's peace nego- 
tiations, 41-50; treaties of 
peace between Great Britain 
and, 50, 52-56, 58-60, 63-65, 
67-76, 85-86, 87-88, 97-117; 
Kennedy's mission, 72-78; 
Aberdeen's policy toward, 79- 
83; Elliot in, 106-116, 119, 
124-137; the Robinson armis- 
tice, 128-137; Calhoun-Paken- 
ham correspondence, 156-167; 
Aberdeen's plan to prevent 
American annexation of, 167- 
175; Anson Jones and the 
" Diplomatick Act," 195-196; 
urged to accept Mexican 
recognition, 198-199; proposed 
offer of joint mediation by 



France and England, 205- 
207; Elliot fails to prevent 
annexation, 208-218; annexa- 
tion completed, 222. 

Treat, James, 41, 43-50. 

Treaties of peace, between Mexico 
and Texas, 31, 38, 39-41, 43- 
49; between Great Britain 
and Texas, 50, 52-56, 58-60, 
63-65, 67-76, 85-86, 87-88, 97- 
117; between Great Britain 
and United States (Ashbur- 
ton), 94-96. 

Tyler, John, 197, 202, 203. 

United States, recognition of 
Texas, 18; share in tripartite 
intervention, 117-122; attitude 
toward alleged British inter- 
ference in slavery in Texas, 
143-144; offers annexation to 
Texas, 150-152; Calhoun- 
Pakenham correspondence, 

156-167; Senate rejects treaty 
with Texas, 177; popular de- 
sire for annexation, 178-180; 
Tyler's determination to com- 
plete annexation, 197, 202, 
203; indignation at Elliot's 
mission to Mexico, 214-218; 
annexation completed, 222; 
annexation of California, 251- 
264. 

Upshur, Abel P., 150. 

Warburton, George, 116 (note). 

Webb, James, 64. 






























\ 












tf 



























^ 






























^ 



























^ 
























o 












«H a. 



'■^ 















^U 


















% 






^e.0* 



























C 



$> 






^ <3* 



^ 









^0 V 









<t 



^ 










^0* 






G ' „ 



^ 



r0 



^d< 















J"% 



r0 "*£> C ^ f c 






^ G 
cP "^ c 0> ' r° 



^ <3* 






<?■> "• 



c- 



-/> 



<? 



& 



~\< 









C- 









<* , 









> 



^d< ^d< 



•v. a" v 



f 



^ 



^ r " 



o 



^ .^ 






p 






V 



*& 



-\V 



Q. 



%»*$ 






b\ v "<>•.< 



*t 



0° - 






V 






-4 G 



r# 



V 



Of 



^ <*> 



'-^ v 



O- 



V 



»J 



S-* ^ 



..' 






w. 

£ Q. 



^ ^> 






o C 






'%■ ^ \^ 



</. 



y ^ 



v v 















LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 




00023^40140 



